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Samenvatting 
Het essay bevat drie analytische hoofdstukken (dat wil zeggen hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4) die de 
problemen van de schuldhoudbaarheid, de financiële crisis en de rol van externe monetaire 
schokken op de stabiliteit van ontwikkelingslanden bespreken. Hier vat ik de sleuteloefeningen, 
bevindingen en bijdragen van deze drie hoofdstukken samen. 
Hoofdstuk 2 heeft zich gebaseerd op het argument dat 'onhoudbare' schuldenlast een negatieve 
rol speelt op de groeivooruitzichten van ontwikkelingslanden. In de literatuur wordt echter niet 
veel aandacht besteed aan de algehele heterogeniteit in ontwikkelingslanden, terwijl de 
benchmarks voor duurzaamheid van schulden worden vastgesteld. Met name de kloof tussen 
ontwikkelingslanden met betrekking tot institutionele kwaliteit wordt vaak over het hoofd gezien. 
Naast de focus op de niet-lineaire effecten van de overheidskuld op groei, levert dit hoofdstuk 
een bijdrage aan door de rol van instellingen te benadrukken (met name die van de kwaliteit 
van de overheidssector). Het hoofdstuk heeft zich vooral geconcentreerd op hoe regeringen met 
uiteenlopende beheerscapaciteit van de overheidssector een uiteenlopende samenhang tussen de 
overheidsschuld en de economische groei kunnen zien. 
Hoewel een lineaire en rechtmatige kijk op de gegevens de hypothesized negatieve relatie tussen 
schuldenlast en economische groei ondersteunt, worden de gegevens niet meer in verband 
gebracht met de kwaliteit van de instellingen. Wat zou worden beschouwd als een duurzaam 
schuldenlast in één land (bijvoorbeeld een land met een efficiënte overheidssector, sterke 
inkomstenmobilisatiecapaciteit en een laag niveau van corruptie) kan niet duurzaam zijn voor 
een ander land (bijvoorbeeld een land met een zwakke institutionele kwaliteit). 
De schuldgroei nexus toont ook een beetje gevoeligheid voor het schuldniveau. Een interessant 
resultaat van de non-linearity oefening (gebaseerd op schuldeniveau) is dat ontwikkelingslanden 
met een beter bestuur van de overheidssector de nadelige gevolgen van de overheidsschuld op 
relatief hogere niveaus ervaren - in vergelijking met andere ontwikkelingslanden met een zwakker 
bestuur van de overheidssector kwaliteit. 
Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt de voorspellende kracht van belangrijke macro-economische variabelen 
tegen incidenten van valuta crisis met behulp van 'signalen' benadering. Door 
valutakrisisafspraken te definiëren als extreme bewegingen in de valutamarktdrukindex, maakt 
de aanpak een niet-parametrische ex-post studie in het gedrag van belangrijke macro-
economische variabelen, in de directe perioden voorafgaand aan geïdentificeerde crisisincidenten. 
De analyse bepaalt drie belangrijke afleveringen van de valutakrisis in Ethiopië (1992-93, 1999 
en 2008). De eerste crisis vertoonde relatief hogere crisis-waarschijnlijkheden buiten de 
steekproef, in vergelijking met de laatste twee crisis. Op basis van de regel van geluid-tot-
signaalverhouding, M2-vermenigvuldiger, bankdeposito's, uitvoer, handelsvoorwaarden, 
afwijking van de echte ER van de trend- en leningsverhouding ratio waren goede indicatoren die 
aanzienlijke 'abnormale' bewegingen voor valuta vertoonden Crisis gebeurtenissen in Ethiopië. 
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Hoofdstuk 4 draagt bij aan het onderzoek naar problemen die verband houden met externe 
financiële schokken. Het bestudeert de spillovers van recentelijk onconventioneel monetair beleid 
van de Fed en ECB. Het analyseert de impact van deze schokken op de rendementen (dynamiek) 
van diverse Zuid-Afrikaanse activa, b.v. Valuta, obligatie rendementen, credit default swap, 
interbancaire marktrente en aandelenmarkt. Aangezien de impact van beleidsaanbevelingen op 
de financiële markten vaak 'direct' is, gebruikt het hoofdstuk dagelijkse data met hoge frequentie. 
De resultaten tonen significant bewijs van spillover-effecten. Bijvoorbeeld, de aankondigingen 
van het grootschalige activa aankoopprogramma (QE) van de Federal Reserve hebben doorgaans 
geleid tot de appreciatie van de Zuid-Afrikaanse valuta, vermindering van de rentes op de 
overheidsschulden (vooral tijdens QE1), credit default swaps, vermindering van de interbancaire 
rente en Winsten door de beurs. De aankondigingen betreffende de afnemende (geleidelijk 
stopzetting) van Fed's activa-aankoopprogramma's tonen in wezen de omgekeerde effecten van 
de activa-aankoopprogramma's. Het leidde tot de afschrijving van de rand, stijging in CDS, 
toename van de interbancaire koers en afname van belangrijke aandelenmarkten. 
Net als het niet-standaard monetair beleid van de Fed, hadden de beleidsinstrumenten gevolgd 
door de ECB ook verspilling op diverse Zuid-Afrikaanse activa. Over het geheel genomen werden 
de aankondigingen van het beleid van de activa-inkopen van de ECB (bijv. 'Securities Markets 
Programme', 'Outright Monetary Transactions', 'Covered Bond Purchases Programs') gevolgd 
door de appreciatie van de rand, dalende opbrengsten van de soevereine obligaties en CDS, en 
Een stijging van aandelenmarkten. Daarnaast heeft het beleid inzake liquiditeitsverzekering 
(bijvoorbeeld 'Fixed Rate Tenders With Full Allotment', 'Long-Term Refinancing Operations', 
'Foreign Currency Funding') en de 'Collateral easing'-programma's (voornamelijk bestaande uit 
'Asset-Backed Securities' ) Had ook kwalitatief dezelfde gevolgen voor de activa-
aankoopprogramma's van de ECB, hoewel de betekenis van de programma's (en hun specifieke 
instrumenten) niet op alle activa was gezien en ook afhankelijk was van de specificatie van de 
gebruikte regressies. 
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Résumé 
La présente thèse comporte trois chapitres analytiques dans les chapitres deux, trois et quatre 
qui traitent des problèmes de soutenabilité de la dette, de crise financière et du rôle des chocs 
monétaires extérieurs dans la stabilité des pays en développement. Je résume ici les principales 
méthodes, résultats et contributions de ces trois chapitres. 
Le chapitre deux est fondé sur l’argument selon lequel le fardeau de la dette dite insoutenable 
joue un rôle négatif sur les perspectives de croissance des pays en développement. Cependant, la 
littérature ne parvient pas à prendre en compte l’hétérogénéité globale dans les pays en 
développement en fixant des critères de soutenabilité de la dette. En particulier, les écarts entre 
les pays en voie de développement pour ce qui concerne la qualité des institutions sont souvent 
occultés. En plus de l’accent mis sur les non-linéarités des impacts de la dette publique sur la 
croissance, ce chapitre contribue à la littérature en mettant en lumière le rôle des institutions 
(en particulier, celles ayant trait à la gestion du secteur public.) Le chapitre s’est particulièrement 
focalisé sur la manière dont les gouvernements dotés d’une capacité de gestion du secteur public 
différente peuvent avoir des interactions diverses entre la dette publique et la croissance 
économique. 
Bien qu’un simple regard sur les données appuie l’hypothèse d’un lien négatif entre l’endettement 
et la croissance économique, une analyse plus approfondie des données révèle des non-linéarités 
liées à la qualité des institutions. Ce qui serait considéré comme un niveau de dette durable dans 
un pays (par exemple, un pays avec un secteur public efficace, une forte capacité de mobilisation 
des revenus et un faible niveau de corruption) peut ne pas être durable pour un autre pays (par 
exemple, un pays ayant une faible qualité institutionnelle). 
L’interaction dette-croissance montre également une certaine sensibilité au niveau de la dette. 
Un résultat intéressant issu de cet exercice basé sur le niveau de dette est que les pays en 
développement avec une meilleure gestion du secteur public tendent à voir les effets néfastes de 
la dette publique à un niveau supérieur de dette, comparé à d’autres pays dont la qualité de la 
gestion du secteur public est moindre. 
Le chapitre trois examine la puissance prédictive des variables macroéconomiques clés 
concernant l’apparition de crises monétaires en utilisant l’approche des signaux. En définissant 
les épisodes de crise monétaire en tant que mouvements extrêmes dans l'indice de pression du 
marché des changes, l'approche fait une étude non paramétrique ex-post sur le comportement 
de variables macroéconomiques clés, dans les périodes immédiates précédant les incidents de 
crise identifiés. 
L'analyse détermine trois épisodes clés de crise monétaire en Éthiopie (1992-1993, 1999 et 
2008). La première crise correspond à des probabilités de crise hors-échantillon bien supérieures 
aux deux autres. Sur base du ratio signal-bruit, le multiplicateur de M2, la quantité de dépôts 
bancaires, la valeur des exportations, les termes de l’échange et la déviation de l’ER réel de sa 
tendance et le ratio prêts-dépôts sont de bons indicateurs qui détectent les mouvements 
anormaux significatifs avant les cas de crises de change en Ethiopie. 
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Le quatrième chapitre supplémente la recherche sur les problèmes liés aux chocs financiers 
externes dans les pays en développement. Ce chapitre étudie les retombées des récentes politiques 
monétaires non-conventionnelles de la Réserve Fédérale et de la BCE. Dans ce chapitre, nous 
analysons l’impact de ces chocs sur les rendements (dynamiques) de divers actifs sud-africains : 
la devise, les rendements obligataires et boursiers, le swap de défaut de crédit, le taux en vigueur 
sur le marché interbancaire. 
Dans la mesure où l’impact des annonces des institutions financières sur les marchés est souvent 
immédiat, le chapitre utilise des données journalières à haute fréquence. 
Les résultats concluent à l’importance des répercussions des décisions de la Réserve Fédérale et 
de la BCE. Par exemple, les annonces du programme d'achat d'actifs à grande échelle (QE) de 
la Réserve fédérale ont généralement conduit à l'appréciation de la monnaie sud-africaine, à la 
réduction des rendements des obligations souveraines (en particulier au cours de la période de 
référence QE1) et des swaps de défaut de crédit, à la diminution du taux interbancaire et à une 
augmentation des gains sur les marchés boursiers. Les annonces successives quant à un 
ralentissement du programme de rachat d’actifs ont essentiellement eu l’effet inverse : 
dépréciation du Rand, augmentation des swaps de défaut de crédit, augmentation du taux 
interbancaire et baisse des principaux indices boursiers. 
Tout comme les politiques non-conventionnelles de la Réserve Fédérale, les instruments de 
politique monétaire activés par la BCE ont également eu des répercussions sur la valeur de divers 
actifs sud-africains. Dans l’ensemble, les annonces par la BCE de ses décisions concernant l’achat 
d’actifs (par exemple, ‘Securities Markets Program’, ‘Outright Monetary Transactions’, ‘Covered 
Bond Purchases Programs’) ont été suivies par une appréciation du Rand, une baisse du 
rendement des obligations souveraines et des CDS et une hausse des indices boursiers. En outre, 
la politique de fourniture de liquidités (par exemple, ‘Fixed Rate Tenders With Full Allotment’, 
‘Long-Term Refinancing Operations’, ‘Foreign Currency Funding’) ainsi que les programmes 
d’assouplissement des garanties de crédit (comprenant principalement les ‘Asset-Backed 
Securities’) ont également eu des impacts quantitativement similaires aux programmes de rachat 
d’actifs de la BCE, bien que la significativité de ceux-ci (et leurs instruments spécifiques) n’ont 
pas été observés pour toutes les classes d’actifs. Cette significativité dépend également de la 
spécification économétrique utilisée. 
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
 
 
Among the biggest challenges faced by developing countries today is the management of 
government finances and various financial shocks emanating from their domestic economy and 
external sources. An increasing number of developing economies are witnessing the integration 
of their domestic financial markets with international capital markets. This has granted them 
access to international capital that has been the driving force of the fast pace of growth across 
many emerging economies in recent decades. Yet, it has also introduced them to equally daunting 
challenges. Developing countries have become particularly vulnerable to capital flow reversals - 
not only when the countries in question show weak macroeconomic fundamentals but also when 
policies in advanced economies change or symmetric shocks affect other emerging economies. In 
such circumstances, monetary policy authorities and central banks in developing countries are 
finding it hard to maintain financial stability and policy independence (Rey, 2015; Aizenman et 
al., 2015, Schaechter et al., 2004; IMF, 2015).  
The gains and adverse impacts of financial globalization are being witnessed both in developing 
countries at an early stage of financial development that follow (managed) floating monetary 
regimes, e.g. Ethiopia,  or those at advanced levels of financial development that follow a mature 
inflation targeting monetary system, e.g. South Africa. The growth in the demand and supply 
of external financial flows - in the era of increased global financial instability and repetitive crisis 
- underscores the need for public debt management by governments across the developing world. 
Maintaining sustainable public debt levels helps them to keep their overall financial stability 
and also makes them less vulnerable to the damage from unforeseen financial shocks - as they 
will have the fiscal space for necessary (e.g. expansionary) monetary policy instruments.  
Given the foregoing motivational issues, this essay tries to answer the following questions. 1) 
How can developing countries balance ‘public spending’ with ‘debt sustainability’ — and does 
the quality of institutions and public sector management play a role? 2) How can developing 
countries ‘foresee’ financial crisis and better prepare themselves to minimize their vulnerability? 
3) What is the nature and extent of developing countries’ vulnerability to external financial 
shocks — particularly to recent monetary policy experiments in advanced countries? However, 
the answer to these questions is rather complex and depends on various domestic and external 
factors. The essay tries to address these issues by presenting its discussions through three 
(analytical) chapters. 
In chapter 2, the problems of sovereign (public) debt, the impact of severe indebtedness on 
economic growth, the issues of debt sustainability, and the institutional settings (specifically 
relating to the public sector) that determine debt sustainability are discussed. The chapter 
“…in the past thirty years financial systems around the world have undergone revolutionary 
change. People can borrow greater amounts at cheaper rates, invest in a multitude of instruments 
catering to every possible profile of risk and return, and share risks with strangers across the 
globe…” Raghuram Rajan (Jackson Hole - Aug 27, 2005) 
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contributes to a topic that has been widely discussed in developed countries in the post crisis 
era — yet, here, we are refocusing the issue to developing countries. In fact, it was only recently 
that the issue of public debt sustainability in high income countries assumed the center stage of 
discussion in mainstream media, international financial institutions and markets. In developing 
countries, by contrast, problems of government debt sustainability have been central and 
represented one of the key areas of advice from global financial institutions such as the IMF and 
World Bank. Indeed, many of the so called ‘heavily indebted poor countries’ (HIPC) went 
through long periods of sovereign debt distress and got back to some fiscal prudence following 
substantial debt forgiveness and restructuring by their key bilateral and multilateral creditors 
(Cassimon et al., 2015; Freytag and Pehnelt, 2008).  
However, while the recent attention on public debt sustainability shifted to advanced countries, 
many developing countries are, once again, facing increasing levels of indebtedness. The chapter 
delivers a timely and useful discussion on the issue by studying a group of developing countries. 
Specifically, it studies the impact of debt distress on economic growth and also if its impact is 
non-linear. That is, whether or not debt plays a constructive role (say by financing the 
development projects of poor countries) when its magnitude is manageable and plays a 
detrimental role when it becomes big and unstainable. The study also makes a further 
contribution by adding an institutional dimension, specifically, regarding the efficiency of the 
public sector. Two countries with comparable economic size but with different revenue 
mobilization capacities, degree of corruption, and property rights should not have similar debt 
sustainability targets. Ceteris paribus, countries with robust bureaucratic apparatus, domestic 
revenue mobilization capacities and low level of corruption should be able to better manage their 
sovereign debt compared to countries with weaker institutions. 
The chapter studies the impact of public debt (with a non-linear model), while controlling for 
other standard determinants of economic growth and cross-country differences in public sector 
management (institutional) quality. A linear estimation of the baseline model (i.e. a comparator 
model to the literature) shows a negative impact of public debt on economic growth. However, 
accounting for non-linearity, reveals that public debt assumes a negative relationship with 
growth only at ‘high’ debt levels. Interestingly, countries with better managed public sectors see 
the negative impact of public debt at levels higher than those countries with weaker public sector 
bureaucratic quality.  
Chapter 3 discusses an aspect of a financial shock that developing countries often face. It 
specifically deals with ‘currency crises’ and how major shocks to key macroeconomic variables 
could be used as an ‘early-warning’ system, so that governments (and monetary authorities) in 
developing countries take timely measures. This procedure uses a non-parametric (signals) 
approach that makes an ex-post analysis of past crisis incidents and how well key macroeconomic 
variables signaled an ensuing crisis (Kaminsky et al., 1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; El-
Shagi et al., 2013). In this way, monetary authorities in developing countries could derive key 
lessons for future crisis and closely track the dynamics of key macroeconomic indicators. 
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The paper conducts a case study on Ethiopia and, in doing so, delivers the first such empirical 
exercise on the country.  In poor developing economies like Ethiopia, financial early warning 
tools are not properly utilized by monetary authorities. Even if the early warning tools by 
themselves have no perfect foresights, they (at least) give some prior warnings - so that necessary 
precautions can be taken.  
While both chapter 3 and 4 deal with the roles of financial shocks in developing countries, the 
countries up on which the case studies are conducted differ as much as the issues addressed. 
Ethiopia (the focus of chapter 3) is a low-income developing economy with very negligible links 
to international capital markets. In fact, the country has yet to adopt a formal stock market, 
liberalize its banking industry, and allow foreign capital investments to own domestic bank 
assets. South Africa (the focus of chapter 4), on the other hand, is an emerging (upper middle-
income) economy with a highly developed financial sector. Nevertheless, it is also a country with 
significant levels of poverty (among a section of its population) and suffers from one of the 
world’s highest rates of inequality. These problems partly stem from the country’s unique 
history.  
Given the difference in the structure of the two economies (level of economic development and 
degree of integration to world economy), the set of shocks affecting them also differ. For this 
reason, the chapter on Ethiopia focuses mainly on key domestic macroeconomic variables and 
their dynamics, while the chapter on South Africa focuses on issues that link the country to 
economic events largely happening outside its borders. However, even in the case of Ethiopia, 
there are signs that domestic shocks could coincide with key external events. 
The key exercises in the chapter include: first, the use of extreme movements in ‘exchange 
market pressure index’ to detect currency crisis episodes.1 Second, studying the periods before 
crisis events and, particularly, the behavior of key macroeconomic indicators for the current 
account (real exchange rate, imports, exports, and terms of trade) the capital account 
(international reserves, ratios of monetary base to reserves, real interest rate differentials) and 
the domestic financial sector (levels and growth rates of domestic credit, domestic real interest 
rates, lending-deposit rate, excess liquidity, bank deposits). Overall, indicators for 
‘abnormalities’ (significant unusual movements) in the current account and domestic financial 
sector were found to be good crisis detectors, on the basis of the noise-to-signal ratio rule. This 
is less of the case for the indicators from the capital account sector - perhaps, characteristic of a 
developing economy with closed financial systems. 
Chapter 4 discusses the unintended consequences (spillovers) of the unconventional monetary 
policies adopted by the US Federal Reserve (Fed) and European Central Bank (ECB). These 
policies became operational largely as a response to (first) the global financial crisis and (later 
on) the liquidity and credit crisis in the banking industry and sovereign debt crisis, which 
followed the global financial crisis of 2008-09 (Bernanke, 2009; Joyce et al., 2012; Aizenman et 
                                                            
1 The Exchange Market Pressure Index (EMPI) essentially tracks movements in a country’s exchange rate 
and foreign reserves. 
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al., 2014). Yet, the key interest of the chapter centers on the spillovers on developing countries. 
For this purpose, the chapter conducts a case study on South Africa. As mentioned earlier, the 
impact of external shocks from such policies on the least-developed countries (with minimal 
integration to international financial markets) will be limited. However, the impact on the likes 
of South Africa (i.e. developing countries with reasonable degree of financial sophistication) will 
be considerable, since these countries have strong ties to international capital markets.  
The chapter specifically studies how the announcements of major unconventional monetary 
policies by the Fed and ECB (such as sterilized and non-sterilized asset purchase programs, 
liquidity provisions, collateral easing operations, etc.) affect the South African currency, 
sovereign bond yields, Credit Default Swaps, Interbank market, and the stock market. The study 
employs high-frequency daily data. Apart from the non-standard monetary policies, the study 
also controls for standard monetary policy changes by the Fed, ECB and the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB). It also accounts for underlying volatilities in international capital 
markets using appropriate indices. Important news items concerning SARB as well as the release 
of key macroeconomic variables that may affect market sentiment are also accounted for (e.g. 
trade balance, current account, GDP growth rate, industrial production, mining production, 
inflation rate, unemployment, retail sales, money supply, foreign exchange reserves, consumer 
confidence, business confidence, etc). 
The results reveal that the unconventional monetary policies of the Fed and ECB have impacted 
various categories of South African assets investigated by the chapter. However, the size and 
significance differs from one policy instrument to another. Overall, the results were in line with 
expectations. The dynamics in the South African assets goes in line with how significant 
international capital inflows/outflows (tied to the ‘international portfolio rebalancing’, 
‘confidence’, ‘sovereign credit’, etc. transmission channels) affects economies with open and 
developed capital markets. Specifically, the ‘large scale asset purchases program’ (QE) of the 
Fed (mainly the first wave) had the effect of reducing South African sovereign bond yields of 
different maturities, lowering credit default swaps, lowering interbank rate and rising stock 
market indices. Announcements of the tapering (gradual termination of QE) had the reverse 
effects. ECB’s asset purchases programs also had similar impacts to Fed’s QE policy. Further, 
ECB’s liquidity provisions and collateral easing policies also had a qualitatively similar impact 
to the asset purchases programs - although they are not consistently significant across different 
South African assets. 
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Chapter 2: Public Debt, Economic Growth and Public Sector Management †  
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper investigates whether differences in public sector management quality affect the link 
between public debt and economic growth in developing countries. For this purpose, we primarily 
use World Bank’s institutional indices of public sector management (PSM). Using PSM 
thresholds, we split our panel into country clusters and make comparisons. Our linear baseline 
regressions reveal a significant negative relationship between public debt and growth. The 
various robustness exercises that we perform also confirm these results. When we dissect our 
dataset into ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ county clusters using public sector management scores, however, 
we find different results. While public debt still displayed a negative relationship with growth in 
countries with ‘weak’ public sector management quality, it generally displayed a positive 
relationship in the latter group. The tests for non-linearity shows evidence of an ‘inverse-U’ 
shape relationship between public debt and economic growth. However, we fail to see a similar 
significant relationship on country clusters that account for PSM quality. Yet, countries with 
well managed public sectors demonstrate a higher public debt sustainability threshold. 
 
Keywords: public debt, economic growth, public sector management, developing countries  
JEL Classification: E62, F34, H63, H83, O11 
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1 Introduction 
Although there is an increasing focus on debt sustainability, one noticeable weakness of the 
current line of research is the failure to account for cross-country heterogeneity in the public 
debt vs. growth dynamics (Kourtellos et al., 2013).3 In an effort to close this literature gap, and 
also supplement the existing empirical works that account for country heterogeneity, this paper 
will study the debt-growth relationship while focusing on a specific set of institutional measures 
of public sector management quality. In this regard, this work tries to complement existing 
studies of public debt sustainability that utilize aggregate institutional measures. As a further 
contribution, the paper will use robust tests of non-linearity and check if non-linearity prevails 
in a similar fashion between countries with different institutional scores for public sector 
management. The main interest of this paper will be to find out if differences in the quality of 
the public sector, other things remaining constant, bear differences in the debt-growth nexus in 
developing countries. 
 
The quality of public sector management, e.g. property rights, budget management, 
transparency etc., has been shown to positively affect growth (Duvanova, 2014). However, the 
special interest of this paper is to analyze if country differences in public sector management 
result in differential outcome in the debt-growth relationship. There are different channels 
through which the quality of the public sector might have an impact on the debt-growth nexus. 
For instance, countries with lower public sector quality (say those with lower rate of revenue 
mobilization, poor budget management and low transparency) are more prone to higher public 
debt levels as they tend to borrow more (Heylen et al., 2013; Fernandez and Velasco, 2014). 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) also state that inefficient and corrupt governments and public sectors 
have the tendency to redirect funds from high value investment areas such as education and 
health to less productive sectors like defense and superfluous infrastructure projects. 
 
However, there might also be counterintuitive arguments. That is, even public sectors with good 
governance quality may sometimes behave in a less efficient manner. Jalles (2011), for instance, 
notes that a democratically elected government may not be very enthusiastic about budget 
sustainability or public debt levels since their primary concern is fulfilling the demands of their 
voters in the short term, i.e. while they are in office. Financing short run consumption with debt 
is argued to yield positive growth (Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1999). However, unrestrained and 
unsustainable consumption level will push sovereign debt levels higher and higher, which may 
on the longer term lead to a negative growth rates.  
 
Furthermore, in countries with weaker public sector management, we would expect a lower level 
of investment compared to countries where good institutions exist. Weaker institutions bring 
uncertainties to the investment atmosphere. Public funds would also be redirected to inefficient 
                                                            
3 For the issues behind rising concerns of debt-sustainability, see e.g. Michel and Von Thadden (2010), 
Helm (2011), Jogiste et al. (2012), Dell’Erba et al. (2013), Panizza and Presbitero (2013). 
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sectors that are more conducive to misappropriation rather than productivity. Scully (1988) 
argues that the presence of freer institutions, such as business freedom and personal liberties, 
yield higher economic growth rates.  
 
With the foregoing brief introduction in to the importance of institutions in the analysis of public 
debt, and its relationship with growth, we will proceed to the discussion of a specific aspect of 
institutional quality (i.e. public sector management) and its possible effects up on the debt-
growth nexus.  
2 Public Sector Management Quality 
The focus of most studies on public sector management and public spending has been examining 
the ‘efficiency’ of the public sector (Gupta and Verhoeven, 2001; Afonso et al., 2005; Hauner, 
2008). In doing so, such studies often dwell on particular socio-economic projects and sectors 
towards which public spending flows. They measure ‘efficiency’ by linking public expenditure to 
specific socio-economic gains. For instance, school enrollment (relative to public expenditure) is 
often used to measure the efficiency in education sector while infant mortality is used for the 
health sector. Apart from the estimations of respective scientific papers, it is often difficult to 
find databases that are dedicated to measuring public sector efficiency or quality at the aggregate 
level, and even more so to compare multiple countries. 
 
One reliable measure of public sector management quality for developing countries has been the 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) database of the World Bank (WB). Various 
empirical papers dealing with cross-country institutional differences have been adopting this 
measure in their analysis (Knack et al., 2011; Dabla-Norris and Gunduz, 2014).4 As its name 
implies, CPIA evaluates the quality of policy and institutional frameworks in developing 
countries. To make sure that there is consistency in the process of applying the criteria for 
various countries, the WB follows a rigorous internal review process (IDA, 2004; GTZ, 2008). 
CPIA is widely used to gauge the allocation of resources to developing countries. The 
International Development Association (IDA) of the WB and various other institutions (both 
private and public) are dependent on this rating for their operational decisions. The increasing 
attention given to the CPIA by WB and other development partners emanates from their belief 
that aid and concessional lending is effectively utilized in countries with a good policy and 
institutional environment.  
 
The CPIA ranks countries on the scale of 1 to 6, where higher is better. The WB uses a median 
score of 3.5 as a threshold. Countries with policy scores above 3.5 will be treated as ‘strong’ 
                                                            
4 The CPIA index is compiled by the WB annually (WB, 2011). In order to direct the IDA lending process, 
the WB kicked-off country assessment programs in the late 1970s (GTZ, 2008). The assessment criteria 
have evolved to assume its current version in 2004. The revisions have also been made with the intention 
of facilitating international comparability in performance across countries. 
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performers and countries scoring below that will be treated as ‘weak’ (see IDA, 2004; Eifert and 
Gelb, 2007). The index also has 16 specific indicators. The 16 individual criteria within the 
overall CPIA index are grouped in to four categories, namely: economic management, structural 
policies, policies of social inclusion and equity, and also public sector management and 
institutions (PSM). Our study focuses on the last category, i.e. PSM, and its 5 individual sub-
components. The five indicators that constitute the PSM index are: 
• Property Rights and Rule-based Governance,  
• Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management,  
• Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization,  
• Quality of Public Administration, and 
• Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector 
 
The detailed descriptions of the indices are given in table 3. The table additionally gives the 
basic statistical summaries of these indices, and also other variables used in our study. Looking 
at the means of the indices, see column-4, we notice that most developing countries receive below 
median score (i.e. below 3.5 on the scale of 1 to 6) for all indices, except for the index of revenue 
mobilization. However, to get a clearer view on the distribution of country scores, we may look 
at the box-plots in figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Box-plots for the indices of public sector management quality 
 
As we can see from the plots, most countries indeed fall in the low institutional score category. 
We can observe from plot (f) that a little over three quarters of the countries score ‘low’ on the 
overall PSM index. Looking at the five specific indices separately, i.e. plots (a) to (e), we observe 
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some differences among the indices. Just like the overall PSM index; about three quarters of the 
observations for property rights (plot-a) and public administration (plot-d) fall in the ‘low’ score 
zone. The index where almost all countries score worst is on transparency. As could be seen from 
plot (e), only a portion of the top quartile for transparency index falls within the ‘high’ score 
range. However, the countries in our sample tend to be evenly spread on the quality of revenue 
mobilization (plot-c) and nearly so for budget management (plot-b). For these two indices, the 
two upper quartiles fall in the ‘high’ score zone while the two lower quartiles fall in the ‘low’ 
score range. 
 
As an alternative, we consider The Heritage Foundation’s (THF) Index of economic Freedom 
(IEF). This dataset is also commonly used by researchers who model economic growth, cross-
country institutional differences and performances of the public sector (see Alonzo, 2002; 
Dawson, 2003; Altman, 2013). Out of ten specific indicators that constitute the IEF, this paper 
will be utilizing five indicators that match the WB’s PSM. Specifically, our paper will use 
‘property rights’, ‘freedom from corruption’, ‘fiscal freedom’, ‘government spending’, and 
‘business freedom’ in an effort to calibrate an alternative index to the WB’s PSM index. Each 
one of these indices is graded on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (THF, 2014). To match the PSM, 
the IEF index has been converted to the scale of 1 to 6. 
3 Methodology and Data 
There is no unique way of testing debt sustainability. For instance, IMF’s formal debt 
sustainability analysis sets thresholds of debt (often as % of GDP) that represent the benchmarks 
of sustainability. These thresholds are different, where poorer countries are generally given lower 
debt to GDP targets. See IMF and WB (2012) for more on the details of the joint IMF/WB 
debt sustainability framework (DSF) for developing countries. Further, the debt sustainability 
analysis undertaken by the empirical literature is even more diverse.  
 
Debt dynamics is largely driven by three important components. These are; the primary budget 
balance (deficit or surplus constituted by revenue minus non-interest spending), interest 
payments, and GDP growth (Hasko, 2007; Apergis and Cooray, 2015). The traditional tests of 
debt sustainability have focused on the primary balance. In this regard, an exemplary important 
contribution has been that of Bohn (1998). Bohn’s approach utilized long run (historical) time 
series regression of the primary fiscal surplus on public debt, and also other control variables.5 
The focus on primary balance makes sense in advanced countries since it is the main component 
deriving debt dynamics. Bohn (1988), in his analysis of U.S. debt dynamics, argues that the 
primary surplus is an increasing function of the debt to GDP ratio. A further analysis of fiscal 
                                                            
5 So far, the application of Bohn’s technique of assessing debt sustainability via the analysis of primary 
balances is largely limited to advanced and emerging countries due to requirements of longer time series 
for a reliable estimation. For further application, see also Mendoza and Ostry (2008); Mauro et al. (2013); 
and Eichengreen and Panizza (2014). 
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sustainability and primary surpluses in emerging markets by Celasum et al. (2006) and recently 
on EU countries by Eichengreen and Panizza (2014) also reveal that high debt to GDP ratio is 
positively associated with the primary balance. Another reason for the focus on primary balance 
is the fact that adjustments to high debt levels via the primary balance are more preferred over 
adjustments through defaults or inflation (IMF, 2002; Eichengreen and Panizza, 2014).  
 
However, the analysis of longer term debt sustainability deserves to be more focused on the 
‘growth’ component of debt dynamics, especially in developing countries. In rich countries, where 
there are low growth prospects, the face value of debt matters more. In developing countries, 
however, sustainability depends on how quickly they can grow, so that their debt (say as % of 
GDP) becomes smaller – even if the nominal or face value of debt is rising. Incidentally, recent 
research on public debt is delivering alternative measures and tests that anchor ‘sustainability’ 
in the ‘growth’ element of debt dynamics. A growing number of recent studies use some form of 
growth regression that augments debt variables among other controls. For instance, Eberhardt 
and Presbitero (2013) use a static neoclassical production function augmented with a debt stock 
term to analyze the debt-development nexus. Kourtellos et al. (2013) use the structural threshold 
regression model. Panizza and Presbitero (2012) use an augmented growth model (previously 
applied in Cecchetti et al., 2011) alongside threshold regression estimations. Presbitero (2008), 
Kumar and Woo (2010), Cecchetti et al. (2012), Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012) and 
Megersa (2015) use augmented dynamic versions of Solow’s growth model where public debt is 
included besides other explanatory variables.6  
 
The debt sustainability analysis applied in our study also follows this fundamental debt-growth 
relationship that is widely used in current literature. The special contribution of our study is 
adding the institutional element of public sector management, along with a non-linear analysis 
of the debt-growth nexus. We particularly study how divergences among developing countries 
with regard to their public sector management quality bear different results on the debt-growth 
relationship (see section 1).  
 
Further, the econometric modeling of the debt-growth nexus in the literature often utilizes linear 
models (Schclarek, 2004; Blavy, 2006; Greiner, 2012; Bal and Rath, 2014). However, there is a 
growing argument that this relationship could be non-linear (Kourtellos et al., 2013; Panizza 
and Presbitero, 2013). To address these issues we will commence with a linear estimation first 
and later on add a test for non-linearity. 
                                                            
6 See Panizza and Presbitero (2013) for more account of the diverse debt sustainability modeling exercise 
used in the literature. 
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3.1 Linear Estimation 
To estimate the relationship between public debt and economic growth we will consider an 
augmented version of Solow’s growth model.7 The model we are utilizing comprises of public 
debt and other control variables; 
 
 푔푖푡 = 훼 + 훽퐷푒푏푡푖푡 + 휇푋푖푡 + 휀푖푡, 푖 = 1, … , 푛 (1) 
 
Here, git represents economic growth and it is calibrated as the log difference of per-capita GDP. 
Debtit represents public debt and is calibrated as the log of general government gross debt as 
percent of GDP. In our analysis, we will specially focus on the sign, magnitude and significance 
of the coefficient of public debt (β) – in relation to our dependent variable, per-capita GDP 
growth. We will control for various standard determinants of economic growth that we find in 
growth literature (Xit). In addition, εit represents random error. 
 
The vector of standard control variables (Xit) includes; log of initial per-capita GDP 
(Init_income), log of investment as percentage of GDP (Investment), log difference of total 
population (Population), the log ratio of import plus exports to GDP (Openness), log difference 
of average CPI (Inflation), log of primary school enrollment (schooling), log difference of net 
barter terms of trade (TOT) and log of net Official Development Assistance receipts (ODA). 
These variables are routinely used by cross-country studies of economic growth (Alesina et al., 
2003; Durlauf et al., 2005) and public debt (Cordella et al., 2010; Presbitero, 2012; Kourtellos et 
al., 2013). They also explain much of the variation in per-capita GDP growth across countries 
(Kathavate and Mallik, 2012). 
 
Among the set of controls are also institutional measures of public sector management, towards 
which this paper will be paying a special attention to. These are the index of Public sector 
management (PSM) and its five subcomponents, namely: Property Rights and Rule-based 
Governance (Property_right); Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management (Budget_mgt); 
Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization (Revenue_mobil); Quality of Public Administration 
(Public_admin); and Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector 
(Transparency).  
 
As we are especially interested in finding out possible divergences in the debt-growth relationship 
across clusters of developing countries, we will split our sample in to country clusters based on 
the scores of public sector management indices.  To determine our clusters, we use both 
exogenous and endogenous thresholds. The exogenous CPIA threshold (i.e a median value of 3.5, 
out of a scale of 1 to 6) are used as rough guides to categorize countries as ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ 
                                                            
7 Apart from their use in the debt literature (see section 3 above), variants of Solow’s model are also 
widely used in the literature of economic growth (Durlauf et al., 2001; Ding and Knight, 2009) and public 
sector (Bajo-Rubio, 2000; Silaghi et al., 2014). 
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performers, regarding the quality of their public sector management.  To make our clustering 
robust, we will also internally determine the policy thresholds by using Hansen’s novel technique 
of threshold regression (see Hansen, 1999 and 2000).  
 
 As a further tool of robustness, we will include an interaction term between public debt and the 
index of public sector management. This should enable us to capture the possible heterogeneous 
effect that public debt may have on economic growth due to cross-country differences in 
institutional quality. It is sensible to assume that countries with well-run public sectors suffer 
less from the negative impacts of debt compared to countries where the public sector is not 
functioning well, ceteris paribus. A negative coefficient for public debt (β in equation-1) and a 
positive coefficient for an interaction term between a public sector management index and public 
debt (see table 1) would prove this to be true.  
 
While examining the impact of public debt (Debtit) on economic growth (git) in equation (1), we 
will rely on a System Generalized Method of Moments (SYS-GMM) regression as a base model. 
There is a growing popularity of GMM models in the growth literature, owing to their reliable 
estimation results for cross-country panels.8 In the face of heteroscedasticity, for instance, the 
GMM estimator outperforms a normal IV regression (Baum et al., 2003).9 Further, as Kathavate 
and Mallik (2012) note, customary techniques like pooled OLS do not consider the potential 
endogeneity of explanatory variables. In other words, these estimations do not reflect on the 
impacts of unobserved and unmodelled country specific differences. As Hansen and Tarp (2001) 
explain, results from OLS estimations will be inconsistent if unmodelled country specific elements 
are significantly correlated to explanatory variables. GMM estimation, on the other hand, tackles 
endogeneity problems among country-specific elements and right hand side variables.10 
Therefore, the use of SYS-GMM estimation in this study is justified. 
                                                            
8 The SYS-GMM estimator was introduced by the seminal work of Blundell and Bond (1998). See Durlauf 
et al. (2005) for the applications of GMM models in growth regressions. 
9 As commonly done in panel growth regressions, we will be utilizing instrumental variables (see Raghuram 
and Subramanian, 2008; Kathavate and Mallik, 2012). Apart from the potentially endogenous explanatory 
variables themselves (i.e. the lagged and differenced macroeconomic and institutional variables listed in 
table 1), we will be using additional instruments for legal origin and religious composition, taken from La 
Porta et al. (2008), and ethnic and linguistic fractionalization, taken from Alesina et al. (2003). We will 
be testing the validity of our instruments by making use of Hansen's J statistic of over-identifying 
restrictions. Further, for the tests of first and second order serial autocorrelations, we will report the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) AR (1) & AR (2) tests. 
10 GMM estimator uses first differencing and the lagged values of the endogenous variables as instruments 
(Raghuram and Subramanian, 2008; and Kathavate and Mallik, 2012). 
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3.2 Testing for Non-Linearity (‘Inverse-U’ Shape) 
Some researchers (Pattillo et al., 2003; Adam and Bevan, 2005; Dogan and Bilgili, 2014) argue 
that the relationship between public debt and growth could be positive in lower debt levels and 
in the presence of well-functioning institutions. As Pattillo et al. (2003) explain, in the presence 
of good institutions where the borrowed funds are directed to productive investment areas, there 
will be economic growth, which will also repay or refinance the borrowed money in a timely 
manner.   Yet, if debt becomes very high, i.e. exceeds the sustainability threshold or ‘tipping 
point’, then the relationship between growth and public debt becomes negative. As Clements et 
al. (2003) argue, the theories on ‘debt overhang’ and ‘crowding-out’ help explain the negative 
relationship seen in the debt-growth nexus at higher debt levels. In an effort to address such 
assertions of non-linearity in the debt-growth nexus, we will be making appropriate tests.11 
 
The non-linearity tests in the debt literature are often conducted via spline regressions. However, 
Panizza and Presbitero (2013) argue that these are not robust due to the arbitrary setting of the 
cut-off points. Here, as in Megersa (2015), we will be using a robust technique of testing non-
linearity proposed by Lind & Mehlum (2010). The presence of an ‘inverse-U’ shape relationship 
between public debt and economic growth would imply a relationship that can be depicted with 
the following graphical relationship.  
 
Figure 2: A non-linear (‘inverse-U’) relationship between public debt and growth 
(For ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ PSM country clusters) 
 
Note: In this theoretical graph, (Y) represents economic growth. This is captured by annual growth in per-capita GDP. (Debt) 
represents the debt-to-GDP ratio (see ‘Methodology and Data’ section for more explanation). B and B’ represent the debt 
sustainability thresholds for countries with ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ PSM, respectively (see ‘Testing for non-linearity’ section for more 
explanation on this). 
                                                            
11 The presence of a ‘Laffer-curve’ or ‘inverted-U’ type relationship in the debt-growth nexus is often 
reported in public debt literature (see Krugman, 1989; Claessens, 1990; Megersa, 2015).  
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As the hypothesis of the ‘debt-laffer curve’ shows, the slopes of  &  will be positive at 
lower levels of public debt and will be negative at higher levels of public debt. That is,  & 
will be positively sloped while  &  will be negatively sloped. The additional hypothesis we 
make here is that, countries with better institutions (i.e. better public sector management), will 
have a higher curve ( ) compared to countries with bad public sector management ( ). 
This also gives them a higher debt sustainability threshold (B) compared to countries with 
weaker institutions (B'). However, in both cases - as the literature argues (e.g. Sachs, 1989; 
Claessens, 1990), we expect a non-linear - specifically an ‘inverse-U’ shaped relationship between 
public debt and economic growth. 
 
Assuming the ‘inverse-U’ quadratic relationship between public debt and per-capita GDP 
growth depicted in Figure 2 holds true, we may state equation (1), i.e. the growth regression in 
section 3.1, as 
 푔푖푡 = 훼 + 훽퐷푒푏푡푖푡 + 휂푓(퐷푒푏푡푖푡)2 + 휇푋푖푡 + 휀푖푡, 푖 = 1, … , 푛 (2) 
 
We can then test the presence of the ‘inverse-U’ relationship with the following joint conditions; 
 훽 + 2휂 푓′(퐷1)  >  0 >  훽 +  2휂 푓′(퐷4)  (3) 
 
This may also alternatively be specified as a composite hypothesis of the following null and 
alternative hypothesis; 12 
 퐻0: 훽 + 2휂 푓′(퐷1) >  0 푎푛푑 훽 + 2휂 푓′(퐷4)  <  0  (4) 
 
 퐻1: 훽 + 2휂 푓′(퐷1)  ≤  0 푎푛푑/표푟 훽 + 2휂 푓′(퐷4)  ≥  0  (5) 
 
3.3 Data 
The dataset is composed of an unbalanced panel of 57 developing countries over the period 1990 
to 2011.13 This list is dependent up on the availability of institutional data for PSM and we have 
taken developing countries for which there is a CPIA report. While classifying countries in to 
separate clusters on the basis of PSM scores, we use an average score over the 2005-2011 period. 
The detail list of the variables in our analysis and their summary statistics has been depicted in 
Table 3 (in annex). The macroeconomic variables come from the World Economic Outlook 
                                                            
12 For more on this non-linearity (‘inverse-U’) test, please refer to Lind and Mehlum (2010). 
13 The countries included in the analysis are: Angola, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Burundi, Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Bosnia And Herzegovina, Bolivia, Bhutan, Central African Republic, Cote D’Ivoire, 
Cameroon, Congo, Rep., Comoros, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Haiti, India, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Cambodia, St. Lucia, 
Lesotho, Moldova, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Mauritania,  Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Nicaragua, 
Nepal, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sudan, Senegal, Solomon Islands, Sierra Leone, Chad, Togo, Tajikistan, 
Tanzania, Uganda, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Vietnam, Zambia. 
ABC CBA ′′
de ed ′′
fg gf ′′
ABC CBA ′′
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(WEO) of the IMF and World Development Indicators (WDI) of the WB. The institutional 
measures of public sector management come from WB’s CPIA dataset. However, we also 
construct and use an alternative measure of public sector management from THF’s IEF dataset 
to control for the WB’s CPIA data (see table 3).  
4 Results and Discussion 
4.1 Results from Linear Modeling 
The linear baseline estimations of our growth model, given in equation (1), for different 
specifications (specifications with and without the debt-growth interaction term) and different 
PSM indices (indices of WB & THF) are displayed in Table 1. Column 1 displays the estimation 
of the growth model incorporating public debt and the other control variables but without our 
institutional variable, i.e. PSM. The rest of the columns, however, incorporate it. Columns 2&4 
deliver estimations without the interaction term between PSM and public debt (i.e. Debt_PSM) 
while columns 3&5 include the term. Columns 2&3 are based on indices from the WB’s CPIA 
index while Columns 4&5 are based on indices from THF’s IEF. 
 
Table 1: SYS-GMM baseline regressions  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Init_income -0.00580* -0.00656** -0.00636**  -0.00789* -0.00599  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Investment 0.0107 0.00724 0.00627 0.00709 0.00993  
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
Population -0.744*** -0.715*** -0.796*** -0.720*** -0.761***  
(0.181) (0.177) (0.182) (0.184) (0.194) 
Openness 0.00181 0.00395 0.00221 0.00597 0.00286  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) 
Inflation 0.105*** 0.104** 0.119*** 0.124 0.134*    
(0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.076) (0.076) 
Debt -0.00786* -0.00718* -0.0643*** -0.00840* -0.0740**   
(0.004) (0.004) (0.025) (0.004) (0.030) 
Schooling 0.0101 0.00821 0.0065 0.0076 0.0103  
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
TOT -0.0661** -0.0648* -0.0625*   -0.0493 -0.0478  
(0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.037) (0.037) 
ODA -0.00181 -0.00178 -0.00114 -0.00152 -0.00145  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
PSM 
 
0.00563 -0.0726**  0.00922 -0.0745**    
(0.008) (0.031) (0.010) (0.037) 
Debt_PSM§ 
  
0.0188**   0.0184**     
(0.008)  (0.009) 
_cons 0.0336 0.0332 0.281**  0.0292 0.301**  
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(0.054) (0.054) (0.112) (0.051) (0.121) 
      
N 643 643 643 572 572 
AR (1) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 
AR (2) 0.024 0.024 0.020 0.030 0.027 
Hansen OIR 0.899 0.874 0.714 0.836 0.664 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.010.  
Dependent variable is the log difference of per-capita GDP.§Debt_PSM is an interaction term between public debt 
and PSM. 
Column 1: regression without PSM; 2&3: with PSM from WB data; 4&5: with PSM from THF data. 
 
The magnitude and sign of the coefficients as well as their significance is robust across the 
different specifications of the growth model, with respect to the public debt and public sector 
management variables. Going to the details, the coefficients of public debt are negative and 
significant in all cases (see columns 1 to 4). The coefficient of our policy variable, PSM, is positive 
but not significant (see columns-1&3). It, however, becomes negative and significant once we 
introduce the interaction term (see columns 2&4). This reaffirms the strong negative relationship 
between public debt and growth, even while controlling for the potential positive impacts of 
good policy on growth and public debt.14  The coefficients of the control variables also mostly 
match the theoretical and empirical literature. The coefficients of investment, openness, inflation 
and schooling are positive.15 On the other hand, the coefficients of initial GDP per-capita, 
population growth, terms of trade growth and official development assistance are negative.16  
 
Based on the P-values at the foot of columns 1 to 5, we cannot reject the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) test for the presence of first and second order serial autocorrelation, i.e. AR(1) & AR(2). 
However, as can be seen from Tables 5&6 (in annex), the second order serial autocorrelation is 
mostly absent once we take disaggregates of the PSM index and account for the differences in 
quality of public sector management, i.e. running regressions on separate country clusters.17 The 
validity of the instruments used is also confirmed by Hansen’s J-statistic for over-identifying 
restrictions (OIR), as can be seen from the last row of table 1.  
                                                            
14 Presbitero (2012), Cordella et al. (2010), and Kourtellos et al. (2013) also arrive at comparable findings 
from their analysis of public debt. 
15 Further estimations (not shown here) using alternative regressions (Differenced-GMM, Fixed Effects, 
Instrumental Variables) show comparable results to our baseline SYS-GMM. The Differenced-GMM 
yielded the closest results to the baseline regression. This is to be expected given that it is related to SYS-
GMM estimation (see Arellano and Bond, 1991 and Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
16 It is interesting to see that the coefficient of initial GDP per-capita is negative and significant in most 
of the cases (see columns-1 to 3). This confirms the ‘convergence-hypothesis’ among countries in the 
literature of economic development. 
17 The robustness exercise that we run on lower frequency dataset, taking four year period averages to 
deal with possible business cycles, strongly confirms the absence of second order serial autocorrelation. 
20 
 
4.2 Results from Non-Linearity (‘Inverse-U’) Test 
Before we make a formal statistical test for the presence of the hypothesized ‘inverse-U’ form of 
non-linear relationship between public debt and economic growth (i.e. table 3), we will first make 
quadratic and kernel fits in to the dataset, see figure 3 below. As we can see from the figure, 
there is an obvious evidence for downwards concave functional relationship in the overall sample, 
see plot (a). When we split our sample in to separate country clusters of strong and weak public 
sector management quality, we even get a more interesting result. Specifically, the data seems 
to back the hypothesis we made earlier (in section-3.2) that countries with better public 
institutions display a higher curve, see plots (a) and (b). As we can see from the basic graphical 
depiction in figure 2, this translates in to higher debt sustainability thresholds for the countries 
with good institutions. 
 
Figure 3: Fitting a non-linear (‘inverse-U’) relationship between public debt and growth 
(For ‘strong/high’ and ‘weak/low’ PSM country clusters) 
 
We addresses the formal tests for the hypothesis of non-linearity in the debt-growth nexus, and 
also the differential thresholds for the set of countries having ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ PSM ratings, 
in Table 2.18 As we can see from column-1 of the table, there is evidence of a non-linear ('inverse-
U') relationship between public debt and economic growth when our whole set of developing 
countries is considered (also see figure 3a). The extreme value lies within the lower and upper 
                                                            
18 The detail of the non-linearity test adopted in this paper is shown in Section 3.2. 
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bounds. Further, the slopes are positive and negative at the lower and upper bounds, 
respectively. The overall t-test for the presence of an ‘inverse-U’ shape is significant, though 
weakly at 10%.  
Table 2: Non-linearity test 
(Using the Lind-Mehlum test for ‘inverse-U’ shape) 
 (1)All countries  (2)Countries with ‘weak’ public 
sector management (PSM <3.5) 
(3)Countries with ‘strong’ public 
sector management (PSM >3.5) 
Bounds Lower  Upper  Lower  Upper  Lower  Upper  
Interval   1.26186    6.11999 1.26186       6.11999 1.26186   6.11999 
Slope                .02435       -.03557 .0116915         -.031210 .18468         -.06554 
Test for slope : P>t             .07322        .00663 .282763          .02851 .27202          .37559 
Extreme point:   3.23628 2.58581 4.84755 
Overall test of 
presence of a bell 
shape: P>t      
.0732 .283 .376 
 
However, as we can see from columns 2&3, the significance tests failed once we split our sample 
in to ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ country clusters, based on the PSM scores. Yet, we can still trace a 
weak ‘inverse-U’ shape for both clusters as the slopes are negative at the lower bounds and 
positive at the upper bounds.19 Furthermore, the extreme points lie within the lower and upper 
bounds in both cases. The extreme point for the strong scoring cluster (Debt/GDP in log. ≈ 
4.85) is higher than the weak scoring cluster (Debt/GDP in log. ≈ 2.59). This is also graphically 
shown in Figure 2 (see B & B'). This result supports the argument that countries with better 
institutions, i.e. PSM, have (and deserve) higher public debt sustainability targets compared to 
those with weaker institutions (see Reinhart et al., 2003; Caner et al., 2010; Cordella et al., 
2010). 
4.3 Robustness Tests 
We will run different robustness exercises to see the consistency of the results against different 
specifications. Roodman (2007) and Kathavate and Mallik (2012) show the importance of 
conducting robustness exercises that involve changes in specification, variable definition and 
datasets. On the basis of such recommendations, we will carry out the following list of robustness 
checks.20 
i) we use an alternative dataset for the public sector management index (Table 1,  
columns 4&5);  
                                                            
19 This ‘inverse-U’ shape is more clearly visible for the countries with low PSM score (see figure 2b&c). 
20 We also made robustness exercises where i) we used a dynamic specification involving the lagged values 
of debt ii) we filtered our data and control for trends iii) we also took consecutive four year period average 
to control for business cycles. In these exercises, public debt displays negative coefficients – as is the case 
in our foregoing analysis.  
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ii) we use a disaggregated measure of the index of public sector management (Table 4 
in annex);  
iii) we use WB’s median CPIA threshold (i.e. a score of 3.5) and an alternative robust 
technique (Hansen's threshold regression) to create country clusters and then run 
regressions (Table 5 & Table 6 in annex);  
 
In the following section, we will deal with the aforementioned robustness exercises in the same 
chronological order. The outputs of the growth regression for equation (1) using the alternative 
THF’s IEF dataset are given in columns 3&4 of Table 1. As explained in the foregoing section 
(section 4.1), the results are quite stable and match the regressions conducted using the WB's 
CPIA data.  
 
The results of the regressions run with the disaggregated indices of public sector management 
are given in table 4 (in annex). As noted in section 2, the PSM index is the average of five 
indices that measure different aspects of public sector management quality. Countries often tend 
to score high on some measures and low on others. Furthermore, the different aspects 
(subcomponents) of PSM may exert a different magnitude or direction of influence on economic 
growth or the debt-growth relationship. Therefore, it becomes useful to use disaggregates of the 
index, as a complement to the analysis made with the PSM index itself. As we can indeed see 
in table 4, there is no uniformity in the coefficients of the subcomponents of the PSM index. All 
sub-indices except one, i.e. revenue mobilization, have positive coefficients. Though, we find a 
significant positive effect only from one index, i.e. budget management. 
 
The results shown in the table 4 enable us to see the direction and significance of the relationship 
between growth and the policy disaggregates that constitute the PSM index. We could see that 
four of the subcomponents of the index, namely: good property rights, budgetary and financial 
management, public administration, transparency, have a positive relationship with economic 
growth, as we might expect. Of these, good budgetary and financial management appears to 
have a very significant effect on growth, even at 1%. On the other hand, the coefficient for 
efficiency of revenue mobilization has a negative sign. It is also significant, though weakly, just 
at 10%.21  
 
                                                            
21 To score good in the measure of ‘Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization’, a country is expected to have a 
broad tax base, less reliance on tax from international trade, low import tariffs, significant income tax, 
etc. However, even those developing countries that witness rapid growth rates (and have better scores in 
other institutional and policy measures) often have problems with tariffs and taxation. They often rely on 
their small formal sector and international trade as major source of taxation. This might, therefore, lead 
to the counterintuitive negative coefficient of the indicator.  
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As a further test of robustness, we will check if different country clusters (based on the quality 
of their institutions) witness similar pattern of relationship between economic growth and public 
debt. Towards achieving this objective, we will first use the CPIA median to create clusters (see 
section 3). Next, we will use a novel threshold regression technique pioneered by Bruce Hansen 
to create clusters that are statistically different from each other (Hansen, 1999). We will use the 
PSM index and its five subcomponents as threshold variables to create the country clusters. The 
threshold regression technique that we adopt has been widely applied by recent researches to 
optimally dissect databases and see how one cluster compares with another (see Van 
Campenhout and Cassimon, 2012; Kuo et al., 2013).  
 
Table 5 shows the results of the regression that we run on the clusters of countries with ‘strong’ 
and ‘weak’ public sector management. The first two columns use the PSM index itself while the 
rest of the columns use the five subcomponents of PSM to create the clusters. As explained in 
section 2, each of these policy and institutional variables are measure on a scale of 1 to 6, where 
scores below 3.5 are treated as ‘weak/low’. Irrespective of the policy variables that are used, 
public debt appeared to have a negative relationship with economic growth, especially for the 
country clusters with ‘weak’ score. Further, in most of these cases the coefficient of public debt 
was not only negative but also significant. For the clusters with ‘strong’ score, the coefficient of 
public debt was positive and even significant in half of the cases. We have only one instance, i.e. 
the cluster formed by revenue mobilization, where the coefficient is negative out of the six 
clusters of countries with ‘strong’ policy score. 
 
Table 6 basically delivers the same information as table 5. The difference here is that we 
internally determine the thresholds as opposed to using the CPIA median. The results in these 
two tables are very similar. In the cluster of countries with ‘weak’ scores, public debt has a 
consistent negative (and mostly significant) coefficient. However, in the cluster of countries with 
‘strong’ scores, public debt mostly has positive (but rarely significant) coefficients. As in table 
5, only in one case – i.e. the cluster formed by revenue mobilization, we have a negative 
coefficient. This distinctive result also conforms to what we see in the boxplots in figure 1. Unlike 
other indices, most countries score well in ‘revenue mobilization’, possibly even those countries 
where public debt is high and unsustainable and already plays detrimental role to growth. 
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5 Conclusion 
The concern over the sustainability of public debt and its negative impacts on economic growth 
is legitimate and has a sound theoretical backing. In this enquiry, however, one has to make 
distinctions between developing countries. It will be wrong to expect that rising levels of public 
debt will have similar impacts on economic growth across developing countries with ‘strong’ and 
‘weak’ institutions. In line with this, our paper investigates the link between economic growth 
and public debt while focusing on country differences in public sector management.  
 
When we consider our dataset in its entirety, disregarding cross-country differences in public 
sector management quality, the results from our linear baseline regressions show that public debt 
has a significant negative relationship with economic growth. The wide arrays of robustness 
exercises that we conducted also yield comparable results. However, we find a different patter 
of relationship once we dissected our dataset in to country clusters, on the bases of public sector 
management quality. In countries with ‘weak’ or poorly managed public sectors, public debt 
displays the familiar negative relationship with economic growth. However, in countries with 
‘strong’ or well managed public sectors, public debt generally shows evidence of positive 
relationship with growth. This outcome largely prevails on alternative country clusters 
determined using disaggregated indices of public sector management and also on optimal clusters 
determined using threshold regressions. 
 
The non-linearity tests we made also show signs of dependence on the country clusters used. We 
have a significant evidence of non-linear (‘inverse-U’) relationship between public debt and 
economic growth, when we consider the whole set of our dataset. However, we only have a weak 
(non-significant) ‘inverse-U’ relationship between public debt and economic growth after we 
split our dataset in to country clusters of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ public sector management quality.  
Interestingly, countries with strong institutions have displayed a higher debt sustainability 
threshold, as the sovereign debt literature seems to suggest. 
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Annex: 
Table 3: Variables’ descriptions, sources and summary statistics 
Variable Descriptions and sources of data Source Mean St.dv. Min Max 
 Growth, public debt and control Variables      
Growth log difference of per-capita GDP growth at constant 
US 2000 prices.  
WDI .0259    .0455   -.181   .316 
Init_income log of initial per-capita GDP.  WDI 5.987    .735    4.851   8.334 
Investment log of gross investment as percentage of GDP.  WEO 3.037    .428    1.518   4.340 
Population  log difference of total population.  WDI .022     .012   -.011   .103 
Openness log ratio of import plus exports to GDP.  WDI .738     .396          0     2.091 
Inflation log difference of average consumer price index.  WEO .081     .098   -.088   .927 
Debt log of government gross debt as percent of GDP.  WEO 4.100    .689    1.262   6.120 
Schooling log of primary school enrollment. WDI 3.737    .239     2.507   4.010 
TOT log difference of net barter terms of trade. WDI .010     .116   -.975   .518 
ODA log of net Official Development Assistance receipts. WDI 1.917    1.056   -
2.226   
4.117 
 Institutional variables      
PSM Public Sector Management and Institutions.  
NB: The five PSM subcomponents are listed beneath. 
 
CPIA 3.112    .465    2.257   3.971 
Alternative PSM index constructed from IEF’s 
indices of ‘Property Rights’, ‘freedom from 
Corruption’, ‘fiscal freedom’, ‘government spending’ 
and ‘business freedom’ 
 
IEF 3.634    .397          2.484    4.714 
Property_right Property Rights and Rule-based Governance: 
This indicator evaluates the degree to which a rule 
based administrational structure and judicial system 
assists the private economic activity within a country 
(WB, 2011). Specifically,  It measures if;  
• formal and informal property rights are 
recognized and respected, 
• formal contractual arrangements are used and 
enforced, 
• property rights and contractual agreements are 
not regularly manipulated, 
• rules and regulations are not frequently altered, 
• laws are not altered in a non-trasparent manner 
to beneft some clients, 
• the judicial system is not an extension of the 
executive part of the governement, 
• there is not widespread corruption within the 
judicial system, 
• judicial decisions are made aviailable to the 
public, 
• the state is willing or able to protect or enforce 
property rights  
• the police force do not commit crime or use 
violence against citizens 
 
CPIA 2.922     .554          2          4 
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Budget_mgt Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management: 
This indicator measures the availability of adequate 
budget for priortised policies, the presence of effective 
financial management system, and implementation of 
precise fiscal reporting and accounting procedures. 
Specifically, it assesses whether; 
• there is a meaningful budeget,  
• there is significant crossreference among the 
spending ministries, 
• there is coherence in budget categorization 
schemes, 
• expenditures often match the amounts budgeted, 
• there is evaluation and reporting of public 
expendings 
 
CPIA 3.255    .575    1.786   4.286 
Revenue_mobil Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization: 
The indicator evaluates the general environment of 
revenue mobilization (tax and non-tax) in the country 
of concern. Specifically, the indicator assesses if; 
• the tax base is not very narrow 
• much of the tax revenues are not gathered from 
international trade or distortionary taxes 
• import tariffs are not high and there is no big 
variety of them 
• income taxes are not very small 
• the tax management is strong and the rate of 
collection is a big 
• there is widespread computerization 
• tax payeers don’t need to make a lot of visits to 
the tax officiess 
• tax and customs functionaries are not corrupt 
 
CPIA 3.496    .499        2.5    4.357 
Public_admin Quality of Public Administration: 
This measure appraises the degree to which civil 
cervants efficiently implement government policies. 
This list includes governments staffs in all ministries 
and administrative departments such as police, 
teachers and health workers. It excludes the army, 
sub-national governments and state-owned 
enterprises. Some of the basic criterias include; 
• there is coordination in the administrational 
apparatus 
• there are no inefficiant bureucracies, 
uncertainities or contradictory plocies 
• there are not many overmlapping responsibilities 
• there are not multiple decision layers and a few 
signatures are needed to get things done 
• there are distinct rules of hiring and promotion 
and this is based on merit and not bribes, 
personal connections or ethnicity  
• employees do not lose their position dues to 
changes in government 
• most employees are regularly present at work 
• wage bills do not deplete all of current spending  
CPIA 3.006    .465          2          4 
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WDI= World Development Indicators, World Bank  
WEO= World economic Outlook, IMF 
CPIA= Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, World Bank  
IEF= Index of Economic Freedom, The Heritage Foundation 
 
  
Transparency Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in 
the Public Sector:  
This measure checks the degree of accountability and 
transparency by the executive and regular employes 
to their  constituencies. For a high score, the list of 
key attributes to be fulfilled include; 
• presence of checks and balances to executive 
power 
• low prevalnce of corruption bribery among public 
officials and other employees 
• government decision making process is not 
secretive 
• the public participates and/or is communicated 
about key government desions  
• the state is not consumed by narrow goals 
(economic, political, military, etc.) 
CPIA 2.879    .604    1.786        4.5 
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Table 4: SYS-GMM regressions with PSM subcomponents  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Init_income -0.00957*** -0.00617** -0.00882*** -0.00931*** -0.00930***  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Investment 0.0203 0.00505 0.0329*** 0.0187 0.0255**   
(0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) 
POP -0.819*** -0.727*** -0.818*** -0.847*** -0.829***  
(0.166) (0.168) (0.160) (0.162) (0.168) 
Openness 0.00335 0.00605 -0.00268 0.00409 0.00153  
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) 
Inflation 0.0969*** 0.146*** 0.0664* 0.0994*** 0.0908**   
(0.034) (0.040) (0.035) (0.034) (0.036) 
Debt -0.00665* -0.0055 -0.00598 -0.00689* -0.00662  
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Schooling 0.00351 0.00093 0.0104 0.00374 0.00425  
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
TOT -0.0579* -0.0522 -0.0626** -0.0576* -0.0612*    
(0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.033) (0.032) 
ODA -0.00116 -0.00019 -0.00128 -0.00043 -0.00056  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Property_right 0.00409 
   
                 
(0.006) 
   
                
Budget_mgt 
 
0.0129***  
 
                  
(0.005) 
  
                
Revenue_mobil 
  
-0.00774* 
 
                   
(0.004) 
 
                
Public_admin 
   
0.00415                     
(0.007)                 
Transparency 
    
0.000674      
(0.004) 
_cons 0.0358 0.0265 0.0113 0.0373 0.0267  
(0.053) (0.048) (0.051) (0.051) (0.053) 
      
N 643 643 643 643 643 
AR (1) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
AR(2) 0.024 0.024 0.026 0.025 0.025 
Hansen OIR 0.063 0.130 0.084 0.053 0.057 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.010. 
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Table 5: SYS-GMM regressions (‘strong’ and ‘weak’ country clusters; using CPIA median of 3.5 as threshold) 
 
PSM Property rights Budget Mgt Revenue Mobil Public Admin Transparency 
Country cluster Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong 
             
Init_income -0.00727* -0.0319*** -0.0109** -0.0171*** -0.00741 -0.0171*** -0.0215*** -0.00267 -0.00706 -0.0265*** -0.00811** -0.00245  
(0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) 
Investment -0.00044 0.0815*** 0.0125 0.0775*** 0.00251 0.00446 0.026 0.011 0.00122 -0.015 0.00735 0.0172  
(0.014) (0.030) (0.016) (0.020) (0.012) (0.014) (0.018) (0.013) (0.015) (0.030) (0.016) (0.020) 
Population -0.651*** -2.843*** -0.740*** -1.976*** -0.115 -1.257*** -0.377 -1.047*** -0.614** -2.125** -0.751*** 0  
(0.174) (0.637) (0.198) (0.260) (0.466) (0.274) (0.379) (0.208) (0.254) (0.954) (0.187) (0.000)  
Openness 0.00508 -0.0790** 0.0128 -0.0605*** 0.0159 -0.00292 0.0278** -0.0126 0.00523 0.000308 0.0104 -0.00458  
(0.012) (0.033) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) 
Inflation 0.138*** -0.19 0.163*** 0.0682 0.110*** -0.197 0.0921*** 0.116 0.136*** -0.237 0.138*** 0.0107  
(0.050) (0.184) (0.055) (0.110) (0.037) (0.127) (0.031) (0.148) (0.046) (0.161) (0.048) (0.134) 
Debt -0.0110** 0.0637** -0.0102* 0.00609 -0.0137*** 0.0133** -0.00813 -0.00446 -0.0112** 0.0389*** -0.0118** 0.0052  
(0.004) (0.029) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.012) (0.006) (0.022) 
Schooling 0.00676 0.254** 0.00518 0.111*** -0.00948 0.0411*** -0.00558 -0.00115 0.0126 0.0327** 0.0104 -0.00028  
(0.009) (0.110) (0.010) (0.031) (0.016) (0.014) (0.011) (0.025) (0.012) (0.014) (0.010) (0.092) 
TOT -0.0524 -0.00155 -0.0388 -0.151* -0.0326 -0.105* -0.0719** -0.0845** -0.0648* 0.061 -0.0595* 0.0466  
(0.033) (0.079) (0.033) (0.080) (0.040) (0.055) (0.034) (0.039) (0.034) (0.047) (0.033) (0.433) 
ODA 0.00214 -0.0136** 0.00229 -0.00645 0.0000 -0.00501* -0.0006 0.00145 0.000976 -0.00083 0.00449 -0.0047  
(0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
             
N 510 133 456 187 326 317 229  414 492 151 522  121  
AR(1) 0.004 0.044 0.009 0.012  0.017 0.023 0.030 0.008 0.005 0.013 0.003 0.413 
AR(2) 0.067 0.083 0.048 0.217 0.156 0.155 0.140 0.142 0.074 0.129 0.029 0.774 
Hansen OIR 0.638 0.868 0.347 0.380 0.940 0.484 0.300 0.829 0.530 0.748 0.380 1.000 
Notes: Regressions include a constant (not reported to save space); standard errors are in parentheses; significance 
levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.010. 
 
Table 6: SYS-GMM regressions (‘strong’ and ‘weak’ country clusters; using Hansen’s threshold regression) 
 
PSM Property rights Budget Mgt Revenue Mobil Public Admin Transparency 
Country cluster Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong 
             
Init_income -0.00989 -0.0109** -0.0110** -0.0174*** -0.00345 0.0168** -0.00607 -0.00472 -0.00706 -0.0265*** -0.0127** -0.00631  
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) 
Investment 0.0304* 0.011 0.0135 0.0416** 0.0108 0.00831 0.00612 0.0339*** 0.00122 -0.015 0.0397** 0.0149  
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.013) (0.030) (0.017) (0.008) (0.015) (0.030) (0.016) (0.014) 
Population -0.956** -0.981*** -0.732*** -1.521*** -0.435** 1.236** -0.771*** -1.161*** -0.614** -2.125** -1.252*** -0.989***  
(0.374) (0.221) (0.198) (0.304) (0.217) (0.593) (0.185) (0.385) (0.254) (0.954) (0.447) (0.215) 
Openness 0.0103 -0.00843 0.0135 -0.0340*** 0.00613 0.0192 0.0123 -0.0367*** 0.00523 0.000308 0.00199 -0.0199***  
(0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.021) (0.013) (0.007) (0.012) (0.017) (0.014) (0.007) 
Inflation 0.126*** -0.048 0.165*** -0.0747 0.127*** -0.286*** 0.0894** 0.136 0.136*** -0.237 0.144*** 0.0108  
(0.049) (0.114) (0.055) (0.117) (0.040) (0.106) (0.045) (0.123) (0.046) (0.161) (0.050) (0.099) 
Debt -0.00888 0.00476 -0.0107** 0.00273 -0.00951** 0.0268*** -0.00794 -0.00574 -0.0112** 0.0389*** -0.0129** 0.00346  
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005) (0.006) 
Schooling 0.0106 0.0152 0.00497 0.0535** -0.0006 0.168*** 0.00727 -0.00451 0.0126 0.0327** 0.0166 0.00975  
(0.011) (0.018) (0.010) (0.027) (0.007) (0.029) (0.010) (0.024) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.019) 
TOT -0.055 -0.0491 -0.0416 -0.0554 -0.0516 -0.0857 -0.0442 -0.0381 -0.0648* 0.061 -0.0236 -0.0746  
(0.034) (0.052) (0.033) (0.072) (0.038) (0.058) (0.032) (0.055) (0.034) (0.047) (0.028) (0.055) 
ODA -0.00267 -0.00322 0.00234 -0.00411 0.00197 -0.0268*** 0.000585 0.00275 0.000976 -0.00083 -0.00673 0.00101  
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
             
N 330 313  445  198  461  182  426  217  492  151  250  393  
AR(1) 0.019 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.004   0.187 0.006   0.010   0.005 0.013 0.045   0.005  
AR(2) 0.051 0.237 0.041 0.360 0.167 0.160 0.126 0.065 0.074 0.129 0.037 0.501  
Hansen OIR 0.372 0.218 0.339 0.251 0.975 0.360 0.331 0.073 0.530 0.748 0.476 0.696   
Notes: Regressions include a constant that is not reported to save space. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.010. 
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Chapter 3: Assessing Indicators of Currency Crisis in Ethiopia † 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Currency crises, generally defined as rapid depreciations of a local currency or loss of foreign 
exchange reserves, are common incidents in modern monetary systems. Due to their repeated 
occurrence and severity, they have earned wide coverage by both theoretical and empirical 
literature. However, unlike advanced and emerging economies, currency crises in low-income 
countries have not received due attention. This paper uses the signals approach developed by 
Kaminsky et al. (1998) and assesses currency crisis in Ethiopia over the time frame January 
1970 to December 2008. Using the Exchange Market Pressure Index (EMPI), we identify three 
currency crisis episodes that coincide with the liberalisation following the fall of Ethiopian 
socialism, the Ethio-Eritrean border conflict, and the zenith of the global financial crisis. The 
timing shows the importance of both local and international dynamics. More macro-economic 
indicators picked up the first crisis in a 24 month signalling window, compared to the latter two. 
Three categories of indicators were used: current account, capital account and domestic financial 
sector. None of the capital account indicators were significant based on the noise-to-signal ratio 
rule. One possible explanation for this might be the weak integration of the Ethiopian economy 
with global capital markets.  
 
Key words: Currency crisis, financial crisis, early warning systems, signals approach, Ethiopia, 
Africa 
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1 Introduction  
Currency crisis and other forms of financial crisis, such as banking and debt crisis, have become 
the subject of rigorous research following their recurrence in recent decades (Berg and Pattillo, 
1999; Adrian and Shin, 2009; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008 & 2009). The empirical and theoretical 
work on the subject has usually coincided with historical waves of major currency crisis. The 
‘first-generation’ models of currency crisis, as they are referred to in the literature, correspond 
to the Latin American currency crisis of the early 1980s (Flood and Garber, 1984). These models 
supposed that currency crises are fundamentally linked to macroeconomic problems. It was 
argued that investors attacked currencies when the respective country’s macroeconomic 
problems grew and became unsustainable. Such events often force monetary authorities to 
devalue their currencies (Ari, 2012). The ‘second-generation’ models of currency crisis came in 
the aftermath of the 1992-93 crisis of European Exchange Rate Mechanism (Obstfeld, 1994 & 
1996). These later set of models accounted for possibilities where currency crisis might arise even 
if there was no severe worsening of macroeconomic fundamentals. The third and latest 
generations of currency crisis models have followed the 1997 Asian currency crisis. These later 
developments have built on the gaps in previous generation models. The Asian currency crisis 
has shown the importance of accounting for fragilities in the financial (banking) sector and 
capital accounts. The countries with weakness in their banking sector and fairly liberalized 
financial sectors did particularly suffer more (Radelet and Sachs, 1998; Krugman, 1999; Aghion 
et al., 2000).  
 
Models of currency crisis are designed to foresee them before they ensue. For this reason, they 
are often referred to as ‘early warning systems’. The models try to achieve their objectives by 
tracking major determinants of currency crisis. The seminal work on ‘early warning systems’ for 
currency crisis has been that of Kaminsky et al. (1998). However, various studies on currency 
crisis have tried to apply the ‘early warning systems’ procedure, using different datasets and 
estimation techniques. For instance, Martinez-Peria (2002), Fratzscher (2003) and Abiad (2003) 
have used Markov-switching approach. Berg and Pattillo (1999), Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2000), Bussiere and Fratzscher, (2006) have applied logit/probit models. Edison 
(2003), Cesmeci and Onder (2008), Peng and Bajona (2008), and El-Shagi et al. (2013) have 
used signals approach.  
 
This paper uses the signals approach in identifying currency crises. Kaminsky et al. (1998) have 
suggested a non-parametric method, known as the signals approach, to foresee banking and 
currency crisis. It makes an ex-post study of the behaviour of various macroeconomic indicators 
and tries to see if the indicators exhibit ‘unusual’ behaviour prior to a currency crisis. The 
indicators will be categorized as showing ‘unusual’ behaviour when they cross a certain 
threshold. These thresholds are calculated as a certain percentiles out of the distribution of the 
indicators which minimize their noise-to-signal ratio. A composite index is then developed out 
of the ensuing signals, which is in turn, converted to conditional crisis probabilities.  
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The signals approach is better suited for this case study, given its simplicity and capacity to 
accommodate large set of indicators. It also has the ability to treat indicators separately and 
also in a unified manner, i.e. composite index (see section-3). Further, a reliable use of Markov-
switching and logit/probit techniques would require bigger datasets. Much of the existing 
literature also shows the use of these techniques on multi-country panels. Even if the use of panel 
datasets delivers the opportunity to use a range of estimation techniques, it limits the analysis 
to a general overview of currency crises. Further, the fundamentals behind currency volatility 
are often different, given the structural differences among countries.  
 
So far, the empirics are mostly based on advanced and emerging economies, whose nature is 
different from those of small low-income economies. This research, therefore, tries to contribute 
to the limited body of literature on currency crisis in low-income developing economies by 
examining the phenomenon in Ethiopia. Developing countries like Ethiopia are likely to have 
sources of fragility that differ from countries that are more financially open and developed. By 
conducting a country case study, this paper tries to deliver an in-depth analysis in to currency 
turmoil in a developing country and various underlying macroeconomic and policy issues that 
span nearly four decades (1970-2008).  Over the years, Ethiopia has witnessed big devaluations 
on its national currency (i.e. birr) and also some volatility in its foreign exchange market, 
especially since the partial float of the currency in 1994. The fact that Ethiopia has a small 
undeveloped economy and weak foreign exchange market makes it susceptible to various shocks. 
 
The paper is structured in the following manner. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the Ethiopian 
economy, describing in particular the history and current state of the financial system. Section 
3 explains the methodology of the signals approach.  In this section, issues such as crisis 
definition, indicator variables, the composite crisis index and probabilities of a currency crisis 
will be addressed. Section 4 discusses the results and section 5 gives the conclusion. 
 
2 Overview of Ethiopian economy and its financial system 
Ethiopia is a low-income developing nation that is currently witnessing rapid economic growth. 
Real GDP growth over the past decade (2001-10) averaged 8.4%. As IMF (2011) shows, the 
country’s average growth rate was 11% in the six years up to the height of the global financial 
crisis in 2009. The main drivers of growth have been agriculture and service sectors. In recent 
years, the nation has also taken advantage of growing exports (especially coffee and horticulture), 
foreign aid and FDI. Alongside the fast pace of GDP growth, the nation has been confronted 
with rising petroleum and food prices, and thus inflation.  
 
The financial sector of the country is relatively small, as is the case in most Sub-Saharan African 
economies. As can be seen in Figure-1(a), Total bank asset as a share of GDP is low, at 25%. 
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The largest bank (Commercial Bank of Ethiopia) is owned by the government, which has great 
control over commercial bank rates and lending. The rest of the banking industry is dominated 
by few domestic private banks. In fact, the five largest banks accounted for 84% of total bank 
assets in 2012, see Figure-1(b). Further, foreign exchange transactions are largely dominated by 
the central bank (National Bank of Ethiopia).  
 
Figure-1: Comparison of banking systems in African economies 
Computation based on World Bank 2012 survey of banking systems in 180 countries (see Barth et al., 2013) 
 
The government owns the largest share of bank assets, at 61%. This is high even by African 
standards, See Figure-1(c) for comparison. In recent years, there have been moves to let the 
domestic private sector participate in the banking business.  Yet, the sector is currently closed 
to foreign ownership. This makes Ethiopia a special case (Barth et al., 2013). In most other 
African countries, however, foreign investors own significant percent of bank assets, see Figure-
1(d). The capital market is relatively undeveloped. The monetary authorities issue treasury bills 
of 28 days as well as for 3 and 6 months. No stock markets exist at the moment but there are 
recent moves towards creating specialised equity markets. One example is the ECX (Ethiopia 
Commodity Exchange), which currently hosts transactions of agricultural goods. It is a spot 
Figure-1 Comparison of banking systems in African economies 
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exchange set up in Addis Ababa, the nation’s capital. Through an open outcry system, a range 
of spot deals are transacted by traders (Alemu and Meijerink, 2010). 
 
The country’s central bank has been the main monetary authority in the economy. Its domain 
of operation has, however, seen changes over the years. The central bank, which was previously 
known as the ‘State Bank of Ethiopia’, was acting as both central and commercial bank from 
its re-establishment in April 1943 to its dissolution towards the end of 1963. Following the 
monetary and banking proclamation no. 206 of 1963, the State Bank of Ethiopia split in to a 
new central bank (National Bank of Ethiopia) and a state-owned commercial bank (Commercial 
Bank of Ethiopia). The duty of issuing coins, which was previously owned by the Ethiopian 
treasury, was transferred to the National Bank.  
 
Following the 1974 Marxist revolution, private banks and insurance companies were nationalised. 
On September 1976, Proclamation No. 99/1976 was passed, giving greater powers to the central 
bank in terms of control over the financial system (insurance institutions, credit cooperatives 
and investment banks). This converted the financial system in to a single (exclusively public) 
banking system. The bank also held a pivotal role in national financial planning.  Following the 
fall of the socialist government in 1991 and the consequent transition to free market economy, a 
new law (Monetary and Banking Proclamation, No. 93/1994) was passed in January 1994. This 
brought back the dual (private and public) banking system that was operational before the shift 
to socialism. Once again, private commercial banks were allowed to operate side by side with 
state banks.  
 
The local currency was pegged to the US dollar for nearly half a century from 1945 until the 
nation adopted a managed floating system in 1994. The peg has been revised periodically over 
the years. On 1st of May 1993, Ethiopia adopted a dual rate system whereby an official peg 
continued to be used, parallel to an independent float determined through auctions. In this 
period, the official rate was periodically adjusted by the central bank according to the evolution 
of the auction rate. Finally, the two rates were officially unified on July 1995. With this brief 
introduction to the nation’s monetary system and history, we proceed to a discussion of the 
signals approach.  
 
3 Methodology (signals approach) 
The aim of the signalling technique is to check if certain key macroeconomic variables are 
behaving ‘unusually’ in a time period preceding a currency crisis. The approach first constructs 
a currency crisis index (EMPI), which serves to define periods of currency crisis. It then examines 
the behaviour of indicator variables in the period prior to the identified crises.  
3.1 Crisis definition  
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Kaminisky et al. (1998:15) define a currency crisis as “a situation in which an attack on the 
currency leads to a sharp depreciation of the currency, a large decline in international reserves, 
or a combination of the two”.22 They propose an exchange market pressure index (as a measure 
of currency crisis) as follows: 
 
 Exchange Market Pressure Index (EMPI) 
Suppose we denote: 
푒푡 = The exchange rate at time t (birr/USD) 푅푡 = Foreign reserves of a nation at time t (in USD) 휎훿푅 = The standard deviation of the rate of change of foreign reserves 휎훿푒 = The standard deviation of the rate of change of the exchange rate 
 
Then, the index of exchange market pressure EMPI can be given as: 
퐸푀푃퐼푖,푡 =  훿푒푖,푡 − (휎훿푒휎훿푅) 훿푅푖,푡, 푤ℎ푒푟푒 훿푒푡 =
(푒푡 − 푒푡−1)푒푡−1  푎푛푑 훿푅푡 =
(푅푡 − 푅푡−1)푅푡−1    (1) 
 
As indicated in the above equation, an appreciating exchange rate is positively associated with 
the EMPI index while international reserve accumulation is, negatively related to the index. If 
the exchange rate instability is severe, it may develop into a currency crisis, which leads to major 
depreciation of the local currency. In such circumstances of depreciation, central banks often get 
involved and increase interest rates and also use their foreign reserves to purchase the local 
currency. Exchange rate instability and reserve losses are, thus, good proxies of a typical currency 
crisis. 
 
According to the EMPI, a currency crisis is supposed to happen when the index exceeds m 
standard deviations beyond its mean. If we designate the mean of the index with μEMPI  and 
the standard deviation of the index with σEMPI, m ε IR+, we can formally describe a currency 
crisis as; 
 퐶푅퐼푆퐼푆푖,푡 = {1, 푖푓 퐸푀푃퐼푖,푡 >  µ퐸푀푃퐼푖,푡 + 푚휎퐸푀푃퐼푖,푡0, 표푡ℎ푒푟푤푖푠푒                                       (2) 
 
In this study, the months in which the index is at 1.5 standard deviations or more above its 
sample mean value are labelled as cases of currency crisis or speculative attacks.23 The threshold 
benchmark of 1.5 standard deviations is also used in various other case studies since it gives 
good estimation of a currency crisis (see Eichengreen et al., 1997; Feridun, 2007; Herrera and 
Garcia, 1999; Cumperayot and Kouwenberg, 2013).  In cases where the index crosses the 
                                                            
22 Kaminisky et al. (1998) state that a ‘crisis’ defined in such a way captures both successful and 
unsuccessful attacks on the currency of a nation under fixed and other exchange rate regimes. See also 
Dahel (2001), Edison (2003) and Davies (2012). 
23 m =1.5 in equation (2) 
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threshold multiple times, we will use an exclusion window of 12 months to avoid counting what 
essentially one crisis is as multiple crises.24  
 
As an alternative to the mean plus 1.5 standard deviations threshold level, we also use the Self-
Exciting Threshold Autoregression or SETAR technique. This method enables us to 
endogenously determine thresholds. 
  
Self-Exciting Threshold Autoregression (SETAR) technique 
SETAR models are nonlinear models that are commonly applied to economic time series data, 
see Tong (1990). They have been successfully used to track and forecast daily exchange rate 
movements and explain recessions (see Ades et al., 1999; Kahraman et al., 2012; Montgomery et 
al., 1998). A single-threshold, dual-regime, first-order lag structure autoregressive SETAR model 
(2, 1, 1) can be specified as: 
 푦푡 = {훼 + 훽푦푡−1 + 휆1푡 푖푓 푦푡−푑 ≤ 훾 휂 + 휌푦푡−1 + 휆2푡 푖푓 푦푡−푑 > 훾  (3) 
 
Where,  
훾  is a threshold level that is estimated over a grid search, 
d is a ‘delay’ parameter,  
휆1푡 and 휆2푡 are independent random variables and 훼  and 휂  are constants.  
 
The threshold (훾) is estimated by means of the maximum-likelihood method, using the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). In other words, it is chosen through a grid search to maximize the 
likelihood of an alteration in the behaviour of the time series. Due to this, the method is 
impervious to a possible blame of ‘arbitrariness’ or subjective selection of thresholds. 
 
3.2 Crisis indicators  
In their study, Kaminsky et al. (1998) used 15 core macroeconomic and financial indicators 
which they consider as having potentially good predictive power for currency crises, namely; real 
exchange rate, exports, stock prices, ratio of M2 to international reserves, output, excess M1 
balances, international reserves, M2 multiplier, ratio of domestic credit to GDP, real interest 
rate, terms of trade, real interest differential, imports, bank deposits and the ratio of lending 
rate to deposit rate. Due to lack of data, this study will not include the indicators ‘industrial 
output’ and ‘stock prices’. Industrial production in Ethiopia is rather low and constitutes only 
a small share of GDP. Further, the indicator ‘stock prices’ is not relevant as there is no stock 
market in the country, as of now. The data on the 13 indicators used in this study was gathered 
                                                            
24 This means that there has to be a minimal gap of one year between two separate incidences of a currency 
crisis. For further explanation, see Feridun (2007). 
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from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). It constitutes monthly values of the set 
of indicators.25 All variables are expressed as percentage changes over the duration of 12 months, 
except those noted otherwise. The information regarding the indicator variables and their 
description is given in Table-1. 
 
Table-1: Description of the Indicator Variables 
Indicator Variable Description How is the indicator 
used? 
Real exchange rate: 
 
Determined from nominal exchange rate (IFS line 
00ae) by adjusting for relative consumer prices (IFS 
line 64). 
 
The indicator is 
measured as percentage 
deviation from its trend 
Imports: 
 
IFS line 71_d 12-month percentage 
change 
Exports: 
 
IFS line 70_d 12-month percentage 
change 
Terms of trade: Global Development Finance & World Development 
Indicators. 
Monthly terms of trade was interpolated from annual 
data. 
12-month percentage 
change 
Reserves: 
 
IFS line 1L.d. 12-month percentage 
change 
M2/reserves: 
 
Determined by converting M2 (IFS lines 34 plus 35) 
from local currency (i.e. birr) into dollars (using line 
00ae) and then dividing it by reserves (line1L.d) 
12-month percentage 
change 
Real interest rate 
differential: 
The difference between domestic real interest rate and 
the real interest rate in the United States. 
Percentage difference 
M2 multiplier Given as the ratio of M2 (IFS lines 34 plus 35) to base 
money (IFS line 14)  
12-month percentage 
change 
Domestic credit/GDP: 
 
Determined by deflating domestic credit (line 32) by 
consumer prices and then dividing it by real GDP 
(line 99b.p.). Monthly real GDP was interpolated from 
annual data. 
12-month percentage 
change 
Domestic real interest rate Determined by deflating deposit rate (IFS line 60l) by 
consumer price inflation (IFS line 64) 
percentage 
Lending-deposit rate ratio Determined by dividing lending rate (IFS line60p) by 
deposit rate (IFS line 60l) 
ratio 
Excess M1 balances: 
 
Determined by deflating M1 (IFS line 34) by consumer 
prices (IFS line 64) and then subtracting an estimated 
demand for money from it. The demand for money, in 
millions of nominal 
currency -birr 
                                                            
25 See table-1 for the list of 13 indicators used in this study. Also see Peng and Bajona (2008) and Kaminsky 
et al. (1998) 
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turn, is estimated from a regression of real M1 
balances on real GDP, consumer price inflation, and a 
linear time trend. 
Bank deposits: 
 
Determined by deflating deposits (IFS line 24 plus 25) 
by consumer prices (IFS line 64). 
12-month percentage 
change 
Note: IFS= International Financial Statistics (International Monetary Fund). See also Peng and Bajona (2008) 
 
Similar to the crisis index, the binary signals from individual indicators (1 = warning signal and 
0 = none) are defined by a certain threshold level for each indicator variable. Table-2 summarizes 
the explanations regarding the thresholds used for each indicator. Those indicators which tend 
to rise before the start of a crisis (such as imports, real interest rates and domestic credit) will 
have an upper threshold. On the contrary, those indicators which tend to decline before the start 
of a crisis (such as the real exchange rate, exports and bank deposits) will have a lower threshold. 
The exact percentiles used to calculate the thresholds for the indicator variables are taken from 
Edison (2003). These values are given in columns 7 and 8 of Table-5. The threshold percentile 
used for exports, for instance, is 10%. This means that, the indicator will be issuing a signal if 
its year-on-year growth is below the first decile of all observations. 
 
Table-2: Description of Thresholds of the Indicator Variables 
Category Indicator Tail Comments 
Current 
account 
indicators i 
Real exchange rate Lower Large negative shocks to exchange rate (i.e. 
the overvaluation of the real exchange rate) 
Imports Upper Rapid rise in Imports (a weak external sector) 
Exports Lower Rapid decline in exports (a weak external 
sector) 
Terms of trade Lower Big negative shocks to exchange rate and 
exports (and, hence, terms of trade) leads to 
loss of competitiveness of local businesses. 
This may at times lead to recessions. 
    
Capital 
account 
Indicators ii 
 
 
 
Foreign reserves Lower Sustained Loss of foreign reserve 
M2/ reserves Upper Expansionary monetary policy and/or rapid 
fall in reserves 
Real interest rate 
differential(Domestic/foreign) 
Upper Large interest rate differential which might 
lead to reversal of capital flows 
    
Domestic 
Financial 
sector 
Indicators 
iii 
M2 multiplier Upper Fast growth of credit 
Domestic credit/GDP Upper Domestic credit normally expands before a 
crisis and then contracts in later date. Since 
we are interested in events before crisis, we 
take the upper threshold. 
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Domestic real interest rates Upper Presence of high real interest rates might 
show a liquidity crunch in an economy. 
Further, speculative attacks are often dealt 
with by rising real interest rates 
Lending/deposit  interest 
rates 
Upper Lending rates normally appear to go up before 
a crisis. Yet, rising lending rates show the 
decline in loan quality. 
Excess real M1 
balances 
Upper Loose monetary policy (excess liquidity) might 
lead to a currency crisis 
Bank deposits Lower Banks lose their deposits as crisis starts to hit 
the economy 
    
Real 
sectoriv 
Industrial production Lower A recession (decline in industrial output) often 
leads financial crises. 
Equity indices Lower Burst of asset price bubbles (such as the US 
housing market bubble in 2007) often lead 
financial crises 
i See Heun (2004); Dornbusch et al. (1995)  
ii See Edison (2003); Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) 
iii See Edison (2003); McKinnon and Pill (1996); Goldfajn and Valdes (1995) 
iv See Edison (2003); Gorton (1988); Calomiris and Gorton (1991); Heun (2004) 
 
An indicator issues a warning signal about the likely occurrence of a crisis when it crosses its 
threshold within a particular period called ‘signalling horizon/window’ of 24 months. A signal 
will be treated as a ‘good signal’ whenever it appears within the signalling horizon and a ‘false 
signal’ or ‘noise’ otherwise. Table-3 summarizes the signalling possibilities, which can be used 
to evaluate the performance of the indicators. 
 
Table-3: The performance of an indicator 
 Crisis within 24 months No crisis within 24 months 
Signal issued A B (a ‘false positive’ = Type II 
error) 
No signal issued C (a ‘miss’ = Type I error) D 
Note: The table summarizes the possible outcomes of an indicator variable. Cell A represents a good signal while cell 
B represents a noise or false alarm. Also note that entries C and B would be zero for a perfect indicator (i.e. a perfect 
indicator only has cell A and D). 
 
In theory, if an indicator is flawless, it will give only good signals i.e. cell A and Cell D > 0 and 
there will be no Type I error (a ‘miss’; cell C) or Type II error (a ‘false positive’ signal; cell B).  
Kaminsky et al. (1998) suggest an indicator threshold which will minimize the ratio of false 
signals to good signals i.e. (B / B +D)/ (A/ A+C), which they call the ‘noise-to-signal ratio’. 
This measure will help to assess the effectiveness of the individual indicators. If the noise-to-
signal ratio is below one, the indicators will be taken as significant. If the ratio is above one, the 
indicator will be considered insignificant and, thus, dropped.  
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3.3 Composite crisis index and probabilities of a currency crisis 
3.3.1 Composite index 
The main objective behind the use of the composite index is to merge the signals from the 
particular indicators in a comprehensive manner. Following Kaminsky et al. (1998), we define 
our composite index as a weighted average of the signals from individual indicators. The signals 
from the indicators are weighed by the noise-to-signal ratio of the respective indicator. Suppose 
the signals from indicator j in period t are given as St j ε {0, 1} and the noise-to-signal ratio of 
indicator j is denoted as ωj, the weighted composite crisis index is given as; 
 퐾푡 = ∑ ( 1휔푗)
푛
푗=1
푠푡 푗 (4) 
 
As the weights are the inverse of the noise-to-signal ratio, this index gives greater weight to 
better-performing indicators (only those with a ratio below unity). Furthermore, as the index is 
a positive sum of the signals, there will be a higher probability that a currency crisis will occur 
if larger number of indicators are signalling.26 
3.3.2 Probabilities of a currency crisis 
The probability of the currency crisis is derived from the composite index. It is calculated by 
watching how frequently a crisis follows a particular value of the index within 24 months (see 
also Edison, 2003; Peng and Bajona, 2008; Kaminisky et al., 1998). We may formally define the 
conditional probabilities of a currency crisis as; 
 
Pr (Ctn, t+24 |Kt = j) = Months with K=j and a crisis within 24 months Months with K=j  (5) 
 
Table-4: Composite crisis Index and Crisis probabilities 
Value of composite crisis indicator Probability of crisis 
0-0.6 .14 
0.6-1.2 .12 
1.2-3 .17 
3-5 .25 
5-7 .32 
7-9 .33 
9-10 .43 
                                                            
26There are other ways in which the signals could be combined. One obvious technique would be to take 
the composite index as a simple sum of the signals. Kaminsky et al. (1998) and Edison (2003), however, 
show that the weighted composite index performs better. 
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10-11 .51 
11-12 .49 
Over 12 .50 
Source: Edison (2003) 
4 Results and discussion 
Figure-2 and Figure-3 plot the exchange market pressure index (EMPI) for Ethiopia over the 
period January 1970 to December 2008, for the fixed and float (managed) exchange rate regimes 
respectively. Using the 1.5 standard deviation rule, we identify one longer crisis episode (October 
1992-September 1993) in the fixed exchange period and two brief crisis episodes (March-July 
1999 and October-December 2008) in the floating exchange regime. When the SETAR technique 
is employed to determine the threshold, more pressure points are identified both for the fixed 
and floating exchange rate regimes. The pressure points are closer to the 1.5 standard deviation 
rule in the case of the floating exchange rate regime. For the fixed exchange rate regime, however, 
the SETAR method labels wide range of periods as pressure points. We have based our analysis 
on the 1.5 standard deviation rule, as it is more robust. 
 
Figure-2: Exchange Market Pressure Index (fixed exchange) 
 
Note:  
(a) The ‘signalling window’ represents a 24 month period before the onset of crisis. Good macroeconomic indicators of crisis will 
show unusual or extreme changes in this period and largely stick to their usual trend in other (normal) period.  
(b) ‘empi_fixed’ refers to Exchange market Pressure Index (EMPI) under fixed exchange rate regime. 
(c) ‘threshold-empi_fixed’ is the benchmark threshold, if crossed by the EMPI would represent a crisis. The threshold is computed 
by taking the mean of EMPI plus 1.5 of its standard deviation. 
(d) ‘SETAR_fixed’ is an alternative threshold, if crossed by the EMPI would represent a crisis. This threshold is computed by 
using Self-Exciting Threshold Autoregression (SETAR) technique. It avoids arbitrary setting (self-selection) of thresholds. 
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Figure-3: Exchange Market Pressure Index (managed float) 
 
Note:  
(a) The ‘signalling window’ represents a 24 month period before the onset of crisis. Good macroeconomic indicators of crisis will 
show unusual or extreme changes in this period and largely stick to their usual trend in other (normal) period.  
(b) ‘empi_float’ refers to Exchange market Pressure Index (EMPI) under floating exchange rate regime. 
(c) ‘threshold-empi_float’ is the benchmark threshold, if crossed by the EMPI would represent a crisis. The threshold is computed 
by taking the mean of EMPI plus 1.5 of its standard deviation. 
(d) ‘SETAR_float’ is an alternative threshold, if crossed by the EMPI would represent a crisis. This threshold is computed by 
using Self-Exciting Threshold Autoregression (SETAR) technique. It avoids arbitrary setting (self-selection) of thresholds. 
 
The 1992-93 crisis was clearly grounded in domestic developments. In the early 1990s, the 
Ethiopian economic and political landscape was dominated by major changes. Following a shift 
in political power, socialist economic policies that were in place for 17 years were replaced by 
free market policies, backed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund’s 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP). The reform program liberalized exchange rate 
regimes and foreign trade. Discretional government interference and regulation in setting prices 
of goods and services were abolished.  
 
Financial market reform opened up commercial banking, micro credit and insurance services for 
the private sector. Additionally, on 1st of October 1992 the local currency (birr) was devalued 
from an exchange rate of 2.07 birr/dollar to 5 birr/dollar. The devaluation was made with the 
intention of advancing local output and employment; removing the difference among the official 
and the parallel market rates, and enhancing foreign reserves. While still susceptible to changes 
in climate and foreign aid, the agriculture dominated export sector has, indeed, demonstrated 
advances after the country gave up the fixed exchange rate policy in 1991 and applied a sequence 
of macroeconomic adjustment and stabilization plans. In reforming the exchange rate regime, an 
auction system for foreign exchange was as well introduced in 1993 (Naude, 2008). 
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The 1999 crisis overlaps with the Ethio-Eritrean border clash. Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia in 
1993. Following that, the two nations signed a treaty ‘Agreement on Friendship and 
Cooperation’ in 1993. According to Tronvoll (2004), the economy was, possibly, the most crucial 
part of that accord. In spite of the importance of the treaty, its implementation was weak and 
both nations went after divergent economic policies. Just before to the eruption of the armed 
conflict, Eritrea’s principal trading partner was Ethiopia, accounting for about two-thirds of its 
exports (Paulos, 1999).27 They both used a single currency (the Ethiopian birr), and the port of 
Assab, in Eritrea, was Ethiopia’s key export outlet. 
  
Over time, because of the increasing competition from domestic products, the demand for 
Eritrean goods in the Ethiopian market diminished. Eritrea laid bigger tariffs on products 
imported and exported by Ethiopia via the port of Assab to retaliate the new Ethiopian economic 
policies. Further divergences appeared regarding investment polices and the handling of 
investors. Eritrea desired to invest without restrictions, while Ethiopia put up confinements, 
especially in key sectors such as electric power supply, insurance and banking (Tronvoll, 2004). 
Then in November 1997, Eritrea released its own currency, the Nakfa (also Nacfa). Eritrea 
demanded a one-to-one parity of the Birr with the new currency and that the two currencies 
would freely circulate in both economies (dual currency union). These propositions were declined 
by Ethiopia. In January 1998, following the introduction of the Nakfa, Ethiopia also released 
new notes of Birr. Such economic policies and measures, added with the political unease, 
hastened the road to war (see Abbink, 1998 and 2003; and Gedamu, 2008).28 Apart from the 
direct impact of the currency wars between the two nations, the huge cost of financing the armed 
conflict and its ripple effects on the overall economy (investment, trade and tourism) may explain 
the timing of this currency crisis.  
 
                                                            
27 Ethiopia was the principal trading partner for Eritrea before the start of the conflict in May 1998. For 
instance, according to IMF (2003), more than 63% of Eritrea’s exports went to Ethiopia in 1997. Further, 
9% of Eritrea's imports came from Ethiopia in the same year (see Table (I) and (II) in Annex). However, 
given the size of unreported cross-border trade between the two countries at the time, the true level of 
Eritrea's dependence on its big neighbor would be much higher than these numbers suggest. After the 
conflict, trade between the two countries has almost entirely stopped. 
28 Before the onset of the conflict, the border was porous and people and goods moved freely between the 
two countries. Onother key area of economic dispute has been the fact that Eritrean businessmen have 
been buying Ethiopian coffee and exporting it - thus, weakening Ethiopian exports and, thus, its foreign 
currency earnings.  This process has reportedly elevated Eritrea to become the 13th largest coffee exporter 
at the time - despite the fact that Eritrea didn’t even grow coffee. This was facilitated by the then existing 
bilateral trade agreement, where Eritrean businessmen were allowed to purchase commodities in Ethiopia 
duty free in local currency. However, in principle, duty free trade were applicable just for purchases 
directed to local consumption and not re-export. Although, trade disputes such as this (and other economic 
woes) are mentioned as the causes of conflict, the border-dispute is seen as the single most important 
cause of the clash between the two neighbors (Michaelson, 1998). 
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Yet, the 1992-93 crisis episode also roughly corresponds to the 1992–93 crisis of European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism, as does the 1999 crisis with the 1997-99 Asian financial crises. 
However, we believe that domestic events were the key explanators of these two crisis. Further, 
by 1999 many emerging Asian economies were actually showing signs of recovery. The 
transmission of financial shocks from the Asian crisis to Sub-Saharan Africa was modest due to 
the undeveloped nature of financial markets and the small amount of private capital inflows 
(Hussain et al., 2002). The main ways through which the effect of the external crisis was felt in 
the region was through the decrease in prices of oil, sugar, and gold (among others) and the 
increase in the prices of other commodities like coffee and tea (Harris, 1999). As it took advantage 
of the decline in international oil price (top import item) and the rise in coffee price (top export 
item), the overall net effect was positive for Ethiopia. It, therefore, seems more plausible that 
the currency crisis was due to the political and economic conflict with Eritrea, rather than the 
Asian financial crisis.  
 
The 2008 currency crisis coincides with the zenith of the global financial crisis. Like all other 
nations, Ethiopia has suffered to some extent from this crisis. The economy has experienced 
shocks through falling foreign direct investment, trade, remittances, loans and aid. Exports of 
commodities (coffee, horticulture, hides, cereals, cotton, sugarcane etc.) declined following the 
downturn in global demand. Mishra (2011) estimates that merchandise exports, merchandise 
imports, service exports, service imports, private financial transfers and foreign direct investment 
would have been 30%, 34%, 22%, 61%, 55% and 70% higher (respectively) than their actual 
value if the crisis didn’t hit. In another study, Getnet (2010) estimates that gross domestic 
investment declined to 20.3% of GDP in 2008/09, from about 24% of GDP in the preceding four 
years. Even overall GDP growth itself declined from 10.8% in 2008 to 8.7% in 2009, though this 
was still high compared to other developing economies.29 Mishra (2011) attributes the relative 
resilience of the Ethiopian Economy to two major factors.  The first has to do with access to 
foreign financial aid. External financing has been recently rising in the form of long term loans 
from non-traditional lenders such as China. The other factor has been the policy response by the 
government. The policy measures included depreciation of the currency, getting rid of fuel 
subsidies and reducing domestic borrowing by the private and public sector.30 While much of the 
rest of the world engaged in easy monetary and fiscal policies in the aftermath of the crisis, 
Ethiopia started following tight monetary and fiscal policies. These policies were justified as the 
domestic imbalance involved excess aggregate demand rather than excess aggregate supply. 
 
                                                            
29 The five year average GDP growth rate of Ethiopia (between 2004 and 2008) was 11.7% while for all 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) developing economies it was 5.6% (World Bank WDI database). 
30 Recent exercises on IMF’s debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) show that Ethiopia’s risk of external debt 
distress is low (see Megersa, 2015).  
51 
 
Ethiopia’s vulnerability to external shocks comes from its overdependence on the export of farm 
items and raw materials (notably, coffee and gold) whose international prices fluctuate greatly. 
Considering the country's petroleum imports (which is about 5% of GDP), the rise in fuel prices 
might significantly affect the balance of trade. Further, vulnerability to external shocks arises 
from volatilities in financial flows (Lin, 2011; Essers, 2013). There is a necessity to keep sufficient 
amounts of foreign reserve as a buffer against exogenous shocks. Indeed, the nation had been 
piling up foreign reserves following the world commodity price surges of the 2000s and IMF’s 
increased support. However, this has been partially reversed since 2011 due to big monetary 
injections through public infrastructural projects, rising inflation, devaluation of birr and the 
subsequent sales of foreign reserve to control domestic liquidity. According to IMF (2012), foreign 
reserves dwindled to US$2.3 billion in April 2012, compared to US$3.5 billion in September 2011. 
This level of reserve is able to cover just 1.8 months of potential imports (the acceptable 
minimum is three months of import cover). This trend puts external stability at great risk.  
 
Having determined the periods of currency crises, we will next try to see the evolution of the 
indicators in the time period under consideration. We are particularly interested to see if the 13 
indicators we selected can produce signals in the 24 month signalling window before the onset 
of the crisis.  Figure-4 displays the evolution of the individual indicators over the period under 
consideration (January 1970 to December 2008).  
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Figure-4: The indicators of vulnerability to currency crisis 
    
Note: The shaded region represents a 24 month period before the onset of crisis. Good macroeconomic indicators of crisis will show 
unusual or extreme changes in this period and largely stick to their usual trend in other (normal) period. The broken lines represent 
threshold lines, when crossed the respective indicator would issue a signal. 
 
All indicators are given as annual percentage changes except for the following indicators, namely;  
• excess M1 balances (given in millions of nominal currency),  
• deviation of the real exchange rate from trend (given in percentage) and 
• the three interest rate variables i.e. real interest rate differential, domestic real interest 
rate, lending-to-deposit rate ratio (given in percentage) 
 
For all indicators in figure-4, the three shaded regions represent the 24 month period of signalling 
window for the three currency crises defined by the EMP index. The broken horizontal line 
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represents the threshold (upper or lower as defined for each indicator). The performance of the 
13 indicators in figure-4 and their thresholds are summarized in Table-5. 
Table-5: Results from the signals approach 
 
Number of signals in 
preceding 24 months 
  Threshold Noise-to-signal ratio 
(Comparison to other studies)  
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M2 multiplier 0 13 5 18 70 85 14.69 0.53 N/A .86 .61 
Domestic 
credit/GDP 
1 4 0 5 93 80 7.09 3.20 N/A .75 .62 
M2/reserves 3 0 0 3 46 90 107.81 2.60 .1 .52 .48 
Bank deposits 12 0 6 18 46 10 -8.06 0.28 10.9 .94 1.2 
Exports 12 2 0 14 46 10 -43.29 0.42 1.02 .6 .42 
Imports 6 0 0 6 46 90 77.38 1.21 .55 .88 1.16 
Terms of Trade 6 2 0 8 46 10 -54.52 0.86 N/A .93 .77 
Reserves 3 0 0 3 46 10 -46.65 2.61 .86 .53 .57 
Deviation of Real 
ER from trend 
24 0 0 24 46 10 -47.59 0.17 0 .26 .19 
Real interest rate 
differential 
0 0 0 0 46 90 143.63 N/A* N/A 1 .99 
Excess M1 
balances 
2 0 0 2 46 90 5043.60 4.00 .19 .55 .52 
Domestic real 
interest rate 
(deflated by cpi) 
0 0 0 0 93 80 20.00 N/A* N/A .66 .77 
Lending-deposit 
rate ratio 
24 0 0 24 93 80 2.41 0.52 3.4 2.7 1.69 
N/A= not available     N/A*= not available due to division by zero 
Note: There are 468 months in the dataset (Jan 1970 to Dec 2008). 72 months (24months X 3 crisis) belong to the 
signalling window. The rest (396 months) are tranquil periods. The total signals received from an indicator in the 3 
signalling windows (72 months) are given in column 5 of table-5. The total signals received from an indicator in the 
whole study period (468 months) are given in column 6 of the table. Suppose: A=column 5, B= (Column 6 – column 
5), C=(72-A), D=(396-B), Then the ‘noise-to-signal ratio’ can be given as (B / B +D)/ (A/ A+C). In the case of 
indicator ‘M2 multiplier’ for instance, A=18; B=53 (i.e. 71-18); C=54 (i.e. 72-A) and D=343(i.e. 396-B). Thus, noise-
to-signal ratio will be (53/(53+343))/ (18/(18+54)) ≈ 0.54. See table-2 and the subsequent explanation in section 3.2 
for more clarification. 
 
Columns (2, 3, 4 and 5) of Table-5 sum up the information about the signals in the 24 months 
signalling window. The sixth column gives the total signals received in the overall period under 
consideration, i.e. 468 months (Jan 1970 to Dec 2008). Columns 7 and 8 show threshold levels 
as percentiles and values of the indicator. Column 9 shows the noise-to-signal ratio for this study 
while the last three columns show the results from other studies, for the sake of comparison. 
Taking the first variable in the table (i.e. M2 multiplier), we see that the indicator gave no 
signals during the 24 month signalling window preceding the 1992-93 crisis. However, the 
indicator gave 13 and 5 signals in the signalling windows of the 1999 and 2008 crisis respectively.  
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During the signalling window for the 1992-93 crisis, three out of 13 variables did not issue any 
signal: the M2 multiplier, real interest rate differential, and domestic real interest rate. The other 
indicators cross their thresholds for various months and, hence, issue signals, ranging from 1 
signal (domestic credit/GDP) to 12 signals (bank deposits and exports). Two indicators, 
deviation of real exchange rate from trend and lending-deposit rate ratio, remained above the 
threshold during the whole period of this signalling window. During the second signalling 
window, four indicators made signals ranging from 2 (exports and terms of trade) to 13 (M2 
multiplier). During the third and latest signalling window, only 2 of the 13 available indicators 
made signals. Indicator M2 multiplier crossed its threshold 5 times while indicator Bank deposits 
crossed its threshold 6 times. 
 
In accordance with the noise-to-signal ratio principle, six indicators (M2 multiplier, bank 
deposits, exports, terms of trade, deviation of real ER from trend and lending to deposit rate 
ratio) appear to be significant. Five indicators (M2 multiplier, Domestic credit/GDP, bank 
deposits, exports, and terms of trade) picked two of the three crises. This follows the small 
number of indicators signalling the 1999 and 2008 crises. Another observation is on the nature 
of these indicators. They were all either current account indicators (deviation of the real 
exchange rate, Exports and terms of trade) or domestic financial sector indicators (M2 multiplier, 
Bank deposits and Lending-deposit rate ratio). None of the Capital account indicators considered 
in the study (Foreign reserves, M2/reserves and Real interest rate differential) was a good 
indicator based on the noise-to-signal ratio rule. 
 
Figure-5 gives the probability of currency crisis for Ethiopia, under the period of consideration. 
As we can see from figure-5, there have been multiple periods where the probability of the 
currency crisis has been high.  
Figure-5: Crisis Probabilities                              
 
Note: The shaded regions represent a 24 month period before the onset of crisis. Good macroeconomic indicators of crisis will show 
unusual or extreme changes in this period and largely stick to their usual trend in other (normal) period.  
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The case studies made by Edison (2003) on Mexico and Peng and Bajona (2008) on China also 
showed that out-of-sample probabilities are irregular and not always consistent. The results 
sometimes showed high crisis probabilities not only in the pre-crisis periods but also in ‘normal’ 
periods where the probabilities should be low. Edison (2003), however, showed that the average 
crisis probabilities were generally higher in the pre-crisis signalling window compared to rest of 
the period under study. This holds true for this case study also (see figure-5).  The average crisis 
probability in the signalling window (0.27) is higher than the average crisis probability in the 
normal period (0.18).  
 
If we also see the composite index in figure-6, it is clearly elevated during the signalling window 
of the 1992-93 crises. However, the composite index values in the latter two signalling windows 
were not exceptionally high. This can be explained by the fact that more indicators signalled in 
the signalling window of the 1992-93 crisis compared to the signalling windows of the 1999 and 
2008 crises.  
 
Figure-6: Composite Crisis Index 
 
Note: The shaded regions represent a 24 month period before the onset of crisis. Good macroeconomic indicators of crisis will show 
unusual or extreme changes in this period and largely stick to their usual trend in other (normal) period.  
 
Our study finds local developments having more explanatory power for currency crises than 
external factors. This matches the reality of undeveloped capital markets in Ethiopia and the 
lose integration to the financial world. The first crisis was of domestic origin and was at the 
crossroads of major economic and political transitions in the country. For this reason, it was 
easily picked up by more indicators. The second crisis has domestic, regional and international 
elements. The third crisis has clear external roots and aligns with the time of global financial 
crisis. The latter two crises were not easily picked by the set of indicators we used. To this end, 
multilateral surveillance techniques and indicators that are good in tracking external shocks 
might be needed.  
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5 Conclusion  
In this study, we used the signals approach (introduced by Kaminsky et al., 1998) to see as to 
what extent key macroeconomic indicators have predictive power for currency crisis in Ethiopia, 
defined by the exchange market pressure index, EMPI. Using this index (and the 1.5 standard 
deviations above the mean threshold), three crisis episodes were identified; October 1992-
September 1993, March-July 1999 and October-December 2008. Relatively more indicators signal 
the first crisis than to the latter two. Consequently, the composite index and the out-of-sample 
crisis probabilities were quite high in the period preceding the first crisis. Out of the 13 indicators 
used, the M2 multiplier, bank deposits, exports, terms of trade, deviation of real ER from trend 
and lending-deposit rate ratio were significant according to the noise-to-signal ratio rule. Their 
extreme values were more or less aligned with the signalling windows preceding the crises 
episodes. 
 
One suggestion that may follow our finding is that, perhaps there is room for more indicators 
(from both real and financial sectors) that are ‘better’ in capturing international contagion. In 
an increasingly interconnected world economy, multilateral surveillance techniques are gaining 
importance.  If the methodological issues of crisis detection are properly addressed and the set 
of indicator variables are augmented to reflect international financial contagion, the signals 
approach may continue to be a useful instrument. The technique can be an integral part of an 
early warning system for different kinds of crises. By analysing past currency crises in a country 
(or set of countries) and the behaviour of financial indicators in the period before the onset of 
the crises, the approach derives key lessons. Policy makers, monetary authorities and other 
stakeholders may use these lessons to take precautionary measures as important financial 
variables start showing ‘unusual’ behaviour. The signals approach might, therefore, help to 
design a good financial early warning system and informed macroeconomic policies. 
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Annex: 
 
Table (I): Eritrea - major export destinations (in Value and share of total) 
  
Source: IMF (2003) 
 
61 
 
Table (II): Eritrea - major sources of import (in Value and share of total) 
  
Source: IMF (2003) 
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Chapter 4: Unconventional Monetary Policy Spillovers to South Africa † 
 
 
Abstract 
The paper investigates how recent non-standard monetary policies in advanced economies 
affected the returns on a wide range of South African assets. We study the impact of nearly all 
key unconventional monetary policies (UMP) adopted by the Federal Reserve (Fed) and 
European Central Bank (ECB) since the onset of the global financial crisis. We use high 
frequency daily data and model foreign investment flows and the returns on sovereign bond 
yields, credit default swaps (CDS), interbank rate, exchange rates, and key stock market indices. 
We control for standard monetary policy instruments, market volatility, financial news, and 
release of macroeconomic data. We also control for endogeneity problems using a novel 
methodology, ‘identification through heteroscedasticity’ (IH). The results show that 
unconventional policies of the Fed has affected South African assets. Generally, the impact of 
the Quantitative Easing (QE) policy has been lowering yields, lowering the interbank rate, 
lowering CDS spreads, boosting stock market indices and appreciation of the rand. The impact 
was strongest for the first phase of QE. The tapering of QE had an impact which, in most cases, 
reversed the impact of the QE policy. Further, the impact of ECB’s ‘asset purchases’, ‘liquidity 
provision’, and ‘collateral easing’ policies had generally been appreciation of the domestic 
currency, reduction or sovereign bond yields and CDS, and increase in key stock market indices. 
Generally, the diverse set of Fed and ECB’s asset purchase program had qualitatively 
comparable spillovers on South African financial assets, although the significance of the effects 
differed under various settings. 
 
Keywords: monetary policy, spillovers, capital flows, Federal Reserve, ECB, South Africa 
JEL classification: E52, E58, G15, N27 
                                                            
† A special thanks goes to Paul Reding, Jan Annaert, Janvier Nkurunziza, Jean-Marie Baland, and Guido 
Erreygers for their valuable comments. All remaining errors are mine. 
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1 Introduction   
During the global financial crisis and the period that followed, advanced economies were gripped 
by retrenched economic and financial distress that limited the effectiveness of conventional 
monetary policies. In response, major central banks have resorted to ‘unusual set of monetary 
tools’ in the quest to deal with ‘unusual set of financial and economic challenges’. However, given 
their size and pivotal role in the international financial system, the policy responses by the Fed 
(and ECB) are thought to have brought knock-on effects on other economies - far and beyond 
their own borders. In recent years, a number of studies have taken on the challenge of analyzing 
these monetary spillovers. Initial studies have focused on analyzing the impact of Fed’s QE 
policies on the rest of the world (e.g. Aizenman et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2014; Lim et al., 2014; 
Fratzscher et al., 2013).  
 
Since the Eurozone crisis, the ECB has also started adopting similar bold unconventional 
monetary responses to deal with liquidity problems in the Eurozone. Given the expansion of Fed 
and ECB balance sheets by trillions of dollars and euros following their massive financial market 
operations (see Figure 1), it is not difficult to assume that there would be a global ramification 
(Fawley and Neely, 2012; Fratzscher et al., 2016). This is especially true for those economies 
that are highly connected to international financial markets. Due to ECB’s more active role in 
its market, in recent years, various studies have also tried to analyze the spillover effects of its 
non-standard monetary policies (e.g. Kucharcukova et al., 2016; Falagiarda et al., 2015; 
Fratzscher et al., 2016). Big central banks often follow these policies in response to localized 
problems. For instance, the ECB was fighting liquidity difficulties in specific Euro area economies 
(or specific asset markets) and persistently low levels of inflation in much of the Eurozone with 
waves of conventional (e.g. policy rate adjustments) and unconventional (e.g. asset purchase 
programs) tools. However, as Falagiarda et al. (2015) note, other economies outside the Eurozone 
that are tightly linked to the Eurozone via financial and real market linkages have faced the 
unintended consequences of these operations.  
 
This study examines the international propagation of spillovers from non-standard (also called 
‘unconventional’) monetary policies adopted in advanced economies, although standard 
monetary policy events are also used as controls. The focus will especially be on the policies 
adopted by the US Fed and Eurozone’s ECB.31 The empirical analysis will focus on a case study 
conducted on South Africa (SA). The objective here is to deliver an in-depth study on the 
                                                            
31 The study makes a comprehensive empirical assessment of all major non-standard monetary spillovers 
from both the US Federal Reserve and ECB using high frequency daily data on asset returns. 
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country.32 This enables us to thoroughly assess the internal policy environment and 
macroeconomic fundamentals that determine how external policy experiments (shocks) get 
transmitted to the local financial market and make an impact.33  
 
Figure 1: Federal Reserve & ECB balance sheets 
 
Source: using FRED data34 
 
The experiences of individual emerging economies and the degree to which they are affected by 
international policy environment depends on their domestic monetary policy environment and 
fundamentals.35 For instance, unique individual country events, such as macroeconomic data 
releases and the fact that they are higher or lower than forecasts (i.e. expectations) will drive 
asset prices in a special way for a specific economy.36 As such, the experience of individual 
emerging economies and their vulnerability to the unconventional monetary shocks becomes 
heterogeneous and different from one another. Therefore, this case study will offer an inquiry 
focused on one key emerging economy, i.e. South Africa.  
                                                            
32 By focusing on South Africa, we get the opportunity to model local events and policy changes that 
might uniquely explain the country’s susceptibility to monetary spillovers. 
33 In doing so, this research complements studies which analyze panels of (diverse) emerging economies. 
Apart from delivering just the average picture, cross-country studies of monetary spillovers give limited 
room to country-specific information. This partially has to do with the difficulty of focusing on detailed 
internal dynamics of multiple countries at the same time. 
34 Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) 
35 Although the scope, methodology, type and volume of data analyzed makes this study unique; there are 
some case studies and reports (mostly descriptive) that have assessed the impact of recent monetary policy 
shocks on South Africa. One such study is that of BIS (2014), which was a report produced together with 
the South African Reserve Bank. It presents a basic descriptive discussion of how Fed’s unconventional 
asset purchase programs - and its later tapering - might affect South Africa and how the country’s central 
bank dealt with it. The preliminary assessments of the report largely back the findings of this empirical 
exercise. 
36 A case study enables us to study (in detail) how external monetary policy shock might affects diverse 
asset classes in different ways. 
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The paper will follow the following structure. Section 2 will discuss the pattern of international 
financial flows to South Africa. Section 3 will discuss the methodology and data used in the 
paper. Section 4 will deliver the main analysis and results, by focusing on specific transmission 
channels of policy spillovers from Fed and ECB’s unconventional monetary policies. Section 5 
conducts a range of robustness exercises. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2 Financial flows to South Africa  
South Africa has one of the most open economies in the developing world, with a highly-
developed banking and finance industries. In fact, its stock market (JSE limited), is the 17th 
largest in the world as of 2015 by market capitalization. JSE’s market capitalization of over 900 
billion USD (as of Jan. 2015) was more than two and half times the size of the country’s GDP 
itself. Net portfolio investment inflows in to equities of the country rose in the early 2000s. 
Conversely, South Africa experienced a net outflow of portfolio investments from equities worth 
4.7 billion USD in 2008, in connection with the global financial crisis. Similarly, net portfolio 
investments in bonds fell from 6.8 billion USD in 2007 to a net outflow of 2.4 billion USD in 
2008. The country recovered to significant portfolio equity investment inflows in 2009 worth 9.4 
billion USD. However, it again witnessed significant outflows in 2011 worth 3.8 billion USD 
(WDI, 2016). This coincides with heightened distress in international markets, especially second 
half of 2011, and fear of a ‘second recession’ (Fawley and Neely, 2013).37 Generally, the country 
has been switching between brief cycles of significant foreign investment inflows and outflows in 
to its financial securities, since 2008. These cycles also match international economic environment 
and monetary policy actions of key central banks, as we will discuss in subsequent sections. 
 
Looking at high frequency depiction of financial transitions by foreigners in South Africa (Figure 
2), there are numerous brief ‘financial cycles’ of significant inflows and outflows in to bonds and 
equities. However, focusing on the cumulative net purchases of both bonds and equities in recent 
years, we notice that foreign investors have been net sellers of equities on the JSE market while 
they have become net buyers of bonds on the market. We generally observe this divergence 
between foreign bond holdings vis-à-vis shareholdings since late 2011. The net sells of equities 
by foreign investors on JSE has, however, dramatically increased since early 2016, where the 
market has seen outflows worth billions of Rands - in a feat not seen since the financial crisis. 
This is particularly driven by recent economic and political difficulties (and waning confidence) 
in the country, as well as due to higher yields on bonds. 
 
                                                            
37 The distress in financial markets in this period could also be seen from the ‘market volatility’ indices 
given in Figure 1.3 in Annex 4.  
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Figure 2: Foreign net purchases of JSE equities and bonds 
(Daily net purchases and cumulative purchases) 
 
Source: using Datastream  
 
Table 1: Foreign banks’ claims (consolidated positions) on South African counterparties 
(Amounts outstanding, Mill. USD - 2016, Quarter 4) 
Source: BIS Consolidated banking statistics   
Note:  
(1) For foreign banks and banks with parents in CBS-reporting countries, F plus Q does not sum to U because F is reported by a 
larger sample of banks; for the latest quarter, immediate counterparty data are reported by banks in 31 countries and ultimate risk 
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Foreign Net Purchases of SA bonds (Ml. USD)
Cumulative Foreign Net Purchases of SA bonds (Ml. USD)
 Claims on an immediate counterparty 
basis (F)1 
Net risk 
transfers 
(Q) (1) 
Claims on an ultimate risk basis (U=F+Q)1 
 International   By sector of counterparty 
Total Total Of which: 
Up to and 
including 
one year 
Local 
positions 
in local 
currencies 
Total Banks Official 
sector Non-bank private sector 
Total Of which: Non-bank 
financial 
Foreign banks 102,679 33,865 11,754 68,814 –1,064 97,371 10,026 18,127 69,202 10,493 
Of which: parents 
in CBS rep 
99,922 31,107 10,419 68,814 –1,064 97,371 10,026 18,127 69,202 10,493 
Australia 404 404 53 ... 216 619 44 1 574 ... 
Austria 111 111 29 ... –53 58 16 35 3 ... 
Belgium 19 19 8 ... 0 18 7 ... 11 ... 
Brazil 1 1 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
Canada 203 203 39 ...  262   226  
Chile ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
Chinese Taipei 534 434 204 100 97 631 431 35 165 ... 
Finland    ... ...   ... ... ... 
France 4,454 3,548 184 906 –770 3,684 825 608 2,251 102 
Germany 4,232    –1,320 2,912 840 299 1,761 40 
Greece 171 24 16 147 ... 171 14 5 153 ... 
Ireland 42 42 3 ... -1 41 2 ... 40 1 
Italy 672 672 22 ...  629 66 77 487 0 
Japan 8,863 8,863 1,252 ... 275 9,138 1,154 2,026 5,958 1,244 
Korea 191 191 174 ... ... 191 21 0 170 ... 
Mexico ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
Netherlands 590   ...  716  ...   
Panama 5 5 1 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
Spain  167 99  -106 61 15  46 ... 
Sweden 68 68 37 ... –31 37 3 0 34 ... 
Switzerland 1,234 1,234 785 ... 158  ... ... ... ... 
Turkey 4 4  ...  4  ...  ... 
United 
Kingdom 
65,532 4,488 2,553 61,044 –225 65,307 3,130 12,379 49,798 7,227 
United States 10,377 5,615 3,537 4,762 558 10,933 2,535 2,609 5,789 1,832 
Memo:Domest. 
banks (2)           Worldwide 
offices 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
Foreign offices 
(unconsolidated) 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
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data by banks in 26. For parents in individual CBS-reporting countries, F plus Q may not sum to U because of rounding differences 
or inconsistencies in the underlying data reported by banks.  
(2) Positions on the country where the controlling parent is located, i.e. on residents of banks’ home country. Available only for 
countries that are CBS-reporting countries. 
 
European economies, the US and Japan are the most important sources of financial inflows. As 
data from Consolidated Banking Statistics (CBS) of Bank of International Settlement (BIS) 
shows, foreign banks had close to 100 billion USD worth of claims on various South African 
counterparties (banks, non-bank private sector, public sector), in the last quarter of 2016. Of 
this, UK, US, Japan, France and Germany were sources of close to 95% of the cross-border 
financial flows to South Africa. The dominant role of these countries, as key source of financial 
flows, has persisted over the years. The only exception has been that of the UK, which has 
considerably increased its investment in South Africa in the early 2000s. As of 2016 (Quarter 4), 
UK accounts around 65% of all cross-border claims (see Table 1).  
Most of the cross-border financial flows (about 70% of the foreign claims on South Africa or 
more than 69 billion USD) were directed to the non-bank private sector. Claims of foreign banks 
on South African banks amounted to 10 billion USD, while the figure for the public sector was 
slightly over 18 billion USD.        
 
Figure 3: Consolidated positions on counterparties resident in South Africa  
(All sectors, USD Mill.) 
 
Source: using BIS Consolidated banking statistics  
The cross-border financial flow between South Africa and its external partners is also facilitated 
by the fact that a number of foreign controlled banks, or branches of foreign banks, are 
operational in the market. This includes Absa Bank, whose majority stake (more than 62%) is 
controlled by Barclays Bank PLC (UK) and branches of major international banks such as 
Citibank, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, HSBC, Standard Chartered Bank, Deutsche 
0
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Bank, JPMorgan Chase Bank, etc. (Table 2). Of these foreign controlled banks or local branches 
of multinational banks, Absa bank (currently called ‘Barclays Africa Group’) is the only one 
that qualifies to be ‘systemic’ (see Figure 4 (a) and (b)). It dominates the country’s banking 
industry, along with big domestic banks like Standard bank, FirstRand bank, and Nedbank. The 
role of other foreign banks is visible just in the foreign currency market (Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Total assets of major domestic & foreign banks in South Africa  
(Bill. Rand, Feb. 2013) 
Bank Foreign 
Bank 
Branch (B), 
Foreign 
Controlled 
(C) 
Foreign 
currency 
loans & 
advances 
Central 
bank 
money & 
gold 
SA 
banks 
Mortgage 
advances 
Overdrafts, 
loans & 
advances: 
private sector 
Investments Total 
assets ‡  
The Standard Bank of SA Ltd 
 
116.02 20.91 23.45 321.93 147.64 174.7 963.4 
FirstRand Bank Ltd 
 
29.27 20.33 12.2 174.6 157.47 136.04 733.38 
Absa Bank Ltd Yes(C) 27.41 19.77 4.59 277.48 145.34 156.68 765.63 
Nedbank Ltd 
 
25.12 22.84 11.44 221.7 137.23 68.58 617.16 
Investec Bank Ltd 
 
16.89 4.37 11.24 79.61 56.37 76.48 260.01 
Citibank N.A Yes(B) 15.2 0.97 4.74  8.16 18.17 48.81 
Bank of China Ltd – Jhb 
branch 
Yes(B) 7.8 0.13 0.61 0.01 1.98 0.36 10.89 
China Construction Bank 
Corporation – Jhb branch 
Yes(B) 7.76 0.20 0.56  2.82 2.2 14.07 
HSBC – Jhb branch Yes(B) 7.58 0.5 0.16  3.44 15.35 38.36 
Standard Chartered Bank Yes(B) 4.39 0.52 3.12 0.14 6.32 5.46 20.22 
Deutsche Bank Ag Yes(B) 3.52 0.01   0.64 13.11 17.98 
JPMorgan Chase Bank Yes(B) 1.43 0.23 0.15  4.32 20.23 35.12 
Bank of Taiwan – SA branch Yes(B) 1.16 0.05 0.01 0.53 0.19 0.15 2.09 
State Bank of India Yes(B) 0.41 0.03 0.37 0.02 0.91 0.63 2.33 
Bidvest Bank Limited 
 
0.24 0.11 1.06 0.13 0.18 0.17 4.1 
Bank of Baroda Yes(B) 0.2 0.02 0.28 0.09 0.79 0.09 1.45 
HBZ Bank Ltd Yes(C) 0.2 0.04 1.44 0.23 0.7 0.5 3.13 
Mercantile Bank Ltd Yes(C) 0.16 0.17 0.00 2.44 3.09 0.3 7.06 
Sasfin Bank Ltd 
 
0.04 0.05 0.54  0.84 0.52 3.07 
Habib Overseas Bank Ltd Yes(C) 0.03 0.02 0.57  0.28 0.13 1.03 
The S A Bank of Athens Ltd Yes(C) 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.99 0.29 0.09 2.01 
Société Générale–Jhb branch Yes(B) 0.02 0.00 5.49  0.22 0.47 6.46 
Capitec Bank 
 
0.00 2.04 3.2  31.39 3.23 38.34 
African Bank Ltd 
 
 1.28 3.19  54.09 4.25 65.9 
Albaraka Bank Ltd Yes(C)  0.18 0.77 1.97  0.45 3.85 
Bank of India Yes(B)  0.00 0.23  0.02 0.00 0.25 
BNP Paribas SA Yes(B)  0.00 0.35    0.36 
Finbond Mutual Bank 
 
 0.00 0.06  0.29  0.62 
GBS Mutual Bank 
 
 0.02 0.04 0.5 0.01 0.09 0.91 
Grindrod Bank Ltd 
 
 0.34 1.83 0.84 1.89 0.34 6.01 
Ubank Limited 
 
 0.3 0.54  1.27 1.19 3.63 
VBS Mutual Bank     0.01 0.05 0.24 0 0.01 0.31 
Total 
 
264.88 95.47 92.34 1083.45 768.18 699.95 3677.94 
Source: PWC (2013)  
Note:  
‡ Total assets includes other assets not shown in the table. Such as, Credit card debtors; Overdrafts, loans and advances to public 
and private sector; non-financial assets, etc. 
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Figure 4 (a): Major South African Banks: Systemic Risk Contribution 
 
Source: AIFMRM 38 
 
Figure 4 (b): Standard Bank: Systemic position in African banking networks 
 
Sources: Mecagni et al. (2015) 
Note:  
(a) Figure depicts Standard Bank (South Africa) and its various markets of operation within Africa 
(b) Countries in which Standard Bank is ‘systemically important’ (i.e. the bank’s deposit share exceeds 10% of respective country’s 
banking system deposits) are represented in red 
(c) The size of each ball indicates the asset share in consolidated assets of that subsidiary 
The fact that South Africa i) witnesses significant cross-border capital flow ii) has a banking 
industry that sees considerable involvement of major foreign banks and banking groups; leads 
us to argue that it will be susceptible to financial shocks and spillovers that are international in 
nature. Further, given that its own banks are operational in various emerging and frontier 
                                                            
38 African Institute of Financial Markets and Risk Management (AIFMRM) 
 http://www.systemicrisk.org.za/ 
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economies, especially those in Africa; the dynamics in South Africa’s financial sector will be of 
interest to them.39 For instance, Standard Bank, the largest bank in the country with a market 
share of around 25% of the domestic banking industry (BAS, 2014), is also systemic40 in about 
nine other African economies (see Figure 4 (b) and Mecagni et al., 2015).41 
3 Methodology and data 
In this study, we will try to identify how the announcement of unconventional monetary policies 
by the Fed and ECB have affected a diverse set of asset classes in South Africa. Using daily data 
that extends over the Jan 01, 2007 to June 30, 2016 period, we highlight the international 
spillovers of these recent policies.42  Apart from the announcement of non-standard monetary 
policies by ECB and Fed, we also make controls for local monetary policy decisions, i.e. from 
South African Reserve Bank (SARB), and release of key macroeconomic data. Including the 
later information is useful as the release of data (e.g. employment, industrial output, exports, 
etc.) has an impact on investor sentiment, and thus, affects cross-border flow of capital.  
The key monetary policy announcements might be conveyed through press releases, speeches 
and conferences (see Tables in Annex 3). With regards to Fed’s policy communications, we focus 
on the three waves of the Quantitative Easing (QE) policy and also its tapering, see Table A1 
in Annex 3. We also study the impact of ECB’s ‘asset purchases’, ‘liquidity provision’, and 
‘collateral easing’ policies. 
 
                                                            
39 Apart from the financial connection created by SA banks with various Southern African countries, 
another important link is the Common Monetary Area (CMA). The CMA is a monetary zone between 
Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia vis-à-vis South Africa. The SA rand is a legal tender in all CMA countries - 
although, the member states also issue their own currencies. Yet, their national currencies are pegged at 
par to the rand (Wang et al., 2007). This creates another source of vulnerability to these economies by 
tying their financial cycles with their bigger neighbour, South Africa. 
40 A ‘systemic’ bank here refers to banks with deposit share exceeding 10% of total banking system deposits 
(Mecagni et al., 2015). 
41 The South African banking industry is dominated by four large banking groups, namely: Standard Bank, 
First Rand, Barclays Africa Group (formerly ABSA group), and Nedbank (originally Netherlands Bank 
of South Africa Limited). These banking groups have international operations and subsidiaries. For 
instance, Standard Bank has made expansions and acquisitions in to various African countries (Cote 
d’Ivoire, Mozambique, Nigeria, Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda) and other international markets (e.g. 
Argentina, UK, Turkey, Russia, etc). Some of these banks are owned either by major international banking 
groups (e.g. ABSA) or by institutional and private investors on the JSE limited (e.g. First Rand and 
Nedbank). 
42 The empirical analysis focuses on the Jan 01, 2007 to June 30, 2016 period - i.e. the period since the 
Global Financial Crisis when unconventional monetary policies became operational in advanced economies. 
However, we also use the data over the Jan 01, 2000 to June 30, 2016 period to compare the dynamics of 
various South African assets before and after the crisis (e.g. see Table 3.1, Table 3.1, Table 3.1, Table 
5.1). 
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3.1 Empirical method 
The econometric model adopted here closely follows those of Fallagiarda et al. (2015), Fratzscher 
et al. (2016); Chen et al. (2014) and Szczerbowicz (2015). We will estimate the following model 
while trying to capture the impact of unconventional external monetary policies on key South 
African financial assets. 
∆푌푡 = 훼 + 훽푈푀푃푡퐹 + 훾1∆퐼푅푡퐹 + 훾2∆퐼푅푡푆퐴 + 휃1∆푀퐾푇푉표푙푎푡푖푙푖푡푦푡 + 휃2푁푒푤푠푡 + 휀푡 (1) 
 
Where, ∆Yt represents the return on our set of dependent variables (i.e. financial assets) such as 
the returns on bilateral exchange rates (Rand vs USD and Rand vs Euro), JSE stock market 
indices, 3 month interbank rate, sovereign bond yields of 5 and 10 years, credit default swap 
(CDS) of 5 and 10 years as well as foreign investment flows in to equities and bonds. The choice 
of these financial assets also closely follows the literature (e.g. Fratzscher et al. 2016; Hofmann 
and Takats, 2015; Fallagiarda et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2014; Fratzscher et al., 2013). Further, 
UMPtF accounts for unconventional monetary announcements by the US Fed and ECB. These 
are event dummies that will assume the value of ‘1’ on the days of the event and ‘0’ otherwise. 
IRtF represents US Federal Funds rate and ECB’s policy rate while IRtRSA represents South 
Africa’s policy rate. MKTVolatilityt captures market volatility.43 Further, Newst accounts for 
key news items in the financial media and the publication of key South African macroeconomic 
data.44 We additionally account for the fact that the data releases could be above or below 
market forecast or expectation (e.g. increase in employment, rise in industrial output, decrease 
in deficit, etc.)45 
3.2 Data 
A) Unconventional monetary policy measures (Shock-I): (Sources: Fed, ECB, Literature) 
All major asset purchase programs, their date of announcements, actual market commencements 
and termination, and also other key non-standard market operations by US Fed and ECB, in 
the period since the global financial crisis, is considered (see Table A1 and A2 in Annex 3). 
B) Conventional monetary policy measures (shock-II): (Sources: SARB, Fed, ECB) 
All interest rate cuts and hikes on the Jan 01, 2007-June 30, 2016 period for SARB, Fed and 
ECB. This includes a review of large number of SARB Monetary Policy Committee meeting 
briefs and their key rate decisions (see Table A3 in Annex 3).  
C)  Asset classes and financial flows (dependent variables): (Sources: Datastream) 
                                                            
43 We use the SAVI index to proxy volatility in the South African Market and the VSTOXX index for 
volatility in external markets. See Figure 1.3 in Annex 4 for an overview of their historical dynamics. 
44 As a number of papers in the literature note (e.g. Fratzscher et al., 2016; Fallagiarda et al., 2015), the 
release of major macroeconomic statistics might affect our financial variables. 
45 Both actual values of data releases as well as forecasts are taken from Tradingeconomies. 
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 Exchange rates 
• South African Rand to USD 
• South African Rand to Euro 
 
 Key government bond yields 
• South African Government benchmark 5 year yields 
• South African Government benchmark 10 year yields 
 
 Credit Default Swaps (CDS) 
• South African Sovereign CDS - 5 years 
• South African Sovereign CDS - 10 years 
 
 Interbank rate 
• South Africa Interbank Rate - 3M 
 
 Stock market Indices  
• JSE All share price index 
• JSE Financial & Industrial index 
 
 Investment flows  
• Foreign net purchases of JSE equities 
• Foreign net purchases of JSE bonds 
 
D) Market Volatility: (Sources: Datastream) 
• Global market volatility index 
• South African market volatility index 
 
E) News on financial media relating to SARB: (source: Financial Times) 
Event dates for news items on Financial Times relating to South African Reserve Bank; where 
the search is conducted on Financial Times news archives using the search terms “South African 
Reserve Bank” and “SARB” (see Table A4 in Annex 3). 
F) News and market surprise relating to macroeconomic data releases: (source: Trading 
economies) 
Dates of various macroeconomic data releases, and information on whether the data released 
was higher or lower than forecasts. These key information reflect the economic fundamentals of 
the South African economy and determine the strength or vulnerability of the local economy to 
external shocks. The key macro data releases covered include: 
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• Balance of Trade 
• Barclays Manufacturing PMI 46 
• KAGISO Manufacturing PMI 
• Standard Bank PMI 
• Business Confidence 
• Consumer Confidence 
• Core Inflation Rate 
• Foreign Exchange Reserves 
• Current Account 
• GDP Growth Rate 
• Gold Production 
• Industrial Production 
• Inflation Rate 
• M3 Money Supply 
• Manufacturing Prod 
• Mining Production 
• Private Sector Credit 
• Producer Price Index 
• Retail Sales 
• Reuters Econometer 
• Total New Vehicle Sales 
• Unemployment 
 
For more details and summary statistics on these variables, see Annex 5 (particularly Tables 
1.1, 1.2 and 1.3). 
 
4 Transmission channels and analysis of impact 
The transmission channels for the non-standard monetary policies (see Annex 2 and 3 for a 
detailed list of these policies) are not mutually exclusive and could operate side by side, 
Fratzscher et al. (2016). Therefore, it can become challenging to separate one from the other. 
Further, different studies adopt different techniques to model the transmission channels (e.g. 
Georgiadis, 2015; Aizenman et al., 2014; Fratzscher et al., 2016; Bauer and Neely, 2013; 
Fratzscher et al., 2013; Christensen and Rudebusch, 2012; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen, 2011). 
As Hausken and Ncube (2013) note, non-standard monetary interventions such as QE follow the 
same purpose as cutting the policy rate (i.e. standard monetary intervention). When central 
banks announce large scale asset purchase programs, they deliver a picture of future monetary 
policies to market actors such as financial institutions and investors.47 In other words, it shows 
to the market that central banks are dedicated to keep interest rates ‘low’, and boost economic 
activity and financial transactions. This gives the market the ‘certainty’ and ‘confidence’ it needs 
for ‘normal’ operation in ‘abnormal’ times. A QE backed interest rate cut will have more power 
in generating market confidence than a mere policy rate cut for a simple reason: policy cuts 
could easily be reversed by central banks, making the future of monetary policy path less 
certain.48 However, when QE follows rate cuts, it is difficult for central banks to abruptly reverse 
                                                            
46 Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) is an indicator of the manufacturing sector’s business conditions. 
Purchasing managers of firms at manufacturing, construction and/or services sectors will be tracked by 
PMI surveys to determine sentiments. PMI surveys often track trends in production, orders, inventories, 
employment, prices, etc. (See https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/SAPMI:IND) 
47 This is sometimes termed as the ‘signaling channel’. 
48 However, sudden rate hikes by major central banks are less common in recent years due to very slow 
recovery in advanced economies. 
75 
 
monetary policy. A sudden rate hike will bring big losses up on central bank assets purchased 
under the QE policy.  
Big asset purchase programs have the power of altering the relative supply of assets that are 
being purchased in the market, since central banks purchase large quantities of private sector 
assets. Their actions, therefore, have impacts on the relative yields of various assets 
(Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; Hauksen and Ncube, 2013, Andrade et al., 2016). 
QE, for instance, raises the prices of asset classes that are under purchase and their ‘substitute 
assets’ (i.e. assets that share close characteristics), relative to the price of other (non-substitute) 
assets. This is addressed in the literature as the “Portfolio rebalancing” effect. The asset 
purchases by central banks under QE injects liquidity to markets. Therefore, QE may also 
increase asset prices due to the reductions of ‘illiquidity Premiums’ (Joyce et al., 2012). 
Conversely, as Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) note, QE might increase 
government bond yields (relative to other more liquid assets). This is possible due to QE’s role 
in liquidity expansion and reductions in risk-premia of sovereign bonds. Nevertheless, such effects 
will only be limited to the period were central banks are in the process of conducting their asset 
purchases (Hauksen and Ncube, 2013). 
In addition to their effect on asset prices, ‘asset purchase programs’ might also have an impact 
on the real sector, since they might also affect inflation and economic growth. With improved 
market liquidity and rise in market confidence, banks might be motivated to lend more for real 
economic activity. However, there was limited empirical evidence for this as banks (following 
the global financial crisis, weak capital fixation, and era of deleveraging) chose instead to hold 
on to central bank injections - rather than lend it out. The boost to confidence following QE 
might also lead to more investments by firms and spending by consumers. 
 
Chart 1: The transmission channels of QE 
 
The key channels of transmission, however, could be grouped in to the following core categories:  
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4.1 ‘International portfolio balance’ channel: 
Non-standard monetary policies are mainly set up to bring changes in the yields and prices on 
local assets. However, this could also have a global reach as ‘substitute assets’ in other countries 
could be affected by the unconventional monetary policies. Whenever the Fed and ECB buy US 
and Euro-area bonds, the yields on these bonds decline as compared to the yields on similar 
assets (e.g. sovereign bonds) in emerging markets. In such circumstances, investors that are 
looking for assets with higher yield - factoring in their risks - would move on to emerging markets 
(Mohanty, 2014; Fic, 2013; Joyce et al., 2012).  
In addressing Fed’s responses (i.e. QE) to the subprime crisis, Bernanke (2009) noted that the 
portfolio channel operates by transmitting its intended effects (or spillovers) to asset prices in 
“different market segments” and “different countries”, not just in the ‘intended market segments’ 
or the local economy of the advanced nations. Asset purchases by central banks will ‘crowd out’ 
investors from certain segments of the financial market in the target economies. This process 
will force investors to look for substitute assets, i.e. causing portfolio rebalancing. Although the 
non-standard monetary policies first impact the yields and risk-premium of specific 
(key/benchmark) asset categories, such as sovereign bonds, they will later on affect the prices of 
wide categories of assets as investors start to rebalance their portfolios.  
For instance, Mohanty (2014) explains how Fed policies affected emerging markets’ long term 
interest rates. First, the long term rate set by the Fed determine the international benchmark 
yields and also the risk appetite prevalent in the market. Conversely, the global benchmark 
yields and market risk appetites will determine the price of different types of bonds issued by 
emerging markets. This applies both to international bonds issued in dollars or euros and local 
currency bonds. However, the strength of this transmission channel depends on the degree to 
which emerging market bonds could serve as substitutes to sovereign bonds from advanced 
economies. Given the growing risks in some advanced countries and generally better yields in 
emerging economies, this is plausible. Fallagiarda et al. (2015) argue that the portfolio rebalance 
channel could be the primary Channel of transmission for non-standard monetary policies from 
advanced economies. This particularly applies to the policies which involve direct purchase of 
assets. Chinn (2013) also notes that the portfolio-rebalancing channel could be the most 
important transmission channel as non-standard monetary policies are mainly set up to work 
through changes in the yields and prices of local assets.49 
We assess the impact of the UMP policies via the international portfolio rebalancing channel by 
directly looking at how they affect the flow of international capital to South African bonds and 
equities as well as indirectly by evaluating how these policies affect the returns on assets. In this 
                                                            
49 While studying the impact external unconventional monetary policies have on the sovereign bond yields 
of South Africa, if portfolio rebalancing has indeed happened from government bonds in advanced 
countries, then the price of ‘substitute assets’ (i.e. South African government bonds) should be affected. 
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regard, we first run a regressions (using equation 1), where the dependent variable is the net 
portfolio investment inflows to South African bonds and equities. Specifically, we use the daily 
net purchases of equities and bonds by foreign investors as a percentage of total investments 
(see Table 1.1 in Annex 1 for further clarification).  
The regressions based on Fed’s and ECB’s unconventional monetary policy events are given 
below. These tables (and others that follow for different transmission channels) give regressions 
of financial flows, asset returns or dynamics up on different non-standard monetary policy events. 
The first column of each table reports the benchmark result, while the other columns use different 
controls. 
The results show that announcements of asset purchase programs by the Fed have led to some 
financial inflows to SA equities and bonds - in line with arguments of the ‘international portfolio 
rebalancing’ channel. Conversely, announcements of the tapering of QE program have led to 
outflows, especially from SA equities. The unconventional policy announcements by ECB for 
asset purchases by ECB do not show significant impact. The Liquidity provision program shows 
statistically significant inflow in to SA bonds, while the collateral easing program shows some 
inflows to equities. However, the cumulated inflows or outflows on these announcements (for 
both Fed and ECB) were small when put in perspective to total foreign funds invested in SA. 
They generally represented inflows or outflows that are less than 1% of total foreign investments 
in the country’s financial assets (both in the benchmark estimates without control and also in 
additional regressions with controls). 
These results highlight two important realities. First, even if these announcement dates see 
statistically significant flows (worth hundreds of millions of USD), their size is diminished by 
the large amount of financial investment outstanding in South Africa (see Section 2). Moreover, 
significant net inflows in one period could be followed by outflows in the following period, or 
vice versa. Therefore, observing an ‘economically’ significant financial inflow or outflow often 
requires persistent inflow or outflow over longer periods of time.50   
Table 3 (a) Fed Unconventional Monetary Policy: Foreign invest. flows to SA equities 
C
on
tr
ol
s 
No controls Mkt. Vol. Mkt. Vol., 
IR 
Mkt. Vol., 
IR, ECB 
announc. 
Mkt. Vol., 
IR, ECB 
announc., 
News 
Mkt. Vol., 
IR, ECB 
announc., 
News 
(Robust) 
Mkt. Vol., 
IR, ECB 
announc., 
News (Lags) 
Mkt. Vol., 
IR, ECB 
announc., 
News (Alt. 
event 
window) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Model (F1.1) (F1.2) (F1.3) (F1.4) (F1.5) (F1.6) (F1.7) (F1.8) 
QE1 0.5734*** 0.5730*** 0.5722*** 0.5723*** 0.5722*** 0.5722 0.0642 0.1737**   
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.46) (0.11) (0.07)    
QE2 0.0620 0.0633 0.0627 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.0614 0.0561     
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07)    
QE3 -0.0518 -0.0544 -0.0556 -0.0555 -0.0555 -0.0555 0.0943 -0.0677     
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15)    
Taper -0.0230 -0.0234 -0.0230 -0.0229 -0.0232 -0.0232 -0.0646 -0.0365     
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08)    
                                                            
50 This section (and the paper at large) mainly focuses on the announcement effects of the unconventional 
policies. For some discussion on the short term and long term impact of these policies, see Section 5.3.2. 
78 
 
_cons 0.0206*** 0.0206*** 0.0214*** 0.0213*** 0.0213*** 0.0213*** 0.0228*** 0.0311***  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
N 2152 2152 2152 2152 2152 2152 2152 2152    
R-sq 0.014 0.014 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.006 0.015    
Notes:  
a) Standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) The dependent variable is the change in daily net purchases of South African equities by foreigners.  
c) Apart from the variables given in the table, additional controls are also used. Regressions (2) to (8) control for market volatility; 
regressions (3) to (8) control for standard monetary policy (interest rate) changes by Fed, ECB & SARB; regressions (4) to (8) 
control for ECP non-standard monetary policy announcements; regressions (5) to (8) control for the release of key macroeconomic 
data; regression (6) implements robust regression; regression (7) uses the lags of explanatory variables; regressions (8) applies a 3-
day event window to regression (7), while the other regressions use a 1-day event window. 
d) Regression (8) also includes interaction terms for Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting dates. Regressions (5) to 
(8) additionally use interaction terms for the release of macroeconomic data that is higher than markets expected.  
 
Table 3 (b) Fed Unconventional Monetary Policy: Foreign invest. flows to SA bonds 
C
on
tr
ol
s 
No controls Mkt. Vol. Mkt. Vol., 
IR 
Mkt. Vol., 
IR, ECB 
announc. 
Mkt. Vol., 
IR, ECB 
announc., 
News 
Mkt. Vol., 
IR, ECB 
announc., 
News 
(Robust) 
Mkt. Vol., 
IR, ECB 
announc., 
News (Lags) 
Mkt. Vol., 
IR, ECB 
announc., 
News (Alt. 
event 
window) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Model (F1.1) (F1.2) (F1.3) (F1.4) (F1.5) (F1.6) (F1.7) (F1.8) 
QE2 0.3886* 0.3958* 0.4005** 0.3997** 0.3601* 0.2037 0.6473*** 0.1737     
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.27) (0.20) (0.21)    
QE3 0.1838 0.1860 0.1891 0.1894 0.1570 0.0773 -0.3392 0.3604    
 (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.49) (0.40) (0.44)    
Taper -0.7036*** -0.7034*** -0.6732*** -0.6729*** -0.5959*** -0.6150*** -0.7320*** -0.5477*   
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.13) (0.18) (0.29)    
_cons 0.2293*** 0.2294*** 0.2276*** 0.2274*** 0.2510*** 0.2393*** 0.2518*** 0.2683*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
N 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500    
R-sq 0.013 0.013 0.015 0.015 0.022 0.019 0.030 0.039    
Notes:  
a) Standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) The dependent variable is the change in daily net purchases of South African bonds by foreigners.  
c) Apart from the variables given in the table, additional controls are also used. Regressions (2) to (8) control for market volatility; 
regressions (3) to (8) control for standard monetary policy (interest rate) changes by Fed, ECB & SARB; regressions (4) to (8) 
control for ECP non-standard monetary policy announcements; regressions (5) to (8) control for the release of key macroeconomic 
data; regression (6) implements robust regression; regression (7) uses the lags of explanatory variables; regressions (8) applies a 3-
day event window to regression (7), while the other regressions use a 1-day event window. 
d) Regression (8) also includes interaction terms for Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting dates. Regressions (5) to 
(8) additionally use interaction terms for the release of macroeconomic data that is higher than markets expected. 
f) We are not able to estimate the impact of QE1 announcements due to data unavailability in bond flows (this series starts only 
from 31 Jul, 2009). 
 
Table 3 (c) ECB Unconventional Monetary Policy: Foreign invest. flows to SA equities 
C
on
tr
ol
s 
No controls Mkt. Vol. Mkt. Vol., IR Mkt. Vol., IR, 
Fed announc. 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
Fed announc., 
News 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
Fed announc., 
News 
(Robust) 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
Fed announc., 
News (Lags) 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
Fed announc., 
News (Alt. 
event 
window) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Model (E1.1) (E1.2) (E1.3) (E1.4) (E1.5) (E1.6) (E1.7) (E1.8) 
Asset Purchase 0.1194 0.1228 0.1192 0.1184 0.1225 0.0673 0.0589 0.2885**  
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11)    
Liquidity Provision -0.0794*** -0.0703** -0.0828*** -0.0834*** -0.0832*** -0.1155*** -0.1167*** -0.0577    
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)    
Collateral Easing 0.1522** 0.1512** 0.1526** 0.1525** 0.1483** 0.1728*** 0.1480** 0.0523    
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.11)    
_cons 0.0118*** 0.0113*** 0.0121*** 0.0125*** 0.0118*** 0.0268*** 0.0130*** 0.0096**   
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)    
N 2152 2152 2152 2152 2152 2152 2152 2152    
R-sq 0.008 0.009 0.014 0.015 0.017 0.011 0.019 0.014    
Notes:  
a) Standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
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b) The dependent variable is the change in daily net purchases of South African equities by foreigners.  
c) Apart from the variables given in the table, additional controls are also used. Regressions (2) to (8) control for market volatility; 
regressions (3) to (8) control for standard monetary policy (interest rate) changes by Fed, ECB & SARB; regressions (4) to (8) 
control for Fed non-standard monetary policy announcements; regressions (5) to (8) control for the release of key macroeconomic 
data; regression (6) implements robust regression; regression (7) uses the lags of explanatory variables; regressions (8) applies a 1-
day event window to regression (5), while the other regressions use a 3-day event window. 
d) Regressions (5) to (8) additionally use interaction terms for the release of macroeconomic data that is higher than markets 
expected.  
 
Table 3 (d) ECB Unconventional Monetary Policy: Foreign invest. flows to SA bonds 
C
on
tr
ol
s 
No controls Mkt. Vol. Mkt. Vol., IR Mkt. Vol., IR, 
Fed announc. 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
Fed announc., 
News 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
Fed announc., 
News 
(Robust) 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
Fed announc., 
News (Lags) 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
ECB 
announc., 
News (Alt. 
event window) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Model (E1.1) (E1.2) (E1.3) (E1.4) (E1.5) (E1.6) (E1.7) (E1.8) 
Asset Purchase 0.4008 0.3958 0.4069 0.4033 0.3390 0.2384 0.4580 -0.2507    
 (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.49) (0.42) (0.57)    
Liquidity Provision 0.3429** 0.3460** 0.3477** 0.3447** 0.3109** 0.1792 0.3457** 0.3316    
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.25)    
Collateral Easing -0.1504 -0.1487 -0.1499 -0.1500 -0.0374 -0.0374 -0.1227 0.1484    
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.33) (0.25) (0.45)    
_cons 0.2139*** 0.2138*** 0.2116*** 0.2141*** 0.2410*** 0.2320*** 0.2390*** 0.2491*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
N 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500    
R-sq 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.010 0.018 0.015 0.019 0.016    
Notes:  
a) Standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) The dependent variable is the change in daily net purchases of South African bonds by foreigners.  
c) Apart from the variables given in the table, additional controls are also used. Regressions (2) to (8) control for market volatility; 
regressions (3) to (8) control for standard monetary policy (interest rate) changes by Fed, ECB & SARB; regressions (4) to (8) 
control for Fed non-standard monetary policy announcements; regressions (5) to (8) control for the release of key macroeconomic 
data; regression (6) implements robust regression; regression (7) uses the lags of explanatory variables; regressions (8) applies a 1-
day event window to regression (5), while the other regressions use a 3-day event window. 
d) Regressions (5) to (8) additionally use interaction terms for the release of macroeconomic data that is higher than markets 
expected.  
f) The bond flows series starts only from 31 Jul, 2009 - due to data unavailability. 
 
4.2 ‘Confidence’ channel: 
Central banks have the capacity to instill confidence in their respective financial markets using 
appropriate interventions and policy responses. Their actions might, therefore, boost asset prices 
by reducing uncertainty and risk premium on assets (Joyce et al., 2011; Joyce et al., 2012; 
Bowdler and Radia, 2012).51 When large scale asset purchases happen by the Fed and ECB, the 
confidence which they instill in the markets might lead to cross border financial flows.52 Capital 
might target assets overseas (i.e. those external markets that have high degree of linkage with 
advanced economies) though ‘carry trade’ where investors chase after higher yield assets.  
                                                            
51 The impact of unconventional monetary interventions on asset prices (or portfolio flows) due to reduced 
risk-premia on sovereign credits, has also been alternatively addressed in the literature as the ‘sovereign 
credit risk channel’ and has been empirically examined using CDS spreads (Fratzscher et al., 2016). 
52 Various monetary policy announcements (especially the non-standard policies that we are more 
interested in) are tools that were put in place with the intention of dealing with market uncertainties in 
advanced economies. However, as we have noted in the forerunning sections, these policies have 
consequences far beyond the domestic financial markets of advanced economies - as their spillover effects 
are also felt in emerging economies such as South Africa. 
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However, the same ‘carry trade’ argument might also imply capital outflow from emerging 
economies if they are especially perceived to be ‘vulnerable’ and assets in advanced economies 
are deemed to be ‘safer’ bets, although these have lower yields.  
Fallagiarda et al. (2015) note that the transmission mechanism which followed the announcement 
of ECB OMT policies impacted international capital markets through the confidence channel. 
OMT operations work by reducing the perceived risks associated with sovereign bonds that are 
issued by euro area economies.53 This would make a big difference especially to the sovereign 
bond issuances coming from countries under financial and economic pressure. The result would 
be an inflow of capital in to those euro area economies. This might affect emerging economies 
such as South Africa by reducing the appeal (and purchase) of their sovereign bond issuances, 
in favor of the bonds issued by Eurozone members. This relates not only to the bonds issued by 
the stronger economies such as Germany but also to those issued by the countries in the 
periphery - as their perceived risks are reduced by the OMT. However, it may also have the 
opposite effect if it leads to portfolio rebalancing and crowding-out of investors to alternative 
(substitute) markets like South Africa. The final impact of these policy intervention on South 
African assets would be difficult to predict since different transmission channels operate side by 
side (e.g. ‘confidence’ and ‘portfolio-rebalancing’ channels) and yet various events in individual 
countries could shape market sentiments.  
The impact of unconventional monetary policies on the ‘confidence channel’ could be examined 
by their effect on market volatility indices, which reflect market uncertainty (Fratzscher et al., 
2016). For this, we run regressions where the dependent variable is the daily change in South 
African Volatility Index. As can be seen from the results in the following tables, the 
announcements of the policies did not immediately (i.e. on dates of announcements) bring 
substantial changes to market confidence. Generally, the cumulated impact on the volatility 
index on the announcement dates was less than one percentage point. However, a visual overview 
of the volatility index in Figure 5 shows that market confidence in South Africa significantly 
improved through the span of QE1 and initial phases of ECB’s asset purchase program from end 
2008 to early 2010. Later on, the periods around end of QE, Eurozone debt crisis, and Fed’s QE 
tapering announcements have seen temporary jumps in market volatility or reduced market 
confidence. However, the scale of market volatility in recent years is lower when compared to 
the environment around late 2008 (i.e. the global financial crisis). 
 
 
 
                                                            
53 Saka et al. (2014) also note that the confidence in the Eurozone’s sovereign bond market has been 
reinstated by the OMT policy of the ECB. This was possible as investors perceive ECB’s commitment 
(via OMT) to act in its unique role as ‘lender of last resort’ within the Eurozone - whenever this would 
be necessary. 
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Table 4 (a) Fed Unconventional Monetary Policy: SA Market Volatility 
C
on
tr
ol
s 
No controls IR IR, ECB 
announc. 
IR, ECB 
announc., 
News 
IR, ECB 
announc., 
News 
(Robust) 
IR, ECB 
announc., 
News (Lags) 
IR, ECB 
announc., 
News (Alt. 
event 
window) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Model (F1.1) (F1.2) (F1.3) (F1.4) (F1.5) (F1.6) (F1.7) 
QE1 0.3298 0.3290 0.3291 0.2419 0.6471 -0.7309*** 0.1040     
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.90) (0.21) (0.17)    
QE2 0.5894* 0.5884* 0.5886* 0.5309* 1.2536** -0.3684 0.3543**   
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.61) (0.24) (0.18)    
QE3 0.5568 0.5560 0.5561 0.4689 1.4078** -0.2905 0.5990***  
(0.38) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.61) (0.28) (0.22)    
Taper 0.5090 0.5076 0.5078 0.4439 0.4264 0.1565 -0.1924     
(0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.21) (0.20)    
_cons -0.0440*** -0.0426*** -0.0428*** -0.0510*** -0.0010 -0.0483*** -0.0577***  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)    
N 2456 2456 2456 2456 2456 2456 2456    
R-sq 0.003 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.010 0.019 0.016    
Notes:  
a) Standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) The dependent variable is the difference in p.p. on the South African Volatility Index (SAVI). 
c) Apart from the variables given in the table, additional controls are also used. Regressions (3) to (7) control for standard monetary 
policy (interest rate) changes by Fed, ECB & SARB; regressions (4) to (7) control for ECP non-standard monetary policy 
announcements; regressions (4) to (7) control for the release of key macroeconomic data; regression (5) implements robust regression; 
regression (6) uses the lags of explanatory variables; regressions (7) applies a 3-day event window to regression (4), while the other 
regressions use a 1-day event window. 
d) Regression (7) also includes interaction terms for Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting dates. Regressions (4) to 
(7) additionally use interaction terms for the release of macroeconomic data that is higher than markets expected.  
 
Table 4 (b) ECB Unconventional Monetary Policy: SA Market Volatility 
C
on
t
ro
ls
 No controls IR IR, Fed 
announc. 
IR, Fed 
announc., News 
IR, Fed 
announc., News 
(Robust) 
IR, Fed 
announc., News 
(Lags) 
IR, Fed announc., 
News (Alt. event 
window) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Model (E1.1) (E1.2) (E1.3) (E1.4) (E1.5) (E1.6) (E1.7) 
Asset Purchase -0.8242*** -0.8210*** -0.8194*** -0.7936*** -0.4611 -0.6218** -0.7832*** 
 (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.38) (0.26) (0.26)    
Liquidity Provision -0.0950 -0.0964 -0.0949 -0.0884 -0.0280 -0.1372* -0.0864    
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.15) (0.08) (0.08)    
Collateral Easing 0.2190 0.2202 0.2203 0.2104 0.1109 0.1492 0.1362    
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (0.17) (0.17)    
_cons -0.0374*** -0.0365*** -0.0372*** -0.0441*** 0.0046 -0.0426*** -0.0576***  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)    
N 2456 2456 2456 2456 2456 2456 2456    
R-sq 0.005 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.004 0.016 0.012    
Notes:  
a) Standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) The dependent variable is the difference in p.p. on the South African Volatility Index (SAVI). 
c) Apart from the variables given in the table, additional controls are also used. Regressions (3) to (7) control for standard monetary 
policy (interest rate) changes by Fed, ECB & SARB; regressions (4) to (7) control for Fed non-standard monetary policy 
announcements; regressions (4) to (7) control for the release of key macroeconomic data; regression (5) implements robust regression; 
regression (6) uses the lags of explanatory variables; regressions (7) applies a 3-day event window to regression (4), while the other 
regressions use a 1-day event window. 
d) Regressions (4) to (7) additionally use interaction terms for the release of macroeconomic data that is higher than markets 
expected.  
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Figure 5: South African Volatility Index
 
Source: Using Datastream  
 
4.3 ‘Sovereign Credit’ channel: 
Asset prices (and portfolio flows) might be affected by non-standard monetary policies as these 
policies have the capacity to minimize the risk premia associated with sovereign credits. Asset 
purchase programs of the Fed, e.g. the different waves of the QE policy, or similar policies of 
ECB, e.g. the securities market program (SMP) or the outright monetary transaction (OMT), 
help to ease difficulties in monetary policy transmission mechanisms. This is due to the capacity 
of these policies to absorb sovereign risk premia that might be deemed excessive by the market 
(Fratzscher et al., 2016).  During the European sovereign debt crisis, for instance, worsening 
market sentiments about the euro and member states in the periphery were driving up sovereign 
risk premia. ECB’s response with the purchase of longer term sovereign bonds (via SMP) and 
short term sovereign bonds (via OMT) have indirectly targeted the risk premia on sovereign 
bonds of specific Eurozone economies as well as the overall sovereign debt markets, in general. 
Indeed, implied market risk premia in South African equity markets have been declining since 
early 2009 and have stabilized around 2.5% since late 2014 (see Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Implied Market-risk-premia in South African Equity market 
 
Source: Fnebris.com 
 
The impact of the policy interventions on sovereign credit risks can be evaluated by looking at 
their effect on sovereign CDS spread. Prices of sovereign bonds might rise due to a decrease in 
risk premium that is linked to falling credit risks. Here we regress daily changes in five year 
South African sovereign yields (in percentage points) and changes in CDS (in basis points) on 
Fed and ECB announcements. The results show that announcements for asset purchase programs 
of the Fed (particularly QE1) and ECB have led to a statistically significant reductions in 
sovereign yields. Further, Fed’s announcements of QE asset purchase programs and ECB’s 
liquidity provision program show reductions in CDS. Nevertheless, the cumulated economic 
impact of these announcements is again not large. Announcements relating to Fed’s QE1 and 
ECB’s asset purchase program, for instance, represented a reduction of about 0.01 percentage 
point in 5 year yields. 
Table 5 (a) Fed Unconventional Monetary Policy: Sovereign Yields (5yr) 
C
on
tr
ol
s 
No controls Mkt. Vol. Mkt. Vol., IR Mkt. Vol., IR, 
ECB announc. 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
ECB announc., 
News 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
ECB announc., 
News (Robust) 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
ECB announc., 
News (Lags) 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
ECB announc., 
News (Alt. 
event window) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Model (F1.1) (F1.2) (F1.3) (F1.4) (F1.5) (F1.6) (F1.7) (F1.8) 
QE1 -0.0108** -0.0110** -0.0110** -0.0110** -0.0111** -0.0110*** -0.0029 -0.0042*    
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
QE2 -0.0040 -0.0042 -0.0042 -0.0043 -0.0044 -0.0041 -0.0075 -0.0041     
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
QE3 -0.0042 -0.0052 -0.0052 -0.0052 -0.0053 -0.0051 0.0024 0.0002     
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)    
Taper 0.0010 0.0014 0.0009 0.0009 0.0019 -0.0034 0.0168*** 0.0065**   
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
_cons 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0000 0.0002 -0.0000     
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
N 2480 2479 2479 2479 2479 2479 2479 2479    
R-sq 0.003 0.044 0.045 0.046 0.048 0.088 0.051 0.047    
Notes:  
a) Standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) The dependent variable is the daily difference in p.p. on the 5 year South African sovereign bond yields.  
84 
 
c) Apart from the variables given in the table, additional controls are also used. Regressions (2) to (8) control for market volatility; 
regressions (3) to (8) control for standard monetary policy (interest rate) changes by Fed, ECB & SARB; regressions (4) to (8) 
control for Fed non-standard monetary policy announcements; regressions (5) to (8) control for the release of key macroeconomic 
data; regression (6) implements robust regression; regression (7) uses the lags of explanatory variables; regressions (8) applies a 3-
day event window to regression (7). 
d) Regressions (5) to (8) additionally use interaction terms for the release of macroeconomic data that is higher than markets 
expected.  
 
Table 5 (b) Fed Unconventional Monetary Policy: Sovereign CDS (5yr) 
C
on
tr
ol
s 
No controls Mkt. Vol. Mkt. Vol., IR Mkt. Vol., IR, 
ECB announc. 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
ECB announc., 
News 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
ECB announc., 
News (Robust) 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
ECB announc., 
News (Lags) 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
ECB announc., 
News (Alt. 
event window) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Model (F1.1) (F1.2) (F1.3) (F1.4) (F1.5) (F1.6) (F1.7) (F1.8) 
QE1 -0.0535*** -0.0408** -0.0408** -0.0408** -0.0407** -0.0407 0.0033 -0.0364**   
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)    
QE2 -0.0654*** -0.0563*** -0.0563*** -0.0561*** -0.0560*** -0.0560** -0.0088 -0.0529***  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)    
QE3 -0.0537*** -0.0479*** -0.0478*** -0.0481*** -0.0480*** -0.0480* -0.0018 -0.0452***  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)    
Taper 0.0704*** 0.0561*** 0.0560*** 0.0560*** 0.0559*** 0.0559**  0.0525***  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.02)    
_cons 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0002     
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
N 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016    
R-sq 0.010 0.258 0.260 0.260 0.260 0.260 0.256 0.260    
Notes:  
a) Standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) The dependent variable is the daily difference (in b.p.) on the 5 year South African sovereign credit default swaps (CDS). 
c) Apart from the variables given in the table, additional controls are also used. Regressions (2) to (8) control for market volatility; 
regressions (3) to (8) control for standard monetary policy (interest rate) changes by Fed, ECB & SARB; regressions (4) to (8) 
control for Fed non-standard monetary policy announcements; regressions (5) to (8) control for the release of key macroeconomic 
data; regression (6) implements robust regression; regression (7) uses the lags of explanatory variables; regressions (8) applies a 3-
day event window to regression (7). 
d) Regressions (5) to (8) additionally use interaction terms for the release of macroeconomic data that is higher than markets 
expected.  
 
Table 5 (c) ECB Unconventional Monetary Policy: Sovereign Yields (5yr) 
C
on
tr
ol
s 
No controls Mkt. Vol. Mkt. Vol., IR Mkt. Vol., IR, 
Fed announc. 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
Fed announc., 
News 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
Fed announc., 
News 
(Robust) 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
Fed announc., 
News (Lags) 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
Fed announc., 
News (Alt. 
event 
window) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Model (E1.1) (E1.2) (E1.3) (E1.4) (E1.5) (E1.6) (E1.7) (E1.8) 
Asset Purchase -0.0093** -0.0093** -0.0084** -0.0090** -0.0090** -0.0140*** -0.0029 -0.0090**  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)    
Liquidity Provision 0.0008 0.0008 0.0013 0.0012 0.0012 0.0003 0.0015 0.0010    
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Collateral Easing -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0008 0.0007 0.0039 -0.0010    
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
_cons  -0.0074 -0.0049 -0.0074 -0.0074 0.0029 -0.0061 -0.0075     
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)    
N -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003    
R-sq (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Notes:  
a) Standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) The dependent variable is the daily difference in p.p. on the 5 year South African sovereign bond yields.  
c) Apart from the variables given in the table, additional controls are also used. Regressions (2) to (8) control for market volatility; 
regressions (3) to (8) control for standard monetary policy (interest rate) changes by Fed, ECB & SARB; regressions (4) to (8) 
control for Fed non-standard monetary policy announcements; regressions (5) to (8) control for the release of key macroeconomic 
data; regression (6) implements robust regression; regression (7) uses the lags of explanatory variables; regressions (8) applies a 3-
day event window to regression (5). 
d) Regressions (5) to (8) additionally use interaction terms for the release of macroeconomic data that is higher than markets 
expected.  
 
85 
 
Table 5 (d) ECB Unconventional Monetary Policy: Sovereign CDS (5yr) 
C
on
tr
ol
s 
No controls Mkt. Vol. Mkt. Vol., IR Mkt. Vol., IR, 
Fed announc. 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
Fed announc., 
News 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
Fed announc., 
News 
(Robust) 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
Fed announc., 
News (Lags) 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
Fed announc., 
News (Alt. 
event 
window) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Model (E1.1) (E1.2) (E1.3) (E1.4) (E1.5) (E1.6) (E1.7) (E1.8) 
Asset Purchase -0.0216 -0.0216 -0.0221* -0.0224 -0.0225 -0.0421 -0.0168 -0.0216    
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)    
Liquidity Provision -0.0144*** -0.0144*** -0.0106** -0.0151*** -0.0152*** -0.0015 -0.0074 -0.0157*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01)    
Collateral Easing -0.0059 -0.0059 -0.0094 -0.0061 -0.0061 -0.0054 0.0218** -0.0096    
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)    
_cons  0.0009 0.0045 0.0009 0.0009 0.0007 -0.0013 0.0002     
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
N 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 0.0000 0.0001 0.0010 -0.0005 -0.0009    
R-sq (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Notes:  
a) Standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) The dependent variable is the daily difference in b.p. on the 5 year South African sovereign credit default swaps (CDS). 
c) Apart from the variables given in the table, additional controls are also used. Regressions (2) to (8) control for market volatility; 
regressions (3) to (8) control for standard monetary policy (interest rate) changes by Fed, ECB & SARB; regressions (4) to (8) 
control for Fed non-standard monetary policy announcements; regressions (5) to (8) control for the release of key macroeconomic 
data; regression (6) implements robust regression; regression (7) uses the lags of explanatory variables; regressions (8) applies a 1-
day event window to regression (5), while the other regressions use a 3-day event window. 
d) Regressions (5) to (8) additionally use interaction terms for the release of macroeconomic data that is higher than markets 
expected.  
 
 
4.4 ‘Bank Credit’ channel: 
One key target area of the non-standard policies (especially for ECB) was liquidity provision to 
the banking sector. ECB’s main refinancing operations (MROs), long-term refinancing operations 
(LTROs) and foreign currency funding (FOR) operations are some of these dedicated liquidity 
provision programs. However, due to the relationship between liquidity and credit risk, the 
liquidity provision policies could have spillovers on bank credit risk.  
As ECB and Fed succeed in lowering liquidity problems in their domestic banking systems (some 
of which are major global banks) through, for instance, currency funding operations; they will 
lower the credit risk in the global banking system. This may, in turn, translate to rising asset 
prices and an overall fall in risk premia (Fratzscher et al., 2016). Although a large part of the 
cross border financial flow that South Africa receives goes to the non-bank private sector and 
the public sector (which together accounted for 90% of foreign investments as per the last quarter 
of 2016, see Figure 7), South African banks still receive inflows worth billions of USD. Further, 
considering the important roles foreign owned banks (and branches of major international banks) 
play as sources of foreign currency loans and advances (see Section 2), one could expect spillovers 
via the international bank lending channel.   
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Figure 7: Consolidated positions on counterparties resident in South Africa 
(Sectoral breakdown, Mill. USD) 
 
Source: using BIS Consolidated banking statistics  
 
To capture the spillovers of the UMP on the South African banking system, we will specifically 
look at how changes in 3-month interbank rate, respond to policy announcements. The results 
show that Fed’s QE1 announcements had led to a cumulated reduction of the interbank rate 
(amounting to about 0.013 percentage point). The announcements relating to the tapering of 
QE had a small reverse impact, where the interbank rate rose during these announcements (by 
a margin close to 0.01 percentage point). On the other hand, ECB’s announcements did not 
show a statistically significant effects.54 
 
Table 6 (a) Fed Unconventional Monetary Policy: Interbank rate 
C
on
tr
ol
s 
No controls Mkt. Vol. Mkt. Vol., IR Mkt. Vol., IR, 
ECB announc. 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
ECB announc., 
News 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
ECB announc., 
News (Robust) 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
ECB announc., 
News (Lags) 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
ECB announc., 
News (Alt. 
event window) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Model (F1.1) (F1.2) (F1.3) (F1.4) (F1.5) (F1.6) (F1.7) (F1.8) 
QE1 -0.0126*** -0.0127*** -0.0120*** -0.0120*** -0.0122*** -0.0122* -0.0099*** -0.0120***  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)    
QE2 -0.0040* -0.0040* -0.0039* -0.0039* -0.0041* -0.0041** 0.0001 -0.0037     
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
QE3 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0020 0.0001     
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Taper 0.0095*** 0.0094*** 0.0085*** 0.0084*** 0.0081*** 0.0081 0.0044*** 0.0098***  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)    
_cons -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002     
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
                                                            
54 Although looking at banking sector CDS would have been complementary, this study has not done so 
due to unavailability of adequate high frequency data.  However, the dynamics in bank sector CDS would 
be closely aligned with sovereign CDS, as the latter is often used as a benchmark for the CDS of banks as 
well as other major South African private and state companies such as Eskom (IMF, 2016). 
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N 2480 2479 2479 2479 2479 2479 2479 2479    
R-sq 0.053 0.053 0.095 0.095 0.098 0.098 0.105 0.064    
Notes:  
a) Standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) The dependent variable is the daily p.p. difference in 3-month interbank rate.  
c) Apart from the variables given in the table, additional controls are also used. Regressions (2) to (8) control for market volatility; 
regressions (3) to (8) control for standard monetary policy (interest rate) changes by Fed, ECB & SARB; regressions (4) to (8) 
control for Fed non-standard monetary policy announcements; regressions (5) to (8) control for the release of key macroeconomic 
data; regression (6) implements robust regression; regression (7) uses the lags of explanatory variables; regressions (8) applies a 3-
day event window to regression (7). 
d) Regressions (5) to (8) additionally use interaction terms for the release of macroeconomic data that is higher than markets 
expected.  
 
Table 6 (b) ECB Unconventional Monetary Policy: Interbank rate 
C
on
tr
ol
s 
No controls Mkt. Vol. Mkt. Vol., IR Mkt. Vol., IR, 
Fed announc. 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
Fed announc., 
News 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
Fed announc., 
News 
(Robust) 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
Fed announc., 
News (Lags) 
Mkt. Vol., IR, 
Fed announc., 
News (Alt. 
event 
window) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Model (E1.1) (E1.2) (E1.3) (E1.4) (E1.5) (E1.6) (E1.7) (E1.8) 
Asset Purchase 0.0014 0.0014 0.0016 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0006 0.0017    
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Liquidity Provision -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0000 -0.0002    
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Collateral Easing -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0017    
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
_cons  0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 -0.0002     
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
N -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0003**  
R-sq (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Notes:  
a) Standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) The dependent variable is the daily p.p. difference in 3-month interbank rate.  
c) Apart from the variables given in the table, additional controls are also used. Regressions (2) to (8) control for market volatility; 
regressions (3) to (8) control for standard monetary policy (interest rate) changes by Fed, ECB & SARB; regressions (4) to (8) 
control for Fed non-standard monetary policy announcements; regressions (5) to (8) control for the release of key macroeconomic 
data; regression (6) implements robust regression; regression (7) uses the lags of explanatory variables; regressions (8) applies a 1-
day event window to regression (5), while the other regressions use a 3-day event window. 
d) Regressions (5) to (8) additionally use interaction terms for the release of macroeconomic data that is higher than markets 
expected.  
 
5 Robustness exercises 
The analysis in Section 4 has focused on four key transmission channels for the spillovers. To 
quantify these channels; the analysis has investigated the dynamics of foreign portfolio 
investment flows in to equities and bonds, South African market volatility index, sovereign yields 
(5 year), and interbank rate (3 month). In this section, we go through a number of robustness 
exercises; where we address specification issues, isolate initial announcements from other 
announcements and implementations, evaluate monetary policy independence, highlight short 
and long-term impacts, and address endogeneity issues. In doing so, we also assess the impact 
on additional financial assets, apart from the ones discussed in Section 4; e.g. stock market 
returns, currency returns, 10 year sovereign yields and CDS (see Section 5.3). 
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5.1 Addressing specification issues 
In the regression tables reported within Section 4.1 to 4.4, we make various modifications and 
specification checks on the benchmark estimates without ‘no controls’ - given in the first column 
of each table. Namely; we control for market volatility; standard monetary policies; ECB and 
Fed announcements; macroeconomic data releases; news items relating to SARB; robust  
standard errors to deal with common persistent shocks and heteroscedasticity; lags of 
explanatory variables; and alternative three day event windows before and after event dates, 
instead of a one day event window. 
We control for market volatility since it plays an important role in determining market 
confidence and financial flow patterns (Tillman, 2016; Bernal et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2014; 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; Prabu et al., 2016). Other things remaining constant, 
the presence of significant market risks in South Africa might lower the net financial inflow to 
the country and/or raise the yields of financial instruments. Standard monetary policy operations 
are also need to be accounted for since domestic rate rises relative to advanced economies (or 
rate cuts in advanced economies) will lead to more financial inflows. We account for releases of 
macroeconomic data since the release of positive information may encourage more financial flows 
and negative information (worse than expected data) may potentially do the reverse (Gagnon et 
al., 2017; BIS, 2014; Rigobon and Sack, 2004). Related to this, the coverage of news items on 
influential media55, especially those which involve activities of central banks, may shape investor 
sentiments and, thus, affect financial inflows (Fratzscher et al., 2016; Aizeinman et al., 2014; 
Rigibon and Sack, 2005). We also run robust regressions. We use Davidson and MacKinnon 
(1993) and Newey and West (1987) robust standard error estimates, which yield better results 
when the model could potentially be heteroskedastic and also control for persistent shocks. The 
issue of heteroscedasticity, in connection with a novel technique to deal with potential 
endogeneity issues, is discussed at length in Section 5.4. We run regressions with lagged 
explanatory variables to catch scenarios where announcements in advanced economies take time 
to influence financial flows in South Africa. The delayed response of assets to announcements 
and news is often noted in the literature (Fratzscher et al., 2016; Evans and Lyons, 2005). 
Moreover, we run regressions with three day event windows before and after events in an effort 
to alternatively catch the delayed as well as anticipated reactions of financial assets to 
announcements (Fallagiarda et al., 2015; Aizeinman et al., 2014; MacKinlayy, 1997).56 
However, as could be seen from the tables reported in Section 4; the sign, size and significance 
of coefficients reported under the benchmark ‘no controls’ regression persists across the later 
                                                            
55 For more on this, see Section 3 as well as Table A4 in Annex 3. 
56 Some events might have delayed impacts that may not be captured in a single day event window. 
However, making the event window too wide also risks attributing the impact of other events (modelled 
and un-modelled) as if they were due to the event under investigation (Fratzscher et al., 2016; Fallagiarda 
et al. 2015; MacKinley, 1997). Altough not reported here, we also run additional regressions to control for 
holidays (non business days). This is done to see if the days immediately after holidays have a special 
impact. However, we do not find significant differences for this in most cases. 
89 
 
exercises involving the insertion of additional control variables. This is particularly true for most 
of these specifications; although the exercises involving robust standard errors, lagged 
explanatory variables and alternative event windows occasionally change the level of significance 
or mildly change the size of coefficients. 
5.2 Impact of initial announcements, policy updates and 
implementations  
Another important argument that could be raised is the likely difference in weight attached to 
series of announcements about the same policy. Programs such as Fed’s QE or ECB’s asset 
purchase or liquidity provision programs (e.g. QE1, SMP, OMT, LTRO, etc.) involve series of 
announcements on different dates. Many programs of ECB, in particular, involve frequent media 
communication and updates. Analyzing the cumulated impact of all announcements, although 
gives the overall impact of the programs, fails to show distinctively how different announcements 
about the same policy may have different impact.57 Specifically, the initial announcement (i.e. 
introduction) of a policy might be argued to have a much stronger effect and already shape 
market expectations, while follow-up announcements (or updates) may not carry as much weight. 
To address this issue, we separately estimate the impact of initial announcement of each category 
of programs as well as follow-up communications about them. We also make a further distinction 
and control for dates of actual implementations (i.e. market operations) of the policies. Indeed, 
the literature notes that announcements and implementations of these policies could have a 
different outcome (Andrade et al., 2016; Fratzscher et al., 2016; Fratzscher et al., Fratzscher et al., 
2013). Particularly, actual market operations of a policy (often unlike announcements) could 
have an outcome that is variable depending on their size, intensity and duration.58  
The results (reported in Annex 4, Table 1.1 and 1.2) show that, the impact of the policies (at 
their initial introduction as well as implementation) mostly fall in line with the results we had 
in Section 4, for the cumulated impact of all announcements. For instance, the implementation 
phase of QE1 and QE2 saw increased portfolio investment inflows in to equities (although the 
net figure is rather small). The initial announcements of QE1 on Nov. 25, 2008, on the other 
hand, led to net outflows from equities while the initial announcement of QE2 on Aug. 27, 2010 
led to net inflows in to equities. The initial announcement of QE2 as well as its implementation 
phase saw net inflows in to South African bonds (where net inflows to bonds totaled about 1.5% 
total foreign investments during the initial announcement and a net figure of about 0.3% during 
the implementation phase). ECB’s announcements of asset purchases and liquidity provisions 
                                                            
57 One could also analyze the impact of every single announcement separately, however, this would become 
cumbersome - given the number of announcements covered here. 
58 Announcements, unlike actual market implementations, are often difficult to quantify (unless the 
announcements carry specific reference to factors such as operational size, intensity and duration) and 
mostly work by shaping expectations. 
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also saw some cumulated inflows in to bonds. Market volatility also appears to have slightly 
reduced during announcements of ECB’s asset purchases programs. Conversely, the 
implementation phase of the asset purchases programs seems to show net outflow from both 
bonds and equities.  
5.3 Monetary Policy independence in South Africa 
The country’s central bank, South African Reserve Bank (SARB), follows an inflation targeting 
monetary policy - specifically since February 2000.59 In following such a policy, the central bank 
explicitly announces an inflation target and works towards achieving the policy target.60 Inflation 
targeting policies are useful for a healthy functioning of financial markets since they bring a 
degree of certainty and transparency in to the monetary policy environment in an economy.61   
A recent study was made by Takats and vela (2014) compared inflation targeting emerging 
economies with exchange rate targeting emerging economies regarding the responsiveness of their 
central banks to the monetary policy changes in advanced countries. Their analysis using policy 
rates shows that inflation targeting emerging economies respond more to monetary policy actions 
of the US Fed. 62 Yet, under the ‘trilemma hypotheses’, monetary policy in inflation targeting 
countries should be insulated from external effects since under (strict) inflation targeting policy 
exchange rate is allowed to move freely against other currencies.  
The ‘trilemma hypotheses’ (also referred to as the impossible trinity) is a theory about monetary 
policy option from the menu of ‘financial integration’, ‘exchange rate stability’ and ‘monetary 
                                                            
59 In the period before ‘Inflation targeting’ (i.e. pre Feb. 2000 period), SARB followed a wide variety of 
monetary tools - ranging from exchange rate targeting, discretionary monetary policy, and monetary 
aggregate targeting, to a heterogeneous set of techniques (SARB, 2016b). 
60 Although there are a number of countries that follow inflation targeting as a monetary policy, the way 
the policy is implemented varies from one country to another. Specifically, countries differ in the way they 
set their inflation targets. Some economies settle for a point (i.e. fixed) target while others adopt a ranges 
of targets with lower and upper bands. Some countries also follow an inflation targeting which is a 
combination of setting point targets together with certain range. While point targets offer simplicity, 
setting ranges offers the flexibility required to face uncertainties in macroeconomic dynamics. 
61 The ‘price stability’ and ‘low inflation’ component of the ‘monetary policy target’ is crucial since it also 
helps to protect the purchasing power of consumers, apart from introducing macroeconomic certainty. 
Especially, in emerging economies like South Africa (which has one of the highest levels of inequality and 
unemployment); appropriate measures against rapid rises in price levels are vital (SARB, 2016a). 
Otherwise, the poorest segment of the society will face significant reductions in welfare. 
62 The SARB and its Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) set monetary policy - with a rather full 
operational autonomy. The bank follows a flexible inflation targeting policy. This gives the SARB the 
necessary policy fluidity - where inflation can be momentarily out of the target range. This allows the 
bank to decide on the necessary time horizon required for inflation to be brought back to its target range. 
First-round effect of supply shocks might push inflation out of its target range. With this policy in place, 
however, the bank has the room to adopt interest rate smoothing over the cycle. This helps to deal with 
variability of output from the response of monetary policy to shocks (SARB, 2016a). 
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independence’. As the Mundell-Fleming framework shows, monetary authorities have to choose 
between only two of these three policy targets (see Obstfeld et al., 2005; Rey, 2015; Aizenman 
et al., 2014). For instance, if South Africa wanted to set the value of the Rand (its currency) 
fixed against dollar or euro, and also if the SARB wants to set interest rates without influence 
from external events or major economies; then capital cannot be allowed to freely move in and 
out between the domestic and international capital markets. If the US Fed or ECB were to set 
interest rates lower than the rates in South Africa (in the hypothetical environment of fixed ER 
regime and free international flow of capital), a big amount of foreign capital would flood in to 
the country. This would accelerate the demand for the Rand and the peg to the dollar or the 
euro would not hold. In reverse, if Fed and ECB rates were set higher than South African rates, 
capital would flood out of the country. This would create severe depreciatory pressures on the 
Rand. If the SARB wanted to maintain the peg (i.e. the value of the Rand), then it would have 
to perhaps severely deplete its reserves in trying to buy out the Rand with its dollar or euro 
reserves. When restrictions to capital flows to a country become undesirable (as is often the case 
in highly open and financially integrated economies like South Africa), then there remain only 
two policy options. Either a country chooses fixed exchange rate regime and loss of control over 
monetary policy, or it adopts a flexible exchange rate policy and obtains control over its 
monetary policy. Advanced economies (especially those outside the Eurozone) follow the second 
option. South Africa too has, in recent years, settled for this option. 
However, recent research (e.g. Rey, 2015; Aizenman et al., 2015) shows that, unlike what is 
implied by the 'trilemma hypothesis', full monetary autonomy might not be necessarily witnessed 
by economies even if they adopt floating exchange rate regimes and are also open to free flow of 
capital. The price of high yield bonds, shares, and other risky assets moves up and down together 
with (bank) credit easing and size of international capital flows. Thus, Rey (2015) concludes 
that the dynamics in investor sentiments and risk appetites have been driving 'global financial 
cycles'. Conversely, monetary policies of the Fed, play a crucial role by sharing investor risk 
sentiments. Given the large amounts of bank Credit denomination in dollars, the monetary 
policies adopted by the Fed had worldwide consequences. Lower rates set by the Fed to create 
dollars and help the US recovery also created cheap dollar credits for foreign businesses and 
households. This leads to rising asset prices globally. Rey (2015) also shows that sudden rise in 
rates by the Fed to have knock on effects of rising mortgage spreads in many advanced countries 
(with floating currencies and monetary policy autonomy), and not just in the US.  
The ‘trilemma’ is, therefore, actually a ‘dilemma’ where countries have to choose between either 
free flow of international capital or independent control of monetary policy and domestic 
financial market conditions. Rey noted that having floating exchange rate regimes are not fully 
capable of gauging cross border capital flows to the extent that monetary policy independence 
is gained by countries. Thus, countries sometimes adopt additional tools (e.g. extra requirements 
on bank capital, selective capital controls, or other forms of macro prudential instruments) to 
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tame rapid and excessive credit growth. This is especially appealing in the current global 
financial environment characterized by high cross border flow of capital, less restrictions of 
capital flows (in many advanced and emerging economies), growing risk appetites of investors, 
and presence of excessive cheap dollars and euros in international capital markets.  
With regards to the issues of ‘trilemma’ or ‘dilemma’, SARB states that monetary policy 
independence its top priority. Further, the South African Rand is a free floating currency and 
capital controls are ‘generally limited’ (Mohanty, 2014). 
5.3.1 Impacts on domestic monetary policy  
SARB’s monetary policy operations since the GFC were, by and large, conventional (e.g. 
Mminele, 2010; BIS, 2014). In dealing with the significant financial inflows linked to the large 
scale asset purchase programs by the major foreign central banks, SARB primarily relied on the 
policy rate (see Table A3). For instance, the Deputy Governor of SARB noted that:  
“…Other emerging markets lowered policy rates to support growth; they also intervened in the 
exchange rate markets to try and stem appreciation pressure, or imposed capital controls. South 
Africa’s policy rate was also lowered, although we were less aggressive than other emerging 
markets in dealing with these inflows as we did not at any time feel it necessary to intervene in 
the exchange rate market nor were any capital controls imposed…” Mminele (2012). 
Given SARB’s contempt to ‘unconventional’ monetary policies of its own, we focus on interest 
rate changes (conventional domestic monetary policy) as key additional determinant of domestic 
asset returns. Table 6.1 reports the impact of SARB’s standard monetary policy announcements 
on various South African asset returns. Clearly, the 3-month (interbank) rate responds positively 
to a rise in domestic interest rate. Further, an increase in interest rate also implies an upsurge 
in bond yields. As interest rates rise, the price of bonds falls and this translates to higher bond 
yields. Aside from the more straightforward impact on interbank rates and bond yields, a more 
interesting (and rather complicated) relationship is the linkage interest rates have with the stock 
market and exchange rates.  
The results in Table 6.1 show that rise in interest rate by SARB negatively affects South African 
stock market returns. For instance, an increase in interest rates by 100 basis points reduces the 
‘JSE all shares’ index by about 5%, on average.63 The same magnitude change in interest rate 
would reduce the ‘JSE financial and industrial shares’ by about 4%. Ceteris paribus, higher 
interest rates imply lower stock market prices since the expected stream of dividends face a 
higher discount rate. Although the likely impact on the stock market also depends on the source 
of the interest rate change (e.g. high inflation rate, overheating economy, international market 
conditions and risks, etc.) This relationship could be even more complicated as there could be a 
                                                            
63 South Africa's JSE All Shares Index includes companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
The index makes up for about 99% of the market capitalization of all listed companies. 
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two-way relationship, where stock market dynamics may also affect monetary policy decisions. 
Central banks may react to higher stock prices by raising interest rates. However, this by itself 
depends on additional factors, e.g. the state of the economy. Rigobon and Sack (2003), 
nevertheless, note that there is little empirical evidence - even in the case of the US Federal 
Reserve - about monetary policy reactions to the stock market.  
 
The results also show that a rise in South Africa’s interest rate implies the depreciation of the 
rand against the dollar and the euro, although this is not highly significant. Economic theory, 
however, dictates that a rise in domestic interest rate in a small open economy would imply an 
appreciation of the domestic currency vis-à-vis foreign currencies - other things remaining 
constant. This is because a higher interest rate in an open and financially integrated economy 
attracts foreign investments; which further leads to higher demands for the domestic currency 
and, thus, rising currency value. However, there is less of an empirical evidence for this, since 
the actual link between interest rate and exchange rate depends on different (interrelated) 
macroeconomic relationships. Apart from the appreciatory pressure from increased foreign 
investment, we can also expect further increase in the value of the domestic currency due to 
rising demand for deposit and, thus, the monetary base of the economy.  On the other hand, 
these appreciatory forces might be offset by other depreciatory factors. For instance, rising 
interest rate may make bank loans expensive and have impact on firms and output (i.e. 
contractionary role of interest rate hike). An increase in interest rate may also further strain the 
fiscal burden of the government and its finances, leading to rising inflation expectations 
(Hnatkovska et al., 2008; Sanchez, 2005). The final link between interest rate and exchange rate 
movements, thus, depends on which of these factors is prominent. 
5.3.2 Short-term vs. long-term impact of monetary policy spillovers 
(alternative specification for spillovers) 
As discussed above (Section 5.3), monetary policy in advanced economies could affect policy rate 
setting in emerging economies - even in those mature emerging economies that follow inflation 
targeting policies and have floating currencies (Rey, 2013; Takats and vela, 2014; Aizenman et 
al., 2015). The discussion of spillovers from unconventional monetary policies in advanced 
economies to the rest of the world basically centers around three areas of impact. Namely; i) 
effects on ‘quantities’ - such as the changes in quantity of portfolio investment flows and cross 
border bank lending (see Section 2 and 4) ii) effect on ‘prices’ - i.e. change in asset prices or 
yields (see Section 4)64 iii) ‘endogenous policy responses’ - a scenario where central banks across 
                                                            
64 It is important to note that changes in asset ‘prices’ could happen without changes in ‘quantities’ of 
investment flows (Takats and vela, 2014). 
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the world adjust their policy in response to actions of big central banks in advanced economies, 
e.g. Fed or ECB (Takats and vela, 2014).  
The spillover effects through changes in ‘quantities’ and ‘prices’ have been discussed in Section 
4. However, countries also adjust their domestic policy setting (as a response to Fed monetary 
policies changes) to control the dynamics in asset ‘prices’, ‘quantity’ of portfolio investment flows 
or cross-border bank lending.65  Although the exercise conducted here closely follows those made 
in previous sections, there is one key distinction. In Section 4, for instance, we were analyzing 
the impact of unconventional monetary policies indirectly using dichotomous variables to capture 
announcement dates. Here, we follow the ‘financial cycle theory’ and directly capture the impact 
of the unconventional monetary policies using US interest rates (e.g. bond yields). That is, the 
effect of unconventional monetary policies will be conveyed to South Africa via their impact on 
US asset prices - to which South African asset prices adjust to. 
 
In general, the co-movements in policy rates (i.e. endogenous policy responses) between countries 
that also drive the ‘price’ and ‘quantity’ of financial variables have been captured in the ‘financial 
cycle theory’ (Borio, 2012). Much of the analysis of the theory has focused on credit cycle 
(Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Jorda et al., 2011; Dell’Arriccia et al., 2012). However, one could 
combine various financial ‘price’ and ‘quantity’ variables - including interest rates, risk premia, 
volatilities, asset prices, etc. (Borio, 2012; Claessens et al., 2011). Further, Borio (2012) notes 
that, while the analysis of international dynamics in financial variables (such as equity prices) 
is well picked at higher frequencies, others such as credit or property prices tend to co-vary 
across countries at low-frequencies.66 Drehmann et al. (2012) also note that the financial cycle 
has a much lower frequency when compared to the traditional business cycle. 
 
In our analysis here, first, we try to see the role of external factors like US monetary policy, 
while also accounting for key domestic factors, e.g. business cycle and inflation. In this regard, 
we try to investigate the spillovers from US rate on both short-term and long-term domestic 
rates. In trying to see the impact of US monetary policy on short-term South African policy rate, 
we fit an augmented domestic Taylor equation - where the South African policy rate is the 
dependent variable and inflation rate, output gap67 and US policy rate are the explanatory 
                                                            
65 Section 5.3 and 5.3.1 try to give an overview in to the supposed ‘policy independence’ of South Africa. 
However, it has been noted that actual policy independence hardly exists in emerging economies. 
66 The co-movement between credit and real economic activity is also widely studied in the literature. For 
instance, Houssa et al. (2013; 2015) look at how global and domestic credit supply shocks affect 
macroeconomic fluctuations in Emerging economies. Using quarterly data, they show that global credit 
shocks indeed significantly affect macroeconomic aggregates in South Africa. However, a detailed analysis 
of the nexus between global financial shocks and real economic activity, although interesting, is beyond 
the scope of this particular paper and its area of focus. 
67 We use monthly industrial production to compute output gap, using HP filter. 
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variables (see Takats and vela, 2014 for specification). The results on this and additional 
specifications with lags as well as additional independent variables such as exchange rate and 
reserves is given in Annex 4 (Table 4.1). Our analysis using monthly data over the January 2007 
- June 2016 period shows a statistically and economically significant direct relationship between 
US and South African short-term policy rates. Our finding also matches that of Takats and vela 
(2014), who conduct similar analysis on a group of emerging economies using quarterly data over 
the 2000-2013 period.68 
 
Yet, the long-term interest rate in advanced countries can also affect the dynamics of financial 
flows in to South Africa. This mostly happens through its ability to shape portfolio investment 
decisions. And as capital flow restrictions become lower, the degree of substitution between 
emerging economy long-term bonds and similar advanced economy bonds grow. This sets the 
stage for stronger expected impact of US rates, for instance, on South African yields (Turner, 
2014; Takats and vela, 2014). Nevertheless, bond yields could adjust across countries - even in 
the face of no significant capital flows - through ‘price effects’ (Takats and vela, 2014). To 
empirically explore the long-term spillovers, we run a regression of South African long-term 
interest rates on US long-term rates (see Annex 4, Table 4.2). However, we also run specifications 
incorporating lagged domestic short-term rates, government deficit, inflation rate, and reserves. 
This builds on the specifications of Turner (2014) and Takats and vela (2014).  Using five-year 
interest rates as long-term rates for both US and South Africa and running a monthly regression 
over the January 2007 - June 2016 period, we find an economically and statistically significant 
direct relationship between US and South African long-term interest rates. 
 
5.4 Addressing endogeneity issues: 
5.4.1 ‘Identification through Heteroscedasticity’ 
There is a potential of facing endogeneity problem when introducing conventional monetary 
policies (i.e. changes in interest rates) as controls in equation (1) to explain part of the changes 
in asset returns. This is so since asset returns can also influence monetary policy (Rigobon, 2003; 
Rigobon and Sack, 2004). To tackle this endogeneity problem, we will employ a method called 
‘Identification through heteroscedasticity’. Further, ‘Identification through heteroscedasticity’ 
                                                            
68 However, we see some differences in the size of coefficients, pertaining to difference in data type and 
frequency. Takats and Vela (2014) also note that emerging economies experiencing domestic economic 
crisis tend to have larger coefficients attached to changes in US policy rates since they become sensitive 
to sudden changes in international financial and economic environment.  
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(IH) is a technique that could deliver a consistent estimate of pass-through under weaker and 
more realistic assumptions.69  
The methodology was introduced by three series of papers; Rigobon (2003) and Rigobon and 
Sack (2003, 2004). Following Rigobon and Sack (2004), we specify the next two simple 
simultaneous equations, equations (2) and (3). These simple specifications make it easy to discuss 
about the key attributes of the methodology. However, as Rigobon (2003) shows, these system 
of simultaneous equations could be expanded to incorporate various exogenous shocks and lags 
of endogenous variables. The two equations linking the changes in asset prices (∆Yt) and changes 
in interest rates (∆IRt) may be given as: 
 ∆퐼푅푡 = 훽∆푌푡 + 훾푋푡 + 휀푡, (2) 
 
 ∆푌푡 = 훼∆퐼푅푡 + 훿푋푡 + 휂푡, (3) 
 
The rest of the notations being same as before (see Section 3.1), Xt represents common exogenous 
shocks that simultaneously affect both asset prices and interest rate (e.g. unconventional 
monetary policy announcements by Fed and ECB, release of macroeconomic data, etc).70 
Further, ηt represents the shock to asset prices while εt represents a monetary policy shock. We 
are especially interested in coefficients α and δ. The coefficient α represents the impact of 
monetary policy shocks on asset prices via changes in interest rates. On the other hand, δ, 
represents the impact of the common exogenous shock (i.e. Xt) on asset prices.  
As Arai (2016) and Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2013) note, the estimation with IH methodology 
for the coefficients of equation (3) using OLS will lead to bias since both asset price changes 
(∆Yt) and interest rate changes (∆IRt) are simultaneously determined in the system of equations 
given in equations (2) and (3) above. Specifically, there will be a bias in the estimation of the 
coefficients using OLS since the regressor ∆IRt in equation (3) will be correlated with the shock 
term ηt due to the response of interest rate to changes in asset markets ∆Yt, i.e. coefficient 훽 in 
equation (2). Rigobon and Sack (2004) also note that the exclusion of some unobservable 
                                                            
69 Standard ‘Event study’ methodology makes strong assumptions where no other event is assumed to 
occur on the policy event date, apart from the event which is being investigated itself. Thus, any 
‘abnormal’ changes in asset prices on that day are assumed to be solely due to that particular event. In 
reality, however, different events could occur on the same date. There is no possibility to control for other 
variables or events in standard event-study methodologies. This is certainly the case in the ‘Constant 
Mean Returns’ model of event-studies (MacKinlay, 1997). At best, in ‘Market Return’ models, one 
additionally accounts for the dynamics of the market. However, this still leaves no flexibility to control 
for other ‘relevant’ concurrent events, which sometimes includes standard monetary policy announcements 
(see Table A3 in Annex 3) or other non-standard monetary policy announcements (e.g. Table A1 and 
Table A2). This is one of the reasons why this study adopts an empirical approach that accommodates 
other factors (see Section 3.1). 
70 See Rigobon (2003) for more on these specifications. 
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exogenous shocks (i.e. Xt) from the specification of our models might generate some bias. This 
will be contingent to value of coefficient 훾 in equation (2). Estimating the dynamics in asset 
returns (equation 3) using OLS will yield estimates of pass-through for the monetary policy 
shocks (훼), where the mean of the parameter could be given as: 
 퐸 훼̅ = 훼 + (1 − 훼 훽)  훽훿휂+(훽+훾)훿푋훿휀 + 훽2훿휂 + (훽+훾)2 훿푥 (4) 
 
Here, each 훿 signifies the variance from each respective shocks. Rigobon and Sack (2004) note 
that the estimates (for a true value of α) will be biased as inferred from equation (4) as a result 
of a simultaneity bias when 훽 ≠ 0  and 훿휂>0. There will also be an omitted variables bias when 훾 ≠ 0 and 훿푋>0. The derivation of this potential bias in OLS estimates is given in Annex 1. 
The bias in OLS estimation could be overcome with regressions using instrumental variables or 
GMM. The technique basically uses the shift in the variances of the endogenous variables from 
‘non-event’ to ‘event’ dates as instruments for identification. Suppose, we denote the dates when 
policy events are announced as (P) and denote all other business dates, i.e. those with no policy 
announcement, as (NP). Thus, the total number of days in our sample (T) could be given as the 
sum of the two subset of dates, i.e. T=TP+TNP. The methodology assumes that the variance of 
the shocks is bigger on announcement dates (i.e. TP), but the parameters of the simultaneous 
equations (2) and (3) are stable.  
Given this assumption, the conditional variance-covariance matrices (ΩP and ΩNP) for these two 
respective sets of dates (TP and TNP) will have a difference that can be explained by the variance 
in monetary policy shocks (∆Ω). Using these notations, we could give the difference between the 
conditional variance-covariance matrices as: 
 ∆Ω = ΩP - ΩNP = 
훿휀|푃2 −훿휀|푁푃2(1−훼훽)2 [1 훼훼 훼2], (5) 
 
In this setting, 훿휀|푃2  represents the conditional variance of monetary policy shocks on policy 
announcement days, while 훿휀|푁푃2  represents the shocks on non-announcement days. See Annex 1 
for the derivation of the conditional variance. 
The IH methodology derives a consistent estimate of 훼 in equation (3) by using ∆Ω as an 
instrument of identification (Rigobon and Sack, 2004; Arai, 2016).  
To formalize the instruments (i.e. ∆Ω), we next define our endogenous variables. We suppose 
that our endogenous variables ∆YP and ∆IRP are (TP x 1) vectors of variables on the 
announcement days. Conversely, ∆YNP and ∆IRNP are (TNP x 1) vectors of variables that belong 
to the non-announcement days. These two vectors could be combined to yield another vector of 
endogenous variables of a (T x 1) dimension.  
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 ∆IR ≡ [∆IRP, ∆IRNP]′                                            (6) 
 
 ∆Y ≡ [∆YP, ∆YNP]′                                               (7) 
 
The instruments will be assembled by normalizing our endogenous variables by the total number 
of business days in the policy ( 1TP ∆YP and 1TP ∆IRP) and non-policy days (− 1TNP ∆YNP and − 1TNP 
∆IRNP), where additionally the signs of the variables are reversed for the non-policy days. That 
is; 
 ZIR ≡ [ 1TP ∆IRP, − 1TNP ∆IRNP]′                                         (8) 
 
 ZY ≡ [ 1푇푃 ∆YP, − 1푇푁푃 ∆YNP]′                                                 (9) 
 
ZIR and ZY serve as appropriate instruments for the goal of identifying the monetary policy pass 
through (as given in equation 3). Given that the variances for the policy and non-policy dates 
are different (i.e. our underlying assumption), then these instruments will be correlated to our 
endogenous variables. In contrast, the instruments are not correlated with the shocks to asset 
prices described in equation (4) above. It is shown, in Annex 1, why these instruments (i.e. ZIR 
and ZY) are orthogonal. 
The orthogonality of these instruments could be used as the moment condition, enabling us to 
have a GMM estimate of equation (3). However, as Rigobon and Sack (2004) show, both IV and 
GMM regressions could be used for the process of estimation, overcoming the bias from OLS. 
Similarly, Arai (2016) notes that GMM estimates of the system yields efficient estimates from 
his analysis of the effects of monetary policy announcements at the zero lower bound in Japan. 
This study will use both IV and GMM estimates.  
The moment condition that will be used could be described as: 
          E[f(α)]  =  0,                                                   (10) 
Where, 
ft(α)  = Zt . et,  
Zt = [z IR,t, zY,t]′, 
et = ∆Yt - α∆IRt. 
Solving the following minimum disturbance problem will yield the estimates of 훼 through GMM: 
 α GMM= arg α min fT(α)′WfT(α),                         (11) 
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Where, fT (α) = ∑ 푓푡 (훼)푇푡=1  and W represents an appropriate weighting matrix of a 2x2 
dimension. In a system of two-step GMM, the minimization problem could be first solved using 
the identity matrix as a weighing matrix. The inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of 
moment conditions, which is estimated in a first step, is then used in second step as a weighting 
matrix. The estimator bases itself on the assumption that limT →∞   1T fT (α) = 0 (Rigobon and 
Sack, 2004). For the details of the orthogonality of instruments and application of GMM and IV 
estimates for IH methodology, refer to Annex 1.  
5.4.2 Results from ‘Identification through Heteroscedasticity’ 
The key assumption of the IH methodology is that there is a shift in variance between policy 
announcement days and non-announcement days (Section 5.4.1). In this regard, we first compare 
the daily changes in asset returns on announcement vs. non-announcement days. Then, we 
implement the methodology to determine the impact (i.e. pass-through) of conventional 
monetary policy shocks, as well as shocks stemming from exogenous factors (e.g. Fed and ECB 
unconventional monetary policies). Table 7.1 to Table 7.9 deliver the variance ratio tests. 
Specifically, the tables display the standard deviation of various asset returns on announcement 
and non-announcement days and a variance ratio test.71 The test examines if there is a robust 
evidence for the non-equality of the standard deviations.  
Before we go to the comparison of various policy event days with non-policy days, we first 
compare the period since the Global Financial Crisis (Jan 1, 2007 to June 30, 2016) with the 
period before (Jan 1, 2000 to Dec 31, 2006).72 The results show that the standard deviations of 
daily asset returns were higher under the period since the GFC than the ‘normal’ period before. 
This is the case virtually for all assets investigated (see Table 7.1). This is to be expected, given 
the considerable financial and economic shocks within the period. The variance ratio test also 
confirms that there is a significant rise in volatility of asset returns during the GFC period than 
the period before. Also looking at the largest daily gains and losses in asset returns over the Jan 
01, 2000-Jun 30, 2016 period, in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2, we notice that the single biggest daily 
movements are witnessed in the GFC period - nearly for all assets.73 Particularly, the 20 largest 
single day gains and losses for 5 and 10 year South African sovereign bond yields and 5 and 10 
year CDS have all been witnessed in the period since 2008.74 
                                                            
71 see Annex 1 for more on the variance-ratio test. 
72 Although the shock on the real sector and GDP from the GFC was seen in South Africa as from late 
2008 to early 2009, the financial sector has already started to feel the shock from US Sub-prime crisis, 
which started to clearly propagate to the banking industry in 2007. 
73 See Table 3.3 to Table 3.6 for the changes in daily returns corresponding to key Fed and ECB 
unconventional monetary policy announcement dates. 
74 Looking at historical trends in key South African asset and market volatility indices (Figure 1.1 to 
Figure 1.6), the 2008-2009 (GFC) period was clearly turbulent. 
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We also observe higher standard deviations of asset returns often on policy dates, as compared 
to non-policy dates for Fed QE, Fed QE Tapering, Fed and ECB conventional monetary policy 
changes, Fed and ECB unconventional monetary policy changes, Fed FOMC meeting dates and 
ECB Governing Council sessions). This is evident in the sample variance ratios for most asset 
returns, as the variance ratios are typically bigger than one. This is similarly accompanied by 
the significance tests of the variance ratios.75 Even simply looking at the figures depicting 
movements in daily asset returns, and overlaying them with Fed (Figure 2.1.1 to Figure 2.1.9) 
and ECB (Figure 2.2.1 to Figure 2.2.9) unconventional monetary policy announcements, we 
notice that event dates roughly overlap with biggest changes in asset returns. Given the apparent 
evidence in shift in variances on policy announcement dates from the variance ratio comparisons, 
we move on to the IH regressions.  
Impact of Fed and ECB unconventional monetary policy 
Table 6.2 to Table 6.11 report the impact of various Fed and ECB unconventional monetary 
policy announcements on the returns of South African assets. These exercises try to measure the 
impact of the unconventional monetary policies (UMP), while accounting for the endogeneity 
issue explained in Section 5.4.1 by using the IH methodology. The results show that the QE 
policy of the Fed (see Table 6.2) had the impact of appreciating the rand, lowering bond yields, 
and CDS. The 3-month interbank rate also shows that it decreased, although this was not 
significant. The stock market indices appear to have gained during this asset purchase program 
of the Fed. These results from the IH methodology are consistent over IV and GMM estimations.  
The tapering of the QE program (see Table 6.3), by contrast, overturned the impact of the QE. 
The nominal exchange rate increased. Further, bond yields, CDS, and interbank rate rose. The 
stock market indices, meanwhile, fell. The impact on financial and industrial stocks appear to 
be more significant than the JSE aggregate index of all shares. These results are broadly in line 
with our earlier findings in Section 4. 
The results of the IH regressions that investigate the impact of ECB’s unconventional monetary 
policies on different South African assets (pooling all ECB UMP together) are reported in Table 
6.4. The results basically mirror the impact of large scale asset purchase programs of the Fed. 
The rand appears to have appreciated. The stock market has also gained following ECB’s UMP 
announcements. Further, ECB’s unconventional monetary policies, overall, imply a significant 
fall in 5 and 10 year bond yields and CDS. Yet, the interbank rate, although carries a negative 
coefficient, fails to be significant. It could be argued that ECB’s unconventional policies may not 
‘directly’ affect the 3-month money market rates in inflation targeting economies with monetary 
                                                            
75 Apart from comparing announcement and (all) non-announcement days, I additionally compared 
announcement days with non-announcement days that are just 5 days before the announcements.  This 
is done as a comparator to exclude the potential shocks from other major events. The results, however, 
largely mirror the outcomes of the policy vs. all non-policy date variance comparisons. 
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policy independence, in line with the expectation of the trilemma hypothesis discussed in 
Section 5.3.  
However, this is less convincing, considering the lack of empirical evidence for full ‘monetary 
independence’ (Rey, 2015; Aizenman et al., 2015). Even if we fail to see significant ‘direct 
spillover’ effects from ECB’s unconventional liquidity operations in to South African money 
market rates, there might still be some ‘indirect’ channels. An example for this is the link 
between some South African banks with banking groups in the Eurozone.36 A parent bank 
in the Eurozone benefiting from ECB’s liquidity operations may inject some liquidity in to 
its subsidiaries in South Africa. This, in turn, may be used as substitute for the liquidity in 
South African money market. This might translate in to lower money market rates, since it 
reduces the demand for bank funding in South African. However, this ‘international bank 
lending’ channel - although couldn’t be ignored - is not significant enough in linking South 
Africa with Eurozone, as is evident in our empirical results. In their investigation of ECB’s 
monetary policy spillovers in Central and Easter European countries (a region far more 
integrated to Eurozone than South Africa), Fallagiarda et al. (2016) were able to see such results 
just in Romania.  
The assessment of individual ECB unconventional monetary policies are given in Table 6.5 to 
Table 6.14. This is a useful exercise since the different list of ECB instruments were launched 
with different objectives (see Annex 2 and 3). First, the impact of three main groups of ECB’s 
unconventional monetary policy instruments, namely ‘Asset purchases’, ‘Liquidity Provisions’ 
and ‘Collateral Easing’ are shown in Table 6.5 to Table 6.7. Next, the impact from specific 
ECB’s instruments, namely - ‘Outright Monetary Transactions’ (Table 6.9); ‘Foreign Currency 
Funding’ (Table 6.10); ‘Securities Markets Program’ (Table 6.11); ‘Covered Bond Purchase 
Program’ (Table 6.12); ‘Long-Term Refinancing Operations’ (Table 6.13); ‘Public Sector 
Purchase Program’ (Table 6.14); ‘Forward Guidance’ (Table 6.8) are shown.  
Generally, the impact of these diversified ECB’s policies appear to be qualitatively similar. In 
line with expectations, the results from the IH regressions show that the ‘asset purchases’, 
‘liquidity provision’, and ‘collateral easing’ programs led to appreciation of the local currency, 
reduction in bond yields and CDS, and an increase in stock market indices. The impact on the 
interbank rate, although negative, was not significant for all the three group of unconventional 
policies investigated. These findings largely match the results from the standard (non-
instrumental) regression analysis for the ‘asset purchases’ and ‘liquidity provision’ policies 
(Section 4). The ‘collateral easing’ policies from the standard regressions, however, did not 
deliver significant results - unlike the IH regressions. 
Next, we also look at the specific instruments constituting the three core unconventional policy 
operations of ECB. From the specific asset purchase programs, the announcements of ‘Covered 
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bond purchases programs’, which saw ECB buying securities from credit institutions so as to 
reassure the markets about medium and longer term refinancing of securities, implied the 
reduction of yields and CDS in South Africa. The rand also showed an appreciation. The other 
asset purchase policy (Securities Markets Program), also shows significant decline in CDS and 
some decline in 5 year bond yields. However, both CBPP and SMP show no significance impact 
either on CDS or the stock market indices. The spillovers on South African sovereign bond yields 
and CDS imply the presence of ‘portfolio rebalancing’ and ‘sovereign credit risk’ channels. 
However, the lack of spillovers in to the stock market might suggest weak spillovers from these 
policies (via ‘confidence channels’) to the stock market. We also see weak evidence for spillovers 
via the ‘international bank lending’ channel as seen from the weak evidence on the 3-month 
South African money market rate. Around late 2014, ECB also announced a move to expand its 
asset purchase programs to include sovereign bonds (PSPP). The spillovers from this ‘purchase 
program for public sector securities’ to South African assets was, however, weak (see Table 6.10). 
GMM estimates show no significant coefficients while IV estimates show some evidence of 
negative spillovers in to the nominal exchange rate and sovereign bond yields, in a manner 
typical to asset purchase programs. 
The third, and one of the main, asset purchase programs of ECB (OMT) shows an impact on 
the stock market. JSE stock indices show gains on OMT announcement days. This positive 
spillover to the stock market from OMT, unlike SMP or CBPP1 or CBPP2, could probably be 
linked to the timing of the announcements, vis-à-vis other major events in the Eurozone and 
international markets. SMP and CBPP programs were largely communicated in 2010 and 2011 
as the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone were starting (see Table A2). Global market 
sentiments were low and there was even expectation of a ‘double-dip’ recession, especially in 
2011. Thus, the international impact of these policies might not be strong enough to offset the 
prevailing risk assessments by investors. The IV estimation also shows significant impact on 5 
and 10 year bond yields and CDS. The money market rate, on the other hand, did not seem to 
be impacted from the OMT - just like those of the SMP and CBPP policies. 
Within ECB’s unconventional monetary policy instruments, the ones that had the objective of 
liquidity provision included the ‘Foreign Currency Funding’ (FOR) and the extensions of 
maturity via ‘Long-Term Refinancing operations’ (LTRO).76 The foreign currency funding 
operations of ECB had very strong spillovers, virtually to all asset returns we investigated for 
South Africa. The program of large liquidity provision in foreign currencies (mostly of US dollars) 
to Eurozone’s banking system had spillovers in to South Africa’s nominal exchange rate, where 
it appreciated the currency. The money market rate, which hasn’t been significantly affected by 
                                                            
76 I additionally investigated the impact of another liquidity provision program, namely the “unlimited” 
provision of liquidity through ‘fixed rate tenders with full allotment’ (FRTPFA). IH estimates using 
instrumentation via both GMM and IV did not show significant impact of this policy, although the signs 
of the coefficients were similar to the other ‘liquidity provision’ programs. 
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other ECB instruments, appears to have been significantly reduced by the FOR policy. This is 
consistent over both IV and GMM estimations. In combination with international bank lending 
channel, significant ‘foreign currency funding’ to banks by ECB would increase the supply of 
foreign currency (relative to supply of the rand). This would exert a downward pressure on the 
nominal exchange market as well as the interbank market of South Africa (see Table 6.6). The 
FOR policy also resulted in significant gains by the stock market and decrease in 5 and 10 year 
bond yields and CDS. Further, ECB’s maturity extension program (LTRO), which was a 
liquidity injection measure that enabled Eurozone banks to borrow more than a trillion euros 
(see Annex 2), had impacts that are largely similar to ECB’s FOR policy instrument. 
Nonetheless, significant spillovers were witnessed form it mainly in the currency market and 
bond yields.  
6 Conclusion 
This study has assessed the spillovers from recent non-standard monetary policies from the 
Federal Reserve and European Central Bank on South Africa, a key emerging economy. By 
documenting major announcements of unconventional monetary policy tools by the Fed and 
ECB and also using a high frequency daily data, this study has examined how the returns on 
different South African assets are affected.  
There is some evidence that yields on 5 and 10 year sovereign bonds declined in announcements 
relating to QE1. Later phases of the QE program also show similar impacts, although these were 
not as significant. This program also led to a decline in 5 and 10 year CDS spread. The impact 
on CDS spread was significant across all phases of QE and estimations under different 
specifications. The significance of the impact was especially stronger on 5 year CDS spreads. The 
interbank rate also responded to the different phases of QE announcements with a decrease in 
rates, although this impact was significant under the initial phase of QE. The returns on the 
stock market index were positive and highly significant in the different phases of the QE 
program. The asset purchase programs under Fed’s QE also generally led to appreciation of the 
rand.  The announcements relating to the tapering of Fed’s asset purchase programs overall led 
to the depreciation of the rand. CDS of 5 and 10 years strongly responded to the tapering of QE 
with significant increases. Similarly, there is some evidence that 5 year Sovereign yields increased. 
The interbank rate also showed significant increment during events relating to the tapering of 
the QE. In addition, the returns on the stock market index were negative and significant during 
the announcements of the tapering. 
The results from the regression analysis on asset returns generally fall in line with the 
international transmission channels for the unconventional monetary policies noted in the 
literature (e.g. Lim et al., 2014; Takas and Vela, 2014; Ehrmann et al., 2011).  The transmission 
channels noted in the literature, carry the impact of large scale asset purchase programs from 
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their initial intended asset markets in advanced economies and specific asset categories to other 
countries (i.e. substitute markets) and broad asset classes (substitute assets). Fed’s QE program 
boosted confidence in international capital markets and increased capital inflows in to emerging 
markets, as investors started targeting higher yield assets overseas and portfolio rebalancing. 
This is evidently seen in rising returns during the QE program. Although, for some assets, the 
effect is mainly significant during the first phase of QE.  Conversely, the outflow of capital from 
emerging markets (in response to the tapering of QE) has seen falling returns on South African 
assets. The empirical finding in other countries and studies also confirms this (BIS, 2014). 
The diversified unconventional monetary policies of ECB also appear to have had spillovers on 
South African assets. In line with expectations, the ‘asset purchases’ policy led to appreciation 
of the local currency, reduction in bond yields and CDS, and an increase in stock market indices. 
The ‘liquidity provision’ and ‘collateral easing’ policies also show impacts on asset returns that 
are similar to the ‘asset purchases’ policy, especially in the IH regressions. Looking at the specific 
unconventional monetary policy instruments constituting these three policy groups, the ‘covered 
bond purchases programs’, reduced South African sovereign bond yields and CDS. The rand also 
appreciated during these announcements. The ‘securities markets program’ also conveyed 
significant decline in CDS and 5 year bond yields. These spillovers to sovereign bond yields and 
CDS imply the likely occurrence of international ‘portfolio rebalancing’ and ‘sovereign credit 
risk’ channels between ECB’s policies and South African asset returns. However, neither of these 
two asset purchase programs showed significant impact either on CDS or the stock market 
indices. The ‘outright monetary transactions’ program (another asset purchase instrument), on 
the other hand, shows some gains by the JSE stock indices. The lack of spillovers in to the stock 
market by some of the asset purchase programs may imply weak spillovers through ‘confidence’ 
channel) to the stock market. The weak spillovers to the money market rate might also imply 
weak transmission via the ‘international bank lending’ channel. 
The ‘foreign currency funding’ program (part of the ‘liquidity provision’ policy of ECB) had very 
strong spillovers, virtually to all asset returns we investigated for South Africa. During the 
announcements events of the policy; the rand appreciated, the stock market made gains, while 
5 and 10 year bond yields and CDS declined. Even the money market rate, which did not face 
significant spillovers from all other ECB policies, was significantly reduced by the program. The 
‘long-term refinancing operations’ of ECB (i.e. maturity extension program), had impacts that 
are essentially comparable to the ‘foreign currency funding’ instrument. Nevertheless, significant 
spillovers from it were seen just on the currency market and South African sovereign bond yields. 
Overall, there is evidence that South African assets were affected by the spillovers from Federal 
Reserve’s and ECB’s policies. However, different policy events have affected different assets in 
different ways and some events had more significant impacts than others.  
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Annex: 
Annex 1 (econometric issues) 
1.1 The bias in IH parameter estimates under OLS  
If we denote equations (2) and (3) in matrix notations, we will get: 
 [ 1 −β−α 1 ] [∆IRt∆Yt ]= [γδ]Xt +[
εtηt]                      (12) 
The reduced form solution can be obtained by solving: 
 [∆IRt∆Yt ]= 11−αβ [ [βδ + γαγ + δ] Xt + [1α] εt + [β1] ηt]   (13) 
The OLS estimate of α in equation (3) could, then, be given as a covariance-variance ratio 
follows: 
 훼푂̂퐿푆 = 퐶표푣 (∆퐼푅푡, ∆푌푡)푉푎푟 (∆퐼푅푡)  (14) 
If we denote the variances of the three respective shocks as 훿푋2 , 훿휀2 and 훿휂2, we could also give 
the estimate as: 
 훼푂̂퐿푆 = (훽훿+훾)(훼훾+훿)훿푋2 +훼훿휀2+훽훿휂2(훽훿+훾)2훿푋2 +훿휀2+훽2훿휂2  (15) 
The bias in OLS estimate, which is the difference between the estimated and actual value of α 
can be given as: 
 훼푂̂퐿푆 − 훼  = (1−훼훽)[훿(훽훿+훾)훿푋2 +훽훿휂2](훽훿+훾)2훿푋2 +훿휀2+훽2δ휂2  (16) 
This bias will be different from zero if there are no extra restrictions on parameters, e.g. α.β = 1. 
1.2 The IH conditional variance 
Following the foregoing notations in Section 5.4.1 and Annex 1 (1.1), suppose we denote the 
conditional variance of the shocks on the announcement days as 훿푋|푃2 , 훿휀|푃2 , and 훿휂|푃2  . Conversely, 
we denote the conditional variance of the shocks on the non-announcement days as 훿푋|푁푃2 , 훿휀|푁푃2 , 
and 훿휂|푁푃2 . Following the reduced form solution to the system given in equation (13), we may, 
then, estimate the conditional variance-covariance matrices for the systems, ΩP and ΩNP, as: 
ΩP = 1(1−훼훽)2 ⎣⎢
⎡(훽훿 + 훾)2훿푋|푃2 + 훿휀|푃2 + 훽2훿휂|푃2 (훽훿 + 훾)(훼훾 + 훿)훿푋|푃2 + 훼훿휀|푃2 + 훽훿휂|푃2. (훼훾 + 훿)2훿푋|푃2 + 훼2훿휀|푃2 + 훿휂|푃2 ⎦⎥
⎤ (17) 
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ΩNP = 1(1−훼훽)2 ⎣⎢
⎡(훽훿 + 훾)2훿푋|푁푃2 + 훿휀|푁푃2 + 훽2훿휂|푁푃2 (훽훿 + 훾)(훼훾 + 훿)δ푋|푁푃2 + 훼훿휀|푁푃2 + 훽훿휂|푁푃2. (훼훾 + 훿)2훿푋|푁푃2 + 훼2훿휀|푁푃2 + 훿휂|푁푃2 ⎦⎥
⎤ (18) 
We further assume that the variance of the monetary policy shocks is bigger in the days with 
policy announcements when compared to the days without announcements. Whereas, the 
variance of other shocks is assumed to remain similar in these two subset of days. That is, the 
following assumptions will hold on the second moments of the shocks. 
  훿휀|푃2 > 훿휀|푁푃2 ,  (19) 
 
 훿푋|푃2 = 훿푋|푁푃2  , and (20) 
 
 훿휂|푃2 = 훿휂|푁푃2  (21) 
Based on these assumptions, the difference between the conditional variance-covariance matrices 
ΩP and ΩNP , i.e. equations (17) and (18), could be given as: 
  ∆Ω = ΩP - ΩNP = 
훿휀|푃2 −훿휀|푁푃2(1−훼훽)2  [1 훼훼 훼2], (22) 
That is, only the variances of the monetary policy shocks remain since the variances of other 
shocks are nullified. 
1.3 The orthogonality of IH instruments and moment condition 
We may show that two instruments zIR and zY are orthogonal to the residuals e as follows: 
 ∑ 푧푡. 푒푡푇푡=1 =  푍′. 푒 (23) 
 
 = [푧′퐼푅푧′푌 ] (∆푌 − 훼∆퐼푅) (24) 
 
 =
⎣⎢
⎢⎡
1푇푃 ∆퐼푅′푃  , −
1푇푁푃 ∆퐼푅′푁푃  1푇푃 ∆푌′푃  , −
1푇푁푃 ∆푌′푁푃  ⎦
⎥⎥⎤ (∆푌푃 − 훼∆퐼푅푃  , ∆푌푁푃 − 훼∆퐼푅푁푃  ) (25) 
 
 =
⎣⎢
⎢⎡
1푇푃 ∆퐼푅′푃  (∆푌푃 − 훼∆퐼푅푃 ) −
1푇푁푃 ∆퐼푅′푁푃 (∆푌푁푃 − α∆IRNP) 1TP ∆Y′P (∆YP − α∆IRP) −
1TNP ∆Y′NP(∆YNP − α∆IRNP) ⎦
⎥⎥⎤  (26) 
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 = ((Ω̂P,12 − αΩ̂P,11) − (Ω̂NP,12 − αΩ̂NP,11)(Ω̂P,22 − αΩ̂P,21) − (Ω̂NP,22 − αΩ̂NP,21))  (27) 
 
 = (∆Ω̂12 − α∆Ω̂11∆Ω̂22 − α∆Ω̂21)  (28) 
Given ∆Ω= C[1 훼훼 훼2], we will get 
 ∑ 푧푡. 푒푡푇푡=1 →푝 0. (29) 
Thus, E [푧푡. 푒푡] = 0, will be the moment condition. 
Note: Section 1.1 to 1.3 of Annex 1 closely follows Rigobon and Sack (2004). For more on parameter bias, 
conditional variance, orthogonality of instruments as well as application of the identification through 
heteroscedasticity methodology, please see Rigobon and Sack (2003), Rigobon and Sack (2004), Rigobon 
(2003), Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2013), Arai (2016),  Caporalea et al. (2005). 
1.4 The variance ratio test 
The variance ratio test which we conduct here makes a test on the equality of the standard 
deviations of two groups. The test (δP = δNP), for instance comparing standard errors of asset 
returns on policy announcement dates (P) with non-policy announcement dates (NP), is given 
as x2 distribution with n-1 degrees of freedom, where, the test is specified as x2 = (n−1)s2δNP2 . Further, 
the test for δ2P = δ2NP could be given as an F distribution with n1 -1 and n0 -1 degrees of freedom, 
where, the test is specified as F = 
푠푃2푠푁푃2 .  
Suppose Yi,j represents the jth observation of a return on asset Y for the ith group (e.g. dates 
with unconventional monetary policy announcements). Further, suppose Zij =|Yi,j −Y̅̅̅̅̅i|, where 
the mean of Y in the ith group is represented by Y̅̅̅̅̅i. Levene’s test statistic for equality of 
variances could be given as: 
푊0 = ∑ 푛푖(푍푖̅−푍̅)2푖 /(푔−1)∑ ∑ (푍푖̅,푗−푍푖̅)2푖푖 / ∑ (푛푖−1)푖  
Where, g represents the number of groups while ni shows the number of observations in group i 
(e.g. number of announcement events per specific unconventional monetary policy type). In 
our case, where we have two groups (e.g. announcement dates vs. non-announcement dates), 
the test statistic could simply be given as: 
푊0 = ∑ 푛푖(푍푖̅−푍̅)2푖∑ ∑ (푍푖̅,푗−푍푖̅)2푖푖 / ∑ (푛푖−1)푖  
The above Levene’s test statistic for equality of variances is robust even under non-normal 
distributions (Gastwirth et al., 2009; Brown and Forsythe, 1974; Levene, 1960).
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Annex 2 (Recent monetary policy environment in the US and Eurozone) 
2.1 Recent monetary policy instruments adopted by the Fed  
The economic environment in late 2008, characterized by severe recession and financial crisis, 
overwhelmed standard monetary policy tools and short term rates were close to zero. Faced by these 
difficulties, the US Federal Reserve (Fed) resorted to strong unconventional monetary tools such as 
‘quantitative easing’ (QE), as did other major central banks such as ECB.77  (For the chronological 
list of key unconventional monetary policies adopted by the Fed and ECB, see Table A1 and Table 
A2 in Annex 3). However, the key unconventional instruments followed by the Fed differed from 
that of the ECB in that Fed’s QE was focused on bond purchases while ECB’s actions were mainly 
focused on direct lending to banks, although it also made asset purchases. Fawley and Neely (2013) 
attribute this to the fact that bond markets play the main role in the US while banks play the main 
role in Eurozone.  
During financial crisis, some assets may suffer liquidity problems or may be undervalued by financial 
markets. Central banks can address liquidity problems and undervaluation of assets by purchasing 
them and modifying the composition of assets which they hold. This is precisely part of the key 
instruments used by the Fed and the ECB during the subprime and Eurozone debt crisis. Such 
policies are generally termed as ‘credit easing’ and they could take the form of ‘pure credit easing’ 
when central bank purchases of assets with liquidity issues is sterilized by the sale of other central 
bank assets. When the credit easing involves the purchase of assets without the sale of other assets 
(and leads to expansion of central bank balance sheets) it is termed as ‘quantitative easing’ 
(Szczerbowicz, 2015). Credit easing policies, be it ‘pure credit easing’ or ‘quantitative easing’, mainly 
achieve their target via the ‘portfolio rebalancing effect’. When a central bank targets and makes 
large purchases of a specific asset group, it alters the quantity of asset available for the private 
investors. This increases the price of the asset and reduces its yield. 
First Round of Quantitative Easing (QE1): Around late 2008 the Fed introduced its first 
Quantitative Easing program (QE1), while the ECB worked on expanding its operations of bank 
lending. This round of QE is commonly termed as QE1, to put it apart from two follow-up rounds 
of the policy (i.e. QE2 and QE3). The Fed publicized on November 25, 2008 that it will make 
purchases of 100 billion USD worth of government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) debt and $500 billion 
USD worth of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) issued by GSEs. On December 1, 2008 the Fed 
suggested that asset purchases under QE might extend also to treasuries. Further announcements 
were made on March 18, 2009 that the Fed will make an additional purchase of MBS securities worth 
750 billion USD, long term treasury securities worth 300 billion USD, and GSE debt worth 100 billion 
USD. As Fawley and Neely (2013) note, these operations by the Fed almost doubled the monetary 
base of the US. Over the span of QE1, assets worth 1.75 trillion USD were purchased by the Fed 
(Chadha et al., 2013). Long term US real interest rates were also lowered by QE1 through its effect 
on term premia (Gagnon et al., 2011; Hausken and Ncube, 2013). As markets stabilized from the 
                                                            
77 The Bank of Japan (BOJ) and Bank of England (BOE) had also followed their own asset purchase 
programs (Fawley and Neely, 2013). 
114 
 
subprime crisis around end of 2009 and beginning of 2010, the Fed decided to conclude its QE1 
operation in the first quarter of 2010.  
Second Round of Quantitative Easing (QE2): The Fed hinted its plan to continue its QE operation 
as the then Fed chairman, Ben Bernanke, noted on August 27, 2010. The need for another round of 
QE came not primarily because of problems in the financial market but due to slow recovery and 
‘worryingly’ low inflation. After repeated communications about QE2, the Fed on November 3, 2010 
formally announced its intention to make purchases of extra 600 billion USD worth of US treasuries. 
QE2 had explicit targets of lowering longer term US real interest rates and also pushing inflation to 
its target levels. 
 However, markets had already anticipated the formal commencement of QE2 on November 2010. 
As Fawley and Neely (2013) note, almost all of primary dealers polled by Reuters (a month before 
actual launch of QE2) expected Fed to announce QE2 on its November 3, 2010 Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) meeting. This meant that the formal announcement of QE2 environment create 
a big surprise effect on the market, as the market has correctly foreseen this and already adjusted to 
this expectation of Fed’s policies. This market anticipation for the ‘renewal’ of Federal Reserve’s 
asset purchase programs (QE2) stands in stark contrast to significant market surprise associated with 
the initial launch of the program (QE1) in November 25, 2008 and the commencement of treasury 
purchases (with expanded QE1) on March 3, 2009 (see Table A1).78  
Third Round of Quantitative Easing (QE3): In light with the poor performance of the labor 
market, the Fed already hinted on August 2012 that it will undertake ‘additional monetary 
accommodations’ (see Table A1). Consistent with clear market expectation, the Fed communicated 
the launch of a third quantitative easing round (QE3). The Fed committed itself to the purchase of 
40 billion USD worth of MBS securities per month until conditions in the labor market improve 
‘substantially’ and even expand purchases if necessary. The Fed further expanded QE3 on December 
12, 2012 by committing itself to continue the purchase of long term treasuries worth 45 billion USD 
per month. 
‘Taper Tantrum’: In his testimony to the US congress On May 22, 2013, Ben Bernanke motioned 
the plan for normalization of US monetary policy and end of asset purchases by stating “In the next 
                                                            
78 The Fed announced another round of purchases for long term treasuries, on September 21, 2011. This 
follows the renewed financial distress and market anxiety about another recession in the second half of 
2011. This program is popularly known as ‘operation twist’, although it is formally known as ‘Maturity 
Extension Program and Reinvestment Policy’. The program earned its nickname since its effect was to 
twist the shape of the yield curve. It does so by reducing long term interest rate as compared to short 
term interest rates. For this objective, the Fed sold 400 billion USD worth of short term assets while at 
the same time purchasing 400 billion USD worth of long term assets. Unlike the QE policy, the program 
environment expand the monetary base (i.e. no money creation). This is because the amount of the assets 
sold and purchased by the Fed were of equal magnitude. The Fed extended ‘Operation twist’ on June 20, 
2012 and committed itself to continue this policy till the end of 2012. It decided to purchase long term 
securities worth 45 billion USD per month, which was funded by the sale of short term securities worth 
45 billion USD. 
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few meetings, we could take a step down in our pace of purchase”. In a press conference on June 19, 
2013, Bernanke also reiterated that “the central bank may start dialing down its unprecedented bond 
buying program this year and end it entirely in mid-2014 if the economy finally achieves the 
sustainable growth the Fed sought since the recession ended in 2009” (Table A1). This speech on QE 
tapering (i.e. gradual winding down of asset purchases) caused a surge in US treasury yields in 2013, 
hence, the name ‘taper tantrum’. Financial markets strongly reacted to Bernanke’s tapering speech 
as they anticipated short term interest rate normalization (i.e. rate hike), apart from the obvious 
(gradual) termination of asset purchases programs (Aizenman et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2014; 
Mohanty, 2014). 
2.2 Recent monetary policy instruments adopted by the ECB 
Since the onset of the global recession, ECB followed a diverse list of unconventional monetary 
policies that could broadly be grouped as ‘assets purchases’, exceptional ‘liquidity provisions’ and 
‘collateral easing’.79 The full list of these policies and their event dates are given chronologically in 
Table A2.  
i) Assets purchases: Some of the key asset purchase programs of the ECB included: 
• Securities Markets Program (SMP): the SMP was launched on May 9, 2010 as an effort to 
stabilize the euro during the sovereign debt crisis of the time, which was triggered by the Greek 
public debt crisis. The ECB used this policy tool to purchase sovereign bonds. However, there 
were concerns of inflation (and other issues related to ECB’s mandate) tied to the SMP. These 
same concerns were also raised against the asset purchase programs of the US Fed, i.e. the 
‘Quantitative Easing’ policy. The ECB has tried to present the SMP as different from the Fed’s 
QE policy. In this regard, the ECB was sterilizing its sovereign bond purchases in secondary 
markets and re-absorbing the liquidity injected to the markets by the SMP policy. 
 
• Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT): the OMT policy is also a purchase program of 
sovereign bonds. The program was launched on September 6, 2012 to address the lingering debt 
crisis in the Eurozone. It was initiated following the rapid rise in sovereign yields of Eurozone’s 
periphery economies. The OMT, although closely related to the SMP, was different in some 
aspects. The SMP targeted the purchase of longer term bonds while the OMT was operational 
on relatively short maturity sovereign bonds, where the maximum was 3 years. Further, euro-
area governments had to comply with a number of requirements (macroeconomic adjustment 
policies) before OMT purchases of their sovereign bonds were made. 
                                                            
79 The ECB also followed certain monetary policy conducts that are ‘unconventional’ but are not necessary 
‘asset purchases’, ‘liquidity provisions’ or ‘collateral easing’. One such example is the adoption of ‘forward 
guidance’ (FWG) policy adopted by ECB on July 4, 2013. This is essentially a change in monetary policy 
communication strategy. FWG has significant impact on markets since it alters expectations of future 
policy rates. In its July 4, 2013 press conference communication, ECB’s monetary policy committee (i.e. 
‘the Governing council’) stated that it “…expects the key ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower 
levels for an extended period of time...”  
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2013/html/is130704.en.html 
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• Covered bond purchases programs (CBPP1 and CBPP2): this programs involved the purchase 
of securities issued by credit institutions (i.e. covered bonds) by ECB. The main objective was 
to assure the markets about the medium and longer term refinancing of these securities. These 
securities are often collateralized by public-sector loans or mortgage loans. Covered bonds often 
have higher ratings than the credit ratings of the banks that issued them. This is due to the 
quality of the collateral attached to the covered bonds. This made them safe and, thus, more 
liquid. The low risk and higher return on these bonds also normally makes them more attractive 
than sovereign bonds. However, as the experience from the subprime and Eurozone crisis period 
shows, private investors might still prefer sovereign bonds (despite their lower returns) - 
especially in times of financial crisis. The ECB announced its first covered bond purchases 
program (CBPP1) on May 7, 2009 and noted that it will purchase covered bonds (euro-
denominated) worth 60 billion. A follow up covered bonds purchases program (CBPP2) was 
announced on October 6, 2011, where ECB would purchase a 40 billion worth of covered bonds 
with euro-denomination. The purchases took place in both primary and secondary markets. 
CBPP3, a follow up of covered bond purchase program CBPP2, was announced on October 2, 
2014. The ECB further announced its expanded Asset Purchase Program (APP), which 
integrates the already operational asset-backed securities (ABSPP) and covered bond purchase 
program (CBPP3) with a new purchase program for public sector securities (PSPP) on January 
22, 2015. The PSPP added bonds issued by governments and Eurozone institutions in to the 
pool of assets purchased by ECB. These combined purchases represented 60 billion euros worth 
of assets by September 2016. On April 21, 2016, the ECB also announced details of new 
corporate sector purchase program (CSPP). 
 
ii) Liquidity provisions: At the start of the 2008 financial crisis, the ECB acted strongly to calm 
down the interbank market. The central bank accepted a diverse list of collaterals and also 
provided liquidity to a big number of banks. However, as the global recession and the Eurozone 
government debt crisis started to make the interbank market even worse, ECB started to resort 
to additional measures that address liquidity.80 These measures are dubbed ‘unconventional’ since 
their scope and way of operation goes beyond conventional open market ECB operations 
(Szczerbowicz, 2015). To restore confidence and the normal operations of the interbank market 
(and lending by banks to firms and households), the ECB started to follow the following list of 
non-standard liquidity provisions: 
 
                                                            
80 When financial assets and money are not perfect substitutes, excess liquidity in the financial market 
may affect the economy via portfolio rebalancing effects (Tobin, 1982; Meltzer, 1995; Szczerbowicz, 2015; 
Hausken and Ncube; 2013; Lim et al., 2014). In other words, excess liquidity induced by ECB’s aggressive 
actions might force banks and other economic agents to purchase sovereign (and corporate) bonds in the 
Eurozone and substitute bonds elsewhere (e.g. South Africa), thereby raising the price of these bonds and 
depressing their yields. 
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• Unlimited provision of liquidity through ‘fixed rate tenders with full allotment’ (FRTPFA): 
Unlike traditional open market operations that are conducted via variable rate tenders, banks 
in Eurozone got the possibility to fulfill all their liquidity requirements at interest rates that 
was determined in advance by the ECB. This fixed interest rate refers to the rate on ‘Main 
Refinancing Operations’ (MROs). Szczerbowicz (2015) note that fixed rate tenders on MROs 
existed before - i.e. at the early days of the Eurosystem (Jan 1999 to June 2000) but were later 
taken away due to overbidding by banks. ECB started the FRTPFA around October 2008 for 
its open market operations and foreign liquidity swaps. By coordinating its efforts with the Fed, 
ECB also started to deliver ‘unlimited’ USD funding to the market. The ECB tried to 
reintroduce variable rate tenders in March 2010 but quickly resumed fixed rate tenders on May 
2010 due to the Greek debt crisis.  
• Extension of the maturity of ‘long-term refinancing operations’ (LTRO):  ECB conducted 
maturity extensions of LTRO (up to 1 year) since 2007 and an exceptional liquidity measure 
of conducting 3 year LTROs. For instance, two packages of 3-year LTROs (one on 21 December 
2011 and another on 29 February 2012) enabled Eurozone banks to borrow in excess of 1 trillion 
euros.  
• Liquidity provision in foreign currencies to enhance ‘foreign currency funding’ (FOR): This was 
carried out via swap lines with other central banks. Under this instrument, ECB followed a 
policy of exchanging euros against US dollars. Although liquidity provisions in USD was the 
main part, it also exchanged euros against the pound sterling and also the Swiss franc. Apart 
from exchanging euros to foreign currencies, the ECB also followed the policy of directly lending 
in foreign currencies to financial institutions in the Eurozone.  
  
iii) Collateral easing: Since late 2008 (the onset of the global financial crisis), the ECB started to 
comprehensively loosen its rules over collaterals. ECB started accepting debt instruments that 
are issued by credit institutions (e.g. deposit certificates from banks) as eligible collaterals. 
However, to limit its exposure to risky assets, ECB started to transition away to asset backed 
securities (ABS) with higher requirements from emergency collateral instruments. The ECB 
announced operational details of asset-backed securities (ABSPP) On October 2, 2014, alongside 
new covered bond purchase program (CBPP3). 
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Annex 3 (Fed, ECB & SARB event dates) 
Table A1: Fed UMP Event dates 
Event 
dates 
Event detail UMP 
Type 
Source 
11/25/2008 Large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) announced: Fed will purchase $100 billion in GSE debt 
and $500 billion in MBS. 
QE1  Fawley and Neely 
(2013); US Fed 
12/1/2008 First suggestion of extending QE to Treasuries. QE1  Fawley and Neely 
(2013); US Fed 
1/28/2009 Fed stands ready to expand QE and buy Treasuries. QE1  Fawley and Neely 
(2013); US Fed 
3/18/2009 LSAPs expanded: Fed will purchase $300 billion in long-term Treasuries and Fed expects low 
rates for an additional $750 and $100 billion in MBS and GSE debt, respectively. 
QE1  Fawley and Neely 
(2013); US Fed 
8/12/2009 LSAPs slowed: All purchases will finish by the end of October, not mid-September. QE1  Fawley and Neely 
(2013); US Fed 
8/27/2010 Bernanke suggests role for additional QE “should further action prove necessary.” QE2  Fawley and Neely 
(2013); US Fed 
9/21/2010 FOMC emphasizes low inflation, which “is likely to remain subdued for some time before 
rising to levels the Committee considers consistent with its mandate. 
QE2  Fawley and Neely 
(2013); US Fed 
10/12/2010 FOMC members’ “sense” is that “[additional] accommodation may be appropriate before 
long.” 
QE2  Fawley and Neely 
(2013); US Fed 
11/3/2010 QE2 announced: Fed will purchase $600 billion in Treasuries QE2  Fawley and Neely 
(2013); US Fed 
9/21/2011 Maturity Extension Program (“Operation Twist”) announced: The Fed will purchase  $400 
billion of Treasuries with remaining maturities of 6 to 30 years and sell an equal amount with 
remaining maturities of 3 years or less; MBS and agency debt principal payments will no 
longer be reinvested in Treasuries, but instead in MBS. 
“Twist”  Fawley and Neely 
(2013); US Fed 
6/20/2012 Maturity Extension Program extended: The Fed will continue to purchase long-term 
securities and sell short-term securities through the end of 2012. Purchases/sales will continue 
at the current pace, about $45 billion/month. 
“Twist”  Fawley and Neely 
(2013); US Fed 
8/22/2012 FOMC members “judged that additional monetary accommodation would likely be warranted 
fairly soon…” 
QE3  Fawley and Neely 
(2013); US Fed 
9/13/2012 QE3 announced: The Fed will purchase $40 billion of MBS per month as long as “the outlook 
for the labor market does not improve substantially…in the context of price stability. Fed 
expects low rates “at least through mid-2015.”  
QE3  Fawley and Neely 
(2013); US Fed 
12/12/2012 QE3 expanded: The Fed will continue to purchase $45 billion of long-term Treasuries per 
month but will no longer sterilize purchases through the sale of short-term Treasuries. The 
Fed expects low rates to be appropriate while unemployment is above 6.5 % and inflation is 
forecasted below 2.5%. 
QE3  Fawley and Neely 
(2013); US Fed 
5/22/2013 (Ben Bernanke's, ex-Fed Chairman, testimony to Congress) “...In 
the next few meetings, we could take a step down in our pace of purchase...” 
Tapering Chen et al(2014); 
US Fed 
6/19/2013 (Ben Bernanke press conference) “...The central bank may start dialing down its 
unprecedented bond-buying program this year and end it entirely in mid-2014 if the economy 
finally achieves the sustainable growth the Fed sought since the recession ended in 2009...” 
Tapering Chen et al(2014); 
US Fed 
12/18/2013 FOMC Meeting, Tapering   Tapering US Fed  
1/29/2014 FOMC Meeting, Tapering   Tapering US Fed 
2/11/2014 Janet Yellen (Current Fed Chair) Testimony, Tapering Tapering US Fed  
 
Table A2: ECB UMP event dates 
Event date Description UMP type 
6/22/2016 ECB reinstates waiver affecting the eligibility of Greek bonds used as collateral in Eurosystem monetary policy 
operations (PSPP).  
PSPP 
6/2/2016 Announcement of remaining details of the corporate sector purchase program (CSPP). “...Today the Governing 
Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) decided that purchases under its corporate sector purchase program 
(CSPP) will start on 8 June 2016. The Governing Council also took decisions on the remaining details of the CSPP. 
The CSPP is a new program added to the existing elements of the asset purchase program that will strengthen the 
pass-through of asset purchases to the real economy…” 
CSPP 
4/21/2016 Announcement of details for the corporate sector purchase program (CSPP). The CSPP aims to further strengthen 
the pass-through of the Eurosystem’s asset purchases to the financing conditions of the real economy. The CSPP will 
be carried out by six national central banks acting on behalf of the Eurosystem, coordinated by the ECB. 
CSPP 
3/10/2016 Decision to add corporate sector purchase program (CSPP) to the asset purchase program (APP) and announces 
changes to APP). The monthly purchases under the asset purchase program will be expanded to €80 billion starting 
in April. Investment grade euro-denominated bonds issued by non-bank corporations established in the euro area will 
be included in the list of assets that are eligible for regular purchases. A new series of four targeted longer-term 
refinancing operations (TLTRO II), each with a maturity of four years, will be launched, starting in June 2016.  
ABSPP 
3/10/2016 ECB announces new series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO II) TLTRO 
11/9/2015 Increase in PSPP issue share limit enlarges purchasable universe (PSPP) PSPP 
9/23/2015 Eurosystem adjusts purchase process in ABS program (ABSPP)  ABSPP 
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6/18/2015 ECB Governing Council takes note of ruling on OMT by the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ)  OMT 
1/22/2015 Decision that the  interest  rate  for  the  remaining  six  TLTROs would  be  equal  to  the  rate  on  the  
Eurosystem’s  MROs  prevailing  at  the  time when each TLTRO is conducted 
TLTRO 
1/22/2015 Announcement of expanded asset purchase program PSPP 
12/4/2014 (Draghi’s press conference) “…Evidently   we   are   convinced   that   a   QE   program   which   could   include 
sovereign bonds falls within our mandate...”  
PSPP 
11/26/2014 (Vitor Constancio, vice president of the ECB, London speech) “…we will have to consider buying other assets, 
including sovereign bonds in the secondary market…” 
PSPP 
11/17/2014 (Mario Draghi’s speech at the European Parliament) “The ECB Governing Council is unanimous in its commitment 
to using additional unconventional instruments […] Unconventional measures might entail the purchase of a variety of 
assets, one of which is sovereign bonds.” 
PSPP 
10/2/2014 Announcement of  operational  details  for covered bond purchase programs CBPP 
10/2/2014 Announcement of  operational  details  for asset-backed  securities   ABSPP 
9/18/2014 Decision to allot €82.6 billion in first targeted longer-term refinancing operation TLTRO 
9/4/2014 Decision that  the  Eurosystem  would purchase a broad portfolio of euro-denominated covered bonds issued by MFIs 
domiciled  in  the  euro  area  under  a  new  covered  bond  purchase  program (CBPP3) 
CBPP 
9/4/2014 Decision on purchasing a broad portfolio of simple and transparent asset-backed  securities (ABSs)  with  underlying 
assets consisting of claims against the euro area non-financial private sector under an ABS purchase program  
(ABSPP) 
ABSPP 
7/29/2014 Publication of legal act relating to targeted longer-term refinancing operations TLTRO 
7/3/2014 Decision on further technical details for the series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) TLTRO 
6/17/2014 Decision to continue offering seven-day US dollar liquidity-providing operations FOR 
6/5/2014 Decision to conduct a series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) aimed at improving bank 
lending to the euro area non-financial private sector, excluding loans to households for house purchase.  
TLTRO 
6/5/2014 Decision to  continue  conducting  the  Eurosystem’s main  and  three-month  longer-term  refinancing  operations  as  
fixed  rate  tender procedures  with  full  allotment  for  as  long  as  necessary.   
LTRO 
6/5/2014 Decision to  continue  conducting  the  Eurosystem’s main  and  three-month  longer-term  refinancing  operations  as  
fixed  rate  tender procedures  with  full  allotment  for  as  long  as  necessary.   
FRTPFA 
6/5/2014 Decision to extend the existing eligibility of additional assets as collateral, notably under the additional  credit  claims  
framework,  at  least  until  September  2018,  and  to intensify   preparatory   work   related   to   outright   
purchases   of   asset-backed securities (ABS). 
COLL 
6/5/2014 Decision to extend the existing eligibility of additional assets as collateral, notably under the additional  credit  claims  
framework,  at  least  until  September  2018,  and  to intensify   preparatory   work   related   to   outright   
purchases   of   asset-backed securities (ABS). 
ABSPP 
11/7/2013 Decision to conduct three-month longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) as fixed rate tender procedures with full 
allotment 
LTRO 
11/7/2013 Decision on continuing the conduct of main refinancing operations (MROs) as fixed rate tender procedures with full 
allotment  for  as  long  as  necessary (at  least  until  the  end  of  the  6th maintenance period of 2015 on 7 July 
2015); Decision to conduct three-month longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) as fixed rate tender procedures 
with full allotment.                                                                                                               
FRTPFA 
10/31/2013 Establishment of standing swap arrangements with other central banks FOR 
9/16/2013 Decision to extend  the liquidity swap arrangement with the Bank of England FOR 
7/4/2013 The Governing Council expects the key ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period 
of time. (Mario Draghi’s press conference) 
FWG 
5/2/2013 Decision to conduct  the  three-month  longer-term  refinancing  operations (LTROs) as fixed rate tender procedures 
with full allotment 
LTRO 
5/2/2013 Decision on continuing the conduct of main refinancing operations (MROs) as fixed rate tender procedures with full 
allotment for as long as necessary, and at least until the end of the 6th maintenance period of 2014 on 8 July 2014 
FRTPFA 
3/22/2013 Collateral rule changed for some uncovered government guaranteed bank bonds COLL 
2/21/2013 Decision to  publish  the Eurosystem’s holdings of securities acquired under the Securities Markets Program (SMP) SMP 
12/13/2012 Decision on extending liquidity swap arrangements with the Fed FOR 
12/6/2012 Decision on the conduct of 3-month LTROs as FRTPFA LTRO 
12/6/2012 Decision on continuing the conduct of MROs as FRTPFA for as long as necessary, and to conduct 3-month LTROs as 
FRTPFA 
FRTPFA 
9/12/2012 Decision on extending liquidity swap arrangement with the Bank of England FOR 
9/6/2012 ECB Governing Council meeting. The ECB Governing Council announced the technical details of OMTs and decided 
on additional measures to preserve collateral availability 
OMT 
9/6/2012 Announcement of technical details for OMTs and decisions on additional measures to preserve collateral availability COLL 
8/2/2012 Decision to undertake outright open market operations (of a size adequate to reach ECB’s objective) OMT 
7/26/2012 (Mario Draghi's, president of ECB, London speech) “… whatever it takes …” OMT 
6/22/2012 increase of  collateral   availability   for counterparties COLL 
6/6/2012 Decision on conducting 3-month LTROs as FRTPFA LTRO 
6/6/2012 Decision on continuing the conduct of MROs as FRTPFA for as long as necessary, and to conduct 3-month LTROs as 
FRTPFA 
FRTPFA 
2/28/2012 Results of second 3-year LTRO LTRO 
2/9/2012 Decision on additional credit claims as collateral in Eurosystem credit operations (specific national eligibility criteria 
and risk control  measures)                                                                  
COLL 
12/21/2011 Results from first 3-year LTRO LTRO 
12/8/2011 Decision on conducting two  LTROs  with  a  maturity  of  3 years and to increase collateral availability LTRO 
12/8/2011 Decision on conducting two  LTROs  with  a  maturity  of  3 years and to increase collateral availability COLL 
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11/30/2011 Decision on the establishment of a temporary network of reciprocal swap lines (in cooperation with other central 
banks) 
FOR 
11/3/2011 Decision on technical modalities of CBPP2 CBPP 
10/6/2011 Decision on conducting 3-month LTROs as FRTPFA, conducting 2 liquidity-providing supplementary LTROs with a 
maturity of 12 and 13 months as FRTPFA 
LTRO 
10/6/2011 Decision on continuing the conduct of MROs as FRTPFA for as long as necessary, conducting 3-month LTROs as 
FRTPFA, conducting 2 liquidity-providing supplementary LTROs with a maturity of 12 and 13 months as FRTPFA 
FRTPFA 
10/6/2011 Decision on launching new covered bond purchase program (CBPP2)                                                          CBPP 
9/15/2011 Decision to conduct  three operations on dollar  liquidity-provision in coordination with other central banks FOR 
8/25/2011 Decision on extending liquidity swap arrangements with the BoE FOR 
8/8/2011 Decision on implementing SMP for Italy and Spain SMP 
8/4/2011 Decision on conducting 3-month LTROs as FRTPFA and conducting  liquidity  provision via  supplementary  LTRO  
with  a  maturity  of  6  months  as  a FRTPFA   
LTRO 
8/4/2011 Decision on continuing the conduct of MROs as FRTPFA for as long as necessary and to conduct 3-month LTROs as 
FRTPFA and on conducting  liquidity  provision via  supplementary  LTRO  with  a  maturity  of  6  months  as  a 
FRTPFA   
FRTPFA 
6/29/2011 Decision on extending liquidity swap arrangements with the Fed FOR 
6/9/2011 Decision on conducting 3-month LTROs as FRTPFA LTRO 
6/9/2011 Decision on continuing the conduct of MROs as FRTPFA for as long as necessary and to conduct 3-month LTROs as 
FRTPFA 
FRTPFA 
3/3/2011 Decision on conducting 3-month LTROs as FRTPFA LTRO 
3/3/2011 Decision on continuing the conduct of MROs as FRTPFA for as long as necessary and to conduct 3-month LTROs as 
FRTPFA 
FRTPFA 
12/21/2010 Decision on extending liquidity swap arrangements with the Fed FOR 
12/17/2010 Announcement of temporary swap facility with the Bank of England FOR 
12/2/2010 Decision on conducting 3-month LTROs as FRTPFA LTRO 
12/2/2010 Decision on continuing the conduct of MROs as FRTPFA for as long as necessary and to conduct 3-month LTROs as 
FRTPFA 
FRTPFA 
9/2/2010 Decision on conducting 3-month LTROs as FRTPFA LTRO 
9/2/2010 Decision on continuing the conduct of MROs as FRTPFA for as long as necessary and to conduct 3-month LTROs as 
FRTPFA 
FRTPFA 
6/10/2010 Decision on adopting FRTPFA in regular 3-month LTROs LTRO 
5/10/2010 Decision on proceeding with SMP SMP 
5/10/2010 Decision on adopting a FRTPFA in the regular 3-month LTROs and to conduct new special LTROs LTRO 
5/10/2010 Decision on reactivating the temporary liquidity swap lines with the Fed FOR 
3/4/2010 Decision on enhancing the provision of LTROs LTRO 
3/4/2010 Decision on continuing the conduct of MROs as FRTFA for as long as needed FRTPFA 
12/3/2009 Decision on enhancing the provision of LTROs LTRO 
12/3/2009 Decision on continuing the conduct of MROs as FRTFA for as long as needed FRTPFA 
9/24/2009 Decision on continuing dollar   liquidity provisions FOR 
6/25/2009 Decision on extending liquidity swap arrangements with the Fed FOR 
6/4/2009 Decision on technical modalities of CBPP1 CBPP 
5/7/2009 Decision on liquidity providing LTROs with a maturity of one year LTRO 
5/7/2009 Decision  on  purchase of euro-denominated  covered  bonds issued  in  the euro area CBPP 
4/6/2009 Decision on establishing temporary reciprocal currency arrangement with the Fed FOR 
3/19/2009 Decision on continuing dollar liquidity provision operations FOR 
3/5/2009 Decision on continuing FRTFA for MROs and LTROs for as long as necessary LTRO 
3/5/2009 Decision on continuing FRTFA for MROs and LTROs for as long as necessary FRTPFA 
2/3/2009 Decision on extending temporary swap lines with the Fed FOR 
12/19/2008 Decision on continuing dollar liquidity provision operations FOR 
12/18/2008 Decision on continuing to carry out  MROs via FRTFA for as long as necessary FRTPFA 
10/15/2008 Decision on enhancement of LTROs provisions LTRO 
10/15/2008 Decision on dollar liquidity provisions via forex swaps FOR 
10/15/2008 Decision on expansion of list of assets that could be eligible as collateral COLL 
10/13/2008 Decision on dollar liquidity provisions FOR 
10/8/2008 Decision on  the adoption of fixed rate tender procedure with full allotment FRTPFA 
10/7/2008 Decisions on enhancing LTROs   LTRO 
10/7/2008 Decisions on expanding dollar  liquidity provisions   FOR 
9/29/2008 Decision on doubling the temporary swap lines with the Fed FOR 
9/26/2008 Decision on dollar liquidity provision enhancements FOR 
9/18/2008 Decision on dollar liquidity provision enhancements FOR 
9/4/2008 Decision to renew two LTROs LTRO 
7/31/2008 Decision to renew two LTROs LTRO 
7/30/2008 Decision to renew two LTROs FOR 
5/2/2008 Decision on dollar liquidity provision enhancements FOR 
3/28/2008 Decision on conducting 6-month supplementary LTROs LTRO 
3/11/2008 Decision on dollar liquidity provisions FOR 
2/7/2008 Decision to renew two Supplementary LTROs LTRO 
1/10/2008 Decision on dollar liquidity provisions FOR 
11/8/2007 Decision on renewal of supplementary LTROs LTRO 
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9/6/2007 Decision on Supplementary LTROs LTRO 
8/22/2007 Decision on Supplementary LTROs LTRO 
  Sources: (ECB) https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/activities/mopo/html/index.en.html; Fallagiarda et al. (2015)   
 
Table A3: Recent SARB MPC briefs regarding SA CMP changes 
3/17/2016 +.25 7.00 “Given  the  upside  risks  to  the  inflation  forecast and  the  protracted  period  of  the expected   breach,   
the   MPC   decided   that   further   tightening   was   required to complement  the  previous  moves.  
Accordingly,  the  MPC decided  to  increase  the repurchase  rate  by  25 basis  points to  7,00  per  cent  per  
annum ,  effective  from  18 March  2016.” 
1/28/2016 +.50 6.75 “Given  the  deterioration  in  the  inflation  outlook,  the  MPC  decided  to  increase  the repurchase  rate  
by  50  basis  points  to  6,75  per  cent  per  annum,  effective  from  29 January 2016. “ 
11/19/2015 +.25 6.25 “...stability in the underlying of core inflation, ... deteriorating  economic  growth  outlook...Against this difficult 
backdrop, the MPC decided to increase the repurchase rate by 25 basis points to 6,25 per cent per annum effective 
from 20 November 2015.” 
7/24/2015 +.25 6.00 “MPC   has   therefore   decided to   continue   on its path   of gradual   policy normalization.  Accordingly,  the  
repurchase  rate  will  increase  by  25 basis points  to 6,0 per  cent  per  annum  with  effect  from  Friday  24  July 
2015. “ 
7/18/2014 +.25 5.75 “The MPC has decided to continue on its gradual normalisation path and raise the repurchase rate by 25 basis 
points to 5,75 per cent per annum , effective from Friday 18 July. Given the expected inflation trajectory, the real 
repurchase rate remains slightly negative and well below its longer term neutral level. The monetary policy stance 
remains supportive of the domestic economy, and, as before, any future moves will be gradual and highly data 
dependent.” 
1/29/2014 +.50 5.50 “The primary responsibility of the Bank is to keep inflation under control and ensure that inflation 
expectations remain well anchored. The depreciation experienced so far could improve our international 
competitiveness, provided that it is not eroded through higher wage and other input prices. In the light of these 
circumstances and taking account of policy trade-offs, the MPC has decided to increase the repurchase rate by 50 
basis points to 5,5 per cent per annum as of 30 January 2014. The MPC is of the view that, notwithstanding this 
increase in the repo rate, monetary policy remains accommodative. “ 
7/19/2012 -.50 5.00 “MPC views the prevailing conditions to be appropriate for further monetary accommodation to the economy that 
will not undermine the inflation outlook. The MPC has therefore decided to reduce the repurchase rate by 50 basis 
points to 5,0 per cent from Friday 20 July 2012. While it is recognised that such a move on its own will not 
overcome the challenges facing the economy, it is felt that it can help alleviate some of the pressures faced by 
some sectors. A sustained increase in the potential output of the economy will require a concerted and 
coordinated effort from both government and the private sector.” 
11/18/2010 -.50 5.50 “… improved longer term inflation outlook and assesses the risks to this outlook to be fairly evenly balanced. The 
domestic economic recovery remains fragile, and the adverse global developments make the growth outlook 
more uncertain. The MPC believes that while monetary policy cannot determine the long term growth path of the 
economy, it can impact on cyclical deviations of output from potential output.  The view of the MPC is that there is 
room for further stimulus, given the weakness in the supply side of the economy…The MPC has accordingly decided to 
reduce the repurchase rate by 50 basis points to 5,5 per cent per annum with effect from 19 November 2010. This 
action is viewed to be consistent with the continued attainment of the inflation target. The scope for further 
downward movement, however, is seen to be limited given the signs of recovery in household consumption expenditure 
and credit extension. “ 
9/9/2010 -.50 6.00 “… improved inflation outlook creates sufficient room for monetary policy to provide additional stimulus to the 
somewhat fragile recovery of the domestic economy which remains vulnerable to the uncertain global 
environment…The MPC has decided to reduce the repurchase rate by 50 basis points to 6,0 per cent per annum with 
effect from 10 September 2010. The MPC views this action to be consistent with the continued attainment of the 
inflation target, having given due regard to the risks to the outlook. The scope for further downward movement is seen 
to be limited, but this will be assessed on an ongoing basis. Our approach remains forward-looking and is informed by 
close examination of the data and future developments.” 
3/25/2010 -.50 6.50 “… despite clear signs that the economy has emerged from the recession, the pace of recovery is expected to 
remain slow. The improved inflation environment has provided some space for an additional monetary stimulus to 
reinforce the sustainability of the upswing without jeopardising the achievement of the inflation target. The MPC has 
therefore decided to reduce the repurchase rate by 50 basis points to 6,5 per cent per annum with effect from 26  
March 2010. The MPC will continue to assess developments, and will adjust the monetary policy stance when 
necessary in order to achieve the inflation target. “ 
8/13/2009 -.50 7.00 “… adverse economic conditions appear to tilt the balance of risks to the inflation outlook towards the downside 
over the medium term. The MPC has therefore decided to reduce the repurchase rate by 50 basis points to 7 per cent 
per annum with effect from 14 August 2009.” 
5/28/2009 -1.00 7.50 “… output gap has widened further. This is expected to contribute to an improved inflation outlook, 
notwithstanding some current inflation inertia. Accordingly the MPC has decided to reduce the repurchase rate by 100 
basis points to 7,5 per cent per annum with effect from 29 May 2009.” 
5/4/2009 -1.00 8.50 “… severe synchronised downturn in international and domestic economic conditions … potential future downward 
impact on inflation, notwithstanding the higher-than-expected recent domestic inflation outcomes. The committee is of 
the view that the adverse economic conditions continue to tilt the balance of risks to the inflation outlook to the 
downside over the medium term and has therefore decided to reduce the repurchase rate by 100 basis points to 8,5 per 
cent per annum with effect from 4 May 2009.” 
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3/25/2009 -1.00 9.50 “Against the background of a slowing global and domestic economy and an improved medium-term outlook for 
inflation, the Monetary Policy Committee has decided to reduce the repurchase rate by 100 basis points to 9,5 per 
cent per annum with effect from 25 March 2009. “ 
2/6/2009 -1.00 10.50 “The Monetary Policy Committee has decided to reduce the repurchase rate by 100 basis points to 10,5 per cent per 
annum with effect from 6 February 2009. The MPC will continue to monitor domestic and global developments in 
order to decide on the most appropriate monetary policy stance going forward.” 
12/12/2008 -.50 11.50 “The Monetary Policy Committee considered recent developments in the South African economy and the risks to the 
inflation outlook against the backdrop of conditions prevailing in the global economy and international financial 
markets. The MPC has noted improvements in the inflation outlook in South Africa since its previous meeting in 
October 2008. However risks to the inflation outlook remain and will be monitored closely. The MPC has therefore 
decided to reduce the repurchase rate by 50 basis points to 11,5 per cent per annum with effect from 12 December 
2008.  “ 
6/13/2008 +.50 12.00 “In the light of the further deterioration in the inflation outlook, but mindful that the economy is responding to 
a less accommodative monetary policy stance, the Monetary Policy Committee has decided that at this stage 
further tightening of monetary policy is warranted. Accordingly the repurchase rate will be increased by 50 basis 
points to 12 per cent per annum with effect from 13 June 2008. The MPC remains committed to bringing inflation 
back to within the target range over a reasonable time period.  “ 
4/11/2008 +.50 11.50 “In view of the deteriorating inflation outlook and especially evidence of more generalised inflation pressures, the 
MPC has decided to increase the repo rate by 50 basis points to 11,5 per cent per annum with effect from 11 April 
2008. The MPC remains committed to bringing CPIX inflation back to within the inflation target range.” 
12/7/2007 +.50 11.00 “The assessment of the MPC is that the balance of risks to the inflation outlook continues to be on the upside. 
Therefore the MPC has decided to adjust the repurchase rate by 50 basis points to 11,0 per cent per annum with 
effect from Friday, 7 December 2007. The MPC will continue to monitor relevant developments and take the 
necessary steps to ensure that inflation returns to within the target range.” 
10/12/2007 +.50 10.50 “Having considered …developments and in particular the risks which are on the upside, the MPC has decided to 
adjust the repurchase rate by 50 basis points to 10,5 per cent per annum with effect from  Friday, 12 October 2007. 
The MPC is determined to ensure that inflation returns to within the target range.” 
8/17/2007 +.50 10.00 “Having considered recent developments, the MPC has decided that a further adjustment in the monetary policy 
stance is required in order to ensure that CPIX inflation returns to within the target range. Accordingly, the repo 
rate is adjusted by 50 basis points to 10,0 per cent per annum with effect from 17 August 2007. The MPC will 
continue to monitor the relevant economic and financial developments in order to ensure that its mandate is fulfilled.” 
6/8/2007 +.50 9.50 “… in view of the further deterioration in the inflation outlook, the monetary policy stance needs to be adjusted to 
ensure that CPIX inflation returns to within the inflation target range over time. Accordingly, the repo rate will be 
increased by 50 basis points to 9,5 per cent per annum with effect from Friday 8 June 2007. The MPC will continue to 
monitor developments which have a bearing on inflation outcomes and will not hesitate to adjust the policy stance as 
may be appropriate.” 
12/8/2006 +.50 9.00 “The Monetary Policy Committee has decided to adjust the existing monetary policy stance by increasing the repo 
rate by 50 basis points to 9,0 per cent per annum with effect from Friday, 8 December 2006. “ 
10/13/2006 +.50 8.50 “Having considered in detail all the recent economic data and other developments impacting on inflation, the 
MPC remains concerned about the outlook for inflation and is of the view that the risks to the outlook are still on 
the upside. Accordingly the MPC has decided that a further upward adjustment in the repo rate is appropriate at this 
juncture. The repo rate is therefore increased by 50 basis points to 8,5 per cent per annum with effect from Friday, 13 
October 2006.” 
8/3/2006 +.50 8.00 “The MPC remains concerned about the longer term threats to the inflation outlook and has therefore decided that 
a further adjustment to the repo rate would be prudent. Accordingly, the repo rate is increased by 50 basis points to 
8,0 per cent per annum with immediate effect.” 
6/8/2006 +.50 7.50 “On the basis of the detailed analysis of the economy which is summarised above, the MPC has decided that a 
moderate adjustment in the repo rate is warranted at present. Accordingly the repo rate is increased by 50 basis 
points to 7,5 per cent per annum with immediate effect. “ 
Table A4: News relating to SARB or its operations on Financial Times  
Event Date Title of News item Other details 
24-Aug-16 South African inflation falls to year low 
 
21-Jul-16 South Africa keeps rates on hold 
 
19-Jul-16 Rand awaits central bank rate decision Currency recovers from recent fall as Ankara’s travails had little to 
do with Pretoria 
13-Jun-16 South Africa: relief all round Policymakers have won some time to fix the economy, but it is not 
clear how they will achieve this 
19-May-16 Rand stumbles as South Africa holds interest rates 
 
4-May-16 Barclays to offload African stake 
 
17-Mar-16 South Africa raises rates and dampens growth outlook amid 
turmoil 
Decision seen to reinforce central bank’s credibility 
17-Mar-16 Rand climbs further after South Africa raises key interest rate 
 
17-Mar-16 South African rates: in the shade of political soap opera 
 
16-Mar-16 Action could come from central banks in Norway and South 
Africa 
 
4-Feb-16 South Africa’s central bank: out on its own  As other policymakers fail to step up, the reserve bank must do 
what it can 
28-Jan-16 South Africa raises key interest rate to 6.75% 
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22-Jan-16 A wild week of two halves for EM FX  
 
8-Jan-16 RBS: South Africa’s under-fire rand needs support 
 
14-Dec-15 AB InBev confirms South African listing plans 
 
10-Dec-15 You’re fired: Analysts react to South African finmin shock 
 
19-Nov-15 South Africa raises rates amid inflation fears Decision in line with central bank’s focus on inflation targeting 
26-Aug-15 South Africa’s central bank chief rules out defence of rand But governor fears for national economy amid emerging market 
turbulence over China 
23-Jul-15 South Africa raises interest rates to curb inflationary pressures Growth outlook has deteriorated amid a power crisis, bouts of 
labour unrest and weak confidence 
22-Jun-15 South Africa in the grip of stagflation Central bank stands firm on prices but little action on much-
needed supply side reforms 
4-Jun-15 How South Africa can fill its public service gap 
 
6-Oct-14 South African Reserve Bank names deputy as new governor Kganyago seen as providing continuity within the institution 
18-Sep-14 Gill Marcus to step down as South Africa’s central bank chief Rand falls after respected governor says she will quit 
10-Aug-14 S African rescue plan will split Abil into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ banks Lender has suffered a 9 per cent drop in its share price 
22-Jun-14 South Africa: exports, please Reserve Bank’s current account problem 
22-May-14 South Africa keeps interest rates on hold  
 
25-Mar-14 Rand benefits from calmer emerging market waters Currencies less sensitive to shift in US rate expectations 
29-Jan-14 South Africa hikes rates but rand weakens 
 
24-Jan-14 Rand at 11: how long before S Africa raises rates? 
 
5-Nov-13 South Africa to invest in China bonds Central bank move aims to diversify currency exposure 
25-Aug-13 South Africa stops short of rand intervention as EM crisis 
builds 
Country has no plans to commit billions to prop up currency 
28-May-13 South Africa: manufacturing slump dents GDP growth 
 
15-May-13 S Africa consumers reluctant to take brake off spending 
 
19-Mar-13 S Africa: weakening rand adds to list of economic woes 
 
12-Mar-13 Brics bank to focus on infrastructure 
 
12-Mar-13 South Africa: rand slumps on deficit 
 
21-Dec-12 S Africa FX: proceeding with caution  
 
5-Oct-12 Rand drops on latest mine death 
 
20-Sep-12 South Africa holds rates for now  
 
11-Sep-12 S Africa: investors jittery as current account deficit soars, 
labour unrest spreads 
 
24-Jul-12 World Bank cuts South Africa forecast Risk of recession or stagnation from eurozone crisis 
19-Jul-12 South Africa: inflation fades as economic woes loom larger 
 
19-Jul-12 South Africa cuts rates to 5 per cent Surprise move to bolster flagging growth 
20-Jun-12 S African inflation adds to pressure for interest rate cut 
 
21-Nov-11 Global financial crisis 
 
21-Nov-11 Rand falls victim to global concerns South Africa’s currency at six-week low against the dollar 
23-Aug-11 Sarb’s Marcus to world leaders: get a grip  
 
21-Jul-11 Global outlook weighs on Sarb 
 
9-Dec-10 Central bank mash-up, carry bash-up 
 
7-Oct-10 Strong rand puts South Africa under pressure Currency’s rise has been driven by foreign investors 
25-Apr-10 Former S African central banker joins Goldman Mboweni to serve as international adviser 
18-Feb-10 South African unions win cenbank policy change 
 
28-Jan-10 Floating currency and falling inflation in South Africa 
 
25-Jan-10 Nationalisation plan for South African central bank 
 
30-Apr-09 S Africa sees no sign of quick recovery Bank cuts interest rate to 8.5% 
14-Aug-08 S Africa opts against further rate rise 
 
12-Aug-08 View of the day: Gloomy outlook for rand  
 
16-Jul-08 Bank attacks S Africa’s inflation data 
 
1-Feb-08 Rand tumbles as SARB holds rates 
 
25-Oct-07 ICBC pays $5.5bn for Standard Bank stake 
 
9-Aug-07 Upheaval at Anglo American 
 
29-Mar-07 SA bank chief hits out at Barclays 
 
23-Sep-04 Barclays in talks over taking €3bn Absa stake 
 
Source: Financial Times 
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Annex 4 (Extra Analytics: Figures) 
1. Historical trends in asset dynamics 
Figure 1.1: Exchange rate (South African 
Rand vs. US dollar and the Euro) 
 
Figure 1.2: 5 and 10 year South African 
Sovereign Bond Yields 
 
Figure 1.3: Volatility indices (for the 
domestic and international markets) 
 
Figure 1.4: Stock market indices 
 
 
Figure 1.5: Interbank rate (3 month) 
 
Figure 1.6: 5 and 10 year CDS 
 
Sourse: using Datastream  
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2. Movements in daily asset returns 
2.1 Fed UMP surprises & daily asset returns 
Figure 2.1.1: Changes in Exchange rate (South African Rand vs. US dollar) 
 
Figure 2.1.2: Changes in Exchange rate (South African Rand vs. Euro) 
 
Figure 2.1.3: Changes in 5 year Yields 
 
Figure 2.1.4: Changes in 10 year Yields 
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Figure 2.1.5: Changes in 5 year CDS 
 
Figure 2.1.6: Changes in 10 year CDS 
 
Figure 2.1.7: Changes in 3 month Interbank rate (IBK) 
 
Figure 2.1.8: Changes in JSE Stock mkt. Indice - all shares 
 
Figure 2.1.9: Changes in JSE Stock mkt. Indice - Financials & Industrials 
 
Sourse: using Datastream  
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2.2 ECB UMP surprises & daily asset returns 
Figure 2.2.1: Changes in Exchange rate (South African Rand vs. US dollar) 
  
Figure 2.2.2: Changes in Exchange rate (South African Rand vs. Euro) 
  
Figure 2.2.3: Changes in 5 year Yields 
  
Figure 2.2.4: Changes in 10 year Yields
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Figure 2.2.5: Changes in 5 year CDS
  
Figure 2.2.6: Changes in 10 year CDS
 
Figure 2.2.7: Changes in 3 month Interbank rate (IBK) 
  
Figure 2.2.8: Changes in JSE Stock mkt. Indice - all shares 
 
Figure 2.2.9: Changes in JSE Stock mkt. Indice - Financials & Industrials 
 
Sourse: using Datastream  
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Annex 5 (Extra Analytics: Tables) 
1. Variable Summary Statistics 
Table 1.1) Summary statistics of dependent variables (Source: Datastream) 
Dependent Variable Measurement Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Net Investment flow to 
equities 
Net purchase of SA equities by foreigners (as a percentage 
of liabilities to foreigners by SA financial corporations) 
-.0001259 .3201191 -3.233232 3.361102 
Net Investment flow to 
bonds  
Net purchase of SA bonds by foreigners (as a percentage of 
liabilities to foreigners by SA financial corporations) 
.0002917 .4068918 -3.66752 3.375528 
SA All Stock/Equity Index JSE all shares stock market returns (in percent) .0376462 1.249416 -7.300471 7.072902 
SA Financial & Industrial 
Stock/Equity Index 
JSE Financial & Indust. stock market returns (in percent) 
0.048782 1.074176 -6.02581 6.741214 
SA Volatility Index (SAVI) Difference in volatility index (in percentage point) .0010749 .7333523 -4.38 7.84 
International Volatility 
Index (VSTOXX) 
Difference in volatility index (in percentage point) 0.0045363 1.967674 -13.98 22.64 
Sovereign yields 5 year SA sovereign yields (difference in percentage point) -8.06e-06 .0773717 -.6450005 .9150009 
Sovereign yields 10 year SA sovereign yields (difference in percentage point) 0.0004 0.07733 -0.48 1.06 
CDS 5 Year SA sovereign CDS (difference in basis point) -.022257 11.04794 -204.9499 124 
CDS 10 Year SA sovereign CDS (difference in basis point) 0.034138 10.62126 -195.534 124 
Interbank rate 3 month SA interbank rate (difference in percentage point) -.0007331 .0373716 -.691 .467 
Exchange rate 
(Rand with USD) 
Currency returns (in percent) 0.02947 1.07494 -6.39074 9.80761 
Exchange rate 
(Rand with Euro) 
Currency returns (in percent) 
0.02706 0.95015 -4.35166 8.87093 
 
Table 1.2) Summary statistics of Explanatory Variables for additional robustness exercises 
(monthly series)  
Explanatory 
Variables 
Source Measurement Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
US long-term 
interest rate 
Datastream US 5 year sovereign 
yields (in percentage 
point) 
2.470186 1.174505 1.027636 5.42719 
Fiscal Deficit Own computation 
using IMF IFS gov. 
revenue and 
expenditure data 
Fiscal deficit (as 
percentage of 
expenditure) 
-7.27791 27.89072 -54.7345 64.57795 
SA short-term 
policy rate  
IMF IFS SA policy rate (in 
percentage point) 
6.98913 2.234202 5 12 
Inflation IMF IFS SA Consumer price 
Index 
107.4292 16.46291 77.21432 132.4826 
Output Gap Own computation 
using IMF IFS 
indust. Prod. data 
SA Output gap (in 
percentage point) 
4.57e-09 2.997164 -7.538948 11.67769 
US short-term 
policy rate 
Datastream US Fed Funds rate 
(in percentage point) 
.8429623 1.570774 .067 5.2655 
SA foreign currency 
reserves 
IMF IFS Log (natural) of SA 
reserves 
23.88458 .1782829 23.46206 24.07805 
 
2. Release of Macroeconomic Data 
Table 2.1) Macroeconomic data releases: summary of actual data and forecast 
 
Actual data Forecast data Unit 
Data Type Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. unit 
Balance of Trade -5.333 10.20631 -5.685 5.079196 ZAR Bl. 
Barclays Manufacturing PMI 48.86154 3.722352 48.88077 2.840603 Index 
Business Confidence 42 5.363696 40.84071 6.789285 Index 
Consumer Confidence -5.76923 5.761277 -5.8541 3.765267 % 
Core Inflation Rate 5.483333 0.197782 5.532778 0.191981 % 
Current Account -190.057 34.01752 -196.179 34.20387 ZAR Bl. 
Foreign Exchange Reserves 47.916 1.635592 48.142 2.076289 USD Bl. 
GDP Growth Rate 1.271429 1.293819 1.4175 1.002991 % 
Inflation Rate 3.105128 2.641522 3.092692 2.615102 % 
Interest Rate Decision 5.894737 0.647194 5.802632 0.63234 % 
KAGISO Manufacturing PMI 49.44211 2.726478 49.73316 2.622376 % 
M3 Money Supply 8.9375 1.935737 9.05 1.602676 % 
Manufacturing Prod 0.291026 2.6944 0.360769 1.701639 % 
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Mining Production -0.79615 6.843536 -0.39577 3.981202 % 
Prime Overdraft Rate 10.16667 0.437798 10 0.474342 % 
Private Sector Credit 8.692222 0.610425 8.084444 0.984666 % 
Producer Price Index 4.433333 2.905559 4.336222 2.900433 % 
Retail Sales 1.524051 1.832836 1.517848 1.344768 % 
Standard Bank PMI 49.1375 1.113473 48.775 1.181706 Index 
Total New Vehicle Sales 49310.86 4090.291 50055.46 4064.391 No. 
Unemployment 25.35833 0.880556 25.25 0.403395 % 
Note: 
a) The data involves month-on-month, quarter-on-quarter as well as year-on-year releases. 
b) The paper uses the dates of data releases as dummies to control for their effect. These dates are not reported here to save space - instead, we 
provide this summary table.  
c) Using additional dichotomous variables, we also account for whether the data released is above or below forecast or market expectation. 
e) Data comes from Tradingeconomies. 
 
3. Impact of Initial announcements, policy updates & actual implementations 
Table 3.1) Fed Unconventional Monetary Policy: Initial announcements, policy updates, and 
actual implementations 
Notes:  
a) Standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) For initial announcement of QE1, we use 11/25/2008 Fed announcement for Large-scale asset purchase (LSAP). Fed announced   
    that it will purchase $100 billion in GSE debt and $500 billion in MBS. 
c) For initial announcement of QE2, we use 8/27/2010 announcement where Bernanke suggested role for additional QE “should   
    further action prove necessary.” 
d) For initial announcement of QE3, we use 8/22/2012 announcement by Fed where FOMC members “judged that additional  
   monetary accommodation would likely be warranted fairly soon…” 
e) For initial announcement of QE taper, we use 5/22/2013 Ben Bernanke's testimony to US Congress “...In 
    the next few meetings, we could take a step down in our pace of purchase...”" 
f) The implementation dates (phases) of Fed's QE programs use: QE1 (Dec. 2008 to Mar. 2010), QE2 (Nov. 2010 to June 2011),  
    QE3 (Sept. 2012 to May 21. 2013), while Tapering (May 22, 2013 to 29 October 2014). The Tapering dates span from end of qe3  
    (on Bernanke's May 22, 2013 ‘taper’ announcement) to actual end of the asset purchase programs on Oct 29, 2014. 
g) 'QE1', 'QE2', 'QE3' and 'Taper' coefficients relate to the series of announcements (updates/communication) made by Fed  
    regarding these programs, as given in Annex 3. 
 
 
Equities, flows Equities, flows Bonds, flows Bonds, flows Stocks, 
returns 
Stocks, 
returns 
Implementation QE1 0.0857*** 
   
0.0885 
 
 
(0.02) 
   
(0.08) 
 
Implementation QE2 0.0377* 
 
0.3351*** 
 
0.0064 
 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.10) 
 
Implementation QE3 0.0166 
 
0.0279 
 
0.0785 
 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.10) 
 
Implementation Taper 0.0137 
 
-0.1035*** 
 
0.0366 
 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.07) 
 
Announcements (cumulated) 
QE1 
0.7942*** 1.2801*** 
  
1.3002 0.3269 
 
(0.23) (0.25) 
  
(1.06) (1.13) 
Announcements (cumulated) 
QE2 
0.0127 -0.1197 -0.3219 -0.0692 0.9539 0.2240 
 
(0.24) (0.25) (0.27) (0.28) (1.11) (1.13) 
Announcements (cumulated) 
QE3 
-0.2083 -0.2491 -0.0364 0.4522 0.0275 0.4488 
 
(0.25) (0.27) (0.27) (0.32) (1.14) (1.24) 
Announcement (cumulated) 
Taper 
-0.2529 -1.1914***  -0.0847 -3.6618*** -4.9088*** 
 
(0.29) (0.36)  (0.45) (1.34) (1.68) 
Announcement (Initial) QE1 
 
-1.2518*** 
   
6.3549***   
(0.31) 
   
(1.43) 
Announcement (Initial) QE2 
 
1.4879*** 
 
1.5053*** 
 
4.1489**   
(0.44) 
 
(0.57) 
 
(2.03) 
Announcement (Initial) QE3 
 
0.1557 
 
-0.6850 
 
-1.1068   
(0.33) 
 
(0.42) 
 
(1.52) 
Announcement (Initial) Taper 
 
-0.3608 
 
-0.0009 
 
0.1689   
(0.38) 
 
(0.49) 
 
(1.76) 
_cons -0.0071 0.0107** 0.1116*** 0.0908*** 0.0124 0.0366  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
N 2479 2479 1805 1805 2479 2479 
R-sq 0.036 0.035 0.112 0.013 0.007 0.018 
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Table 3.2) Fed Unconventional Monetary Policy: Initial announcements, policy updates, and 
actual implementations 
Notes:  
a) Standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) For initial announcement of QE1, we use 11/25/2008 Fed announcement for Large-scale asset purchase (LSAP). Fed announced   
    that it will purchase $100 billion in GSE debt and $500 billion in MBS. 
c) For initial announcement of QE2, we use 8/27/2010 announcement where Bernanke suggested role for additional QE “should   
    further action prove necessary.” 
d) For initial announcement of QE3, we use 8/22/2012 announcement by Fed where FOMC members “judged that additional  
   monetary accommodation would likely be warranted fairly soon…” 
e) For initial announcement of QE taper, we use 5/22/2013 Ben Bernanke's testimony to US Congress “...In 
    the next few meetings, we could take a step down in our pace of purchase...”" 
f) The implementation dates (phases) of Fed's QE programs use: QE1 (Dec. 2008 to Mar. 2010), QE2 (Nov. 2010 to June 2011),  
    QE3 (Sept. 2012 to May 21. 2013), while Tapering (May 22, 2013 to 29 October 2014). The Tapering dates span from end of qe3  
    (on Bernanke's May 22, 2013 ‘taper’ announcement) to actual end of the asset purchase programs on Oct 29, 2014. 
g) 'QE1', 'QE2', 'QE3' and 'Taper' coefficients relate to the series of announcements (updates/communication) made by Fed  
    regarding these programs, as given in Annex 3. 
 
Table 3.3) ECB Unconventional Monetary Policy: Initial announcements, policy updates, and 
actual implementations 
 
Equities, flows Equities, 
flows 
Bonds, flows Bonds, flows Stocks, 
returns 
Stocks, 
returns 
Implementation Asset Purchase -0.0342*** 
 
-0.3338*** 
 
0.0368 
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.06) 
 
Implementation Liquidity Provision 0.0120 
 
0.0056 
 
0.0437 
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.06) 
 
Announcements (cumulated) Asset Purchase 0.1674 0.1645 0.4438** 0.5597*** 1.0376* 0.9650* 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.19) (0.21) (0.57) (0.58) 
Announcements (cumulated) Liquidity 
Provision 
-0.0301 -0.0166 0.2213*** 0.2123*** 0.2095 0.1913 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.18) (0.18) 
Announcements (cumulated) Collateral 
Easing 
0.0495 0.0584 -0.1228 -0.1858 -0.2618 -0.2268 
 
Mkt. Volatility Mkt. Volatility Sovereign 
Yields 
Sovereign 
Yields 
Interbank Interbank 
Implementation QE1 -0.0033*  0.0008 
 
-0.0177*** 
 
 
(0.00)  (0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
Implementation QE2 -0.0007  0.0039 
 
-0.0039 
 
 
(0.00)  (0.01) 
 
(0.00) 
 
Implementation QE3 -0.0021  -0.0005 
 
-0.0019 
 
 
(0.00)  (0.01) 
 
(0.00) 
 
Implementation Taper -0.0006  0.0050 
 
0.0004 
 
 
(0.00)  (0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
Announcements (cumulated) 
QE1 
0.0206 0.0231 -0.0584 -0.0550 -0.0036 -0.0183 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) 
Announcements (cumulated) 
QE2 
0.0353 0.0445 -0.0009 0.0100 -0.0211 -0.0100 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) 
Announcements (cumulated) 
QE3 
0.0405 0.0336 0.0153 0.0250 0.0013 -0.0000 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) 
Announcements (cumulated) 
Taper 
0.0021 0.0287 0.0105 0.0347 -0.0188 0.0360 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.08) (0.10) (0.04) (0.05) 
Announcement (Initial) QE1  -0.0484 
 
-0.0400 
 
-0.0317  
 (0.03) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.04) 
Announcement (Initial) QE2  -0.0634 
 
-0.0650 
 
-0.1003  
 (0.05) 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.06) 
Announcement (Initial) QE3  0.0168 
 
-0.0300 
 
-0.0000  
 (0.04) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.05) 
Announcement (Initial) Taper  0.0604 
 
-0.0200 
 
0.0000  
 (0.04) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.05) 
_cons 0.0008 0.0000 -0.0009 0.0002 0.0022** -0.0007  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
N 2456 2456 2480 2480 2480 2480 
R-sq 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.028 0.003 
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(0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.13) (0.37) (0.40) 
Announcements (Initial) Forward Guidance -0.1135 -0.1232 0.0640 0.0182 1.4289** 1.4409**  
(0.12) (0.12) (0.18) (0.20) (0.61) (0.61) 
Announcements (Initial) Asset Purchase 
 
-0.1102 
 
0.3607 
 
0.2699   
(0.21) 
 
(0.35) 
 
(1.07) 
Announcements (Initial) Liquidity Provision 
 
-0.2794 
 
 
 
0.2092   
(0.21) 
 
 
 
(1.06) 
Announcements (Initial) Collateral Easing 
 
-0.1853 
 
-0.0610 
 
0.1274   
(0.23) 
 
(0.37) 
 
(1.13) 
_cons 0.0189*** 0.0064 0.3658*** 0.0833*** 0.0048 0.0524**  
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) 
N 2479 2479 1805 1805 2479 2479 
R-sq 0.006 0.003 0.192 0.011 0.005 0.004 
Notes:  
a) Standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) For initial announcement of asset purchases, we use Draghi's speech, 7/26/2012 “… whatever it takes …” (OMT) 
c) For initial announcement of liquidity provision, we use ECB’s decision, 3/11/2008, on US dollar liquidity provisions (FOR)  
d) For initial announcement of collateral provision, we use 10/15/2008 Decision on expansion of list of assets that could be eligible   
    as collateral (COLL). This also includes enhanced provision of LTROs and provision of US dollar liquidity through foreign- 
    exchange swaps. 
e) The Implementation of Asset Purchase programs refers to dates where ECB conducted market purchases under SMP program.    
    Data on this is taken from Fratzscher et al. (2016). 
f) The implementation of ECB's Liquidity Provision program refers to dates where liquidity auctions were conducted under the  
    LTRO program. Data on this is taken from Fratzscher et al. (2016). 
g) 'Asset Purchase', 'Liquidity Provision' and 'Collateral Easing' coefficients relate to the series of announcements  
    (updates/communication) made by ECB regarding these programs, as given in Annex 3. 
 
Table 3.4) ECB Unconventional Monetary Policy: Initial announcements, policy updates, and 
actual implementations 
 Mkt. 
Volatility 
Mkt. 
Volatility 
Sovereign 
Yields 
Sovereign 
Yields 
Interbank Interbank 
Implementation Asset Purchase 0.0017  -0.0001 
 
0.0045** 
 
 (0.00)  (0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
Implementation Liquidity Provision -0.0013  -0.0001 
 
-0.0013 
 
 (0.00)  (0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
Announcements (cumulated) Asset 
Purchase 
-0.0356*** -0.0365*** -0.0627* -0.0553 0.0108 0.0117 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Announcements (cumulated) Liquidity 
Provision 
-0.0002 -0.0006 0.0056 0.0069 -0.0033 -0.0049 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Announcements (cumulated) Collateral 
Easing 
0.0072 0.0087 -0.0079 -0.0050 -0.0071 -0.0067 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Announcements (Initial) Forward 
Guidance 
-0.0097 -0.0095 -0.0306 -0.0311 -0.0008 0.0006 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
Announcements (Initial) Asset Purchase  -0.0024 
 
-0.1054* 
 
-0.0033 
  (0.02) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.04) 
Announcements (Initial) Liquidity 
Provision 
 0.0142 
 
-0.0861 
 
0.0023 
  (0.02) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.04) 
Announcements (Initial) Collateral Easing  -0.0069 
 
-0.0284 
 
0.0106 
  (0.02) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.04) 
_cons -0.0017** -0.0014*** -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0024** -0.0006 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
N 2456 2456 2480 2480 2480 2480 
R-sq 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.000 
Notes:  
a) Standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) For initial announcement of asset purchases, we use Draghi's speech, 7/26/2012 “… whatever it takes …” (OMT) 
c) For initial announcement of liquidity provision, we use ECB’s decision, 3/11/2008, on US dollar liquidity provisions (FOR)  
d) For initial announcement of collateral provision, we use 10/15/2008 Decision on expansion of list of assets that could be eligible   
    as collateral (COLL). This also includes enhanced provision of LTROs and provision of US dollar liquidity through foreign- 
    exchange swaps. 
e) The Implementation of Asset Purchase programs refers to dates where ECB conducted market purchases under SMP program.    
    Data on this is taken from Fratzscher et al. (2016). 
f) The implementation of ECB's Liquidity Provision program refers to dates where liquidity auctions were conducted under the  
    LTRO program. Data on this is taken from Fratzscher et al. (2016). 
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g) 'Asset Purchase', 'Liquidity Provision' and 'Collateral Easing' coefficients relate to the series of announcements  
    (updates/communication) made by ECB regarding these programs, as given in Annex 3. 
 
4. ‘Financial Cycle Theory’: The impact of US Short-term and long-term rates 
Table 4.1) Impact on Short-term policy rates (Dep. Var.: SA short-term policy rate) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
Inflation rate -0.0730*** 
 
-0.0729*** 0.0035 0.0033 -0.0738*** 0.0033     
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)    
Output gap 0.0662 
 
0.0609 0.0346*** 0.0334*** 0.0621 0.0347***  
(0.05) 
 
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01)    
US short-term policy rate 0.3632*** 0.3948*** 0.3919*** 0.1032*** 0.1013*** 0.3982*** 0.1042***  
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.02) (0.02) (0.13) (0.02)    
Inflation rate (Lagged) 
 
-0.0724*** 
    
                 
(0.01) 
    
               
Output gap (Lagged) 
 
0.0965** 
    
                 
(0.05) 
    
               
Exchange rate (Change) 
  
-0.0053 
 
-0.0086 
 
                  
(0.06) 
 
(0.01) 
 
               
SA short-term policy rate 
(Lagged) 
   
0.9608*** 0.9609*** 
 
0.9602*** 
    
(0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.02)    
Reserves (change) 
     
-5.9492 -1.0107          
(8.53) (1.56)    
_cons 14.5213*** 14.4190*** 14.5068*** -0.2093 -0.1869 14.6280*** -0.1767     
(1.34) (1.32) (1.36) (0.36) (0.36) (1.36) (0.36)    
N 115 114 114 114 114 114 114    
R-sq 0.551 0.562 0.553 0.985 0.985 0.555 0.985    
Note: 
a) The inflation rate uses consumer price index 
b) Output gap is computed from monthly industrial production using HP filter. 
c) Exchange rate is REER. 
d) Short term policy rates represent Federal Funds rate for US and the monetary policy rate for South Africa. 
e) Reserves represent South African official foreign currency reserve assets. 
f) Lags and changes represent month-to-month dynamics 
g) Table uses monthly series coming from IMF’s IFS database. 
 
Table 4.2) Impact on Long-term interest rates (Dep. Var.: SA long-term interest rate) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
US long-term interest rate 0.3052*** 0.1323*** 0.7181*** 0.2857*** 0.3218*** 0.1288**   
(0.09) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10) (0.05)    
SA short-term policy rate 0.2006*** -0.0226 0.1998*** -0.0056 0.1947*** -0.0214     
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)    
SA long-term interest rate (Lagged) 
 
0.8790*** 
 
0.7865*** 
 
0.8786***   
(0.05) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.05)    
Deficit 
  
0.0041** 0.0022** 
 
                  
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
               
Inflation rate 
  
0.0354*** 0.0106*** 
 
                  
(0.01) (0.00) 
 
               
Reserves (change) 
    
1.6178 0.4402         
(3.80) (1.82)    
_cons 5.6032*** 0.7718*** 0.8158 -0.1258 5.6021*** 0.7725***  
(0.21) (0.27) (0.81) (0.44) (0.21) (0.27)    
N 115 114 115 114 114 114    
R-sq 0.585 0.907 0.720 0.920 0.590 0.907    
Note: 
a) The inflation rate uses consumer price index 
b) Short term policy rates represent Federal Funds rate for US and the monetary policy rate for South Africa. 
c) Long term interest rates represent five-year interest rates for US and South Africa. 
d) Deficit represents total/fiscal deficit. 
e) Reserves represent South African official foreign currency reserve assets. 
f) Lags and changes represent month-to-month dynamics 
g) Table uses monthly series coming from IMF’s IFS database, except for long term (5 Year) interest rates that come from Datastream. 
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5. Largest gains and losses on daily asset returns  
Table 5.1: 20 largest gains and losses on daily asset returns (Jan 01, 2000-Jun 30, 2016) 
date ER Rand to USD date ER Rand to Euro date Yields 5YR date Yields 10YR date IBK 3M 
16-Oct-08 10.3% 21-Dec-01 -9.2% 11-Jun-13 27.9% 11-Jun-13 25.2% 20-Jul-12 -9.0% 
21-Dec-01 -8.2% 16-Oct-08 8.9% 22-Jan-16 15.0% 22-Jan-16 13.6% 30-Jan-14 8.9% 
20-Dec-01 7.5% 20-Dec-01 7.3% 21-Jan-16 -14.4% 21-Jan-16 -13.1% 13-Aug-04 -8.5% 
29-Oct-08 -6.2% 14-Dec-01 6.5% 10-Dec-15 12.1% 10-Dec-15 12.1% 15-Jun-01 -8.0% 
14-Dec-01 5.9% 11-Dec-15 5.9% 6-Nov-08 -10.3% 6-Nov-08 -8.6% 15-Apr-05 -7.8% 
17-Mar-16 -5.8% 8-Oct-08 4.5% 22-Apr-10 9.2% 23-Jul-12 -8.1% 17-Oct-03 -7.2% 
22-Oct-08 5.5% 15-Oct-08 4.5% 23-Jul-12 -8.9% 22-Apr-10 5.8% 14-Aug-09 -7.1% 
6-Oct-08 5.4% 14-Dec-15 -4.4% 21-Apr-10 -8.4% 14-Dec-15 -5.5% 19-Mar-09 -7.1% 
11-Dec-15 5.3% 15-May-03 4.3% 19-Apr-10 8.4% 21-Apr-10 -5.5% 26-Mar-10 -6.2% 
15-Oct-08 4.9% 17-Dec-02 4.3% 16-Apr-10 -7.7% 20-Jun-13 5.4% 9-Jun-06 5.7% 
14-Dec-15 -4.6% 17-Mar-08 4.3% 8-Apr-10 7.1% 11-Dec-15 5.1% 13-Jun-03 -5.2% 
15-May-03 4.6% 10-Dec-15 4.2% 29-Apr-10 -6.9% 8-Apr-10 5.1% 19-Nov-10 -5.1% 
22-Sep-11 4.5% 24-Aug-15 4.2% 4-Nov-08 6.6% 6-Apr-10 -4.9% 12-Dec-03 4.9% 
8-Oct-08 4.5% 26-May-10 -4.1% 6-Apr-10 -6.6% 19-Apr-10 4.9% 29-Jan-16 4.9% 
10-Dec-15 4.4% 24-Dec-01 -4.1% 3-May-12 6.5% 3-May-12 4.7% 16-Jan-02 4.8% 
2-Mar-09 4.4% 2-Jan-02 4.0% 15-Apr-10 6.3% 4-Nov-08 4.7% 21-Sep-01 -4.5% 
24-Nov-08 -4.3% 12-Aug-04 3.8% 14-Apr-10 -6.0% 16-Apr-10 -4.6% 6-Feb-09 -4.0% 
17-Dec-08 -4.2% 9-Aug-11 3.8% 20-Jun-13 6.0% 23-Oct-08 4.6% 27-May-09 -4.0% 
27-Jun-16 4.1% 13-Dec-01 3.8% 12-Apr-10 5.9% 30-Apr-10 4.3% 29-May-08 3.7% 
 
Table 5.2: 20 largest gains and losses on daily asset returns (Jan 01, 2000-Jun 30, 2016) 
date CDS 5YR date CDS 10YR date Stocks-Fin&Indust date Stocks-all 
15-Oct-08 47.7% 8-Oct-08 51.2% 17-Apr-00 -7.6% 17-Apr-00 -7.6% 
14-Oct-08 -45.0% 14-Oct-08 -41.1% 17-Jul-08 6.7% 6-Oct-08 -7.3% 
10-Oct-08 37.4% 15-Oct-08 39.3% 8-Jun-06 -6.3% 8-Dec-08 7.1% 
12-Nov-08 30.3% 10-Oct-08 35.3% 6-Oct-08 -6.0% 15-Oct-08 -7.0% 
10-May-10 -25.0% 12-Nov-08 30.7% 25-Sep-01 5.8% 25-Nov-08 6.7% 
22-Sep-11 21.4% 10-May-10 -25.2% 19-Sep-08 5.7% 29-Oct-08 6.7% 
20-Jun-13 21.4% 9-Oct-08 25.0% 18-Apr-00 5.2% 8-Jun-06 -6.5% 
20-Jan-09 17.6% 20-Jan-09 18.3% 9-Jun-06 4.6% 25-Sep-01 6.1% 
30-Oct-08 -17.4% 30-Oct-08 -17.0% 10-Jan-00 4.5% 24-Oct-08 -5.8% 
22-Oct-08 16.3% 22-Sep-11 16.9% 11-Sep-01 -4.3% 29-Sep-08 -5.8% 
10-Dec-15 16.2% 24-Oct-08 16.4% 7-May-10 -4.3% 19-Mar-09 5.8% 
7-May-10 16.2% 6-May-10 15.1% 15-Jun-06 4.2% 19-Sep-08 5.4% 
24-Oct-08 15.9% 13-May-09 14.4% 18-Dec-14 4.2% 30-Oct-08 5.4% 
13-Jan-09 13.8% 23-Oct-08 13.6% 15-Oct-08 -4.1% 21-Dec-01 -5.4% 
16-Oct-08 13.5% 28-Oct-08 -13.5% 5-Apr-00 -4.0% 24-Jan-08 5.3% 
28-Oct-08 -13.1% 20-Jun-13 13.5% 29-Oct-08 4.0% 1-Feb-08 5.3% 
23-Oct-08 13.1% 10-Dec-15 13.3% 10-May-10 4.0% 10-Nov-08 5.1% 
7-Jan-09 -13.0% 7-Jan-09 -13.2% 20-Sep-01 -3.9% 24-Nov-08 5.1% 
27-Oct-08 -12.8% 27-Oct-08 -13.2% 29-Sep-08 -3.9% 15-Jun-06 5.0% 
  
135 
 
Table 5.3: gains and losses on daily asset returns (selected Fed UMP events) 
Fed UMP event date ER Rand to USD Percentile rank ER Rand to Euro Percentile rank Yields 5YR Percentile rank Yields 10YR Percentile rank 
  21-Nov-08 -0.1% 7.8% -0.2% 19.0% -2.2% 97.2% -2.1% 97.5% 
  24-Nov-08 -4.3% 99.6% -1.9% 94.1% -2.7% 98.3% -2.1% 97.5% 
QE1 25-Nov-08 -3.2% 98.8% -2.0% 95.6% -1.9% 96.3% -1.5% 94.4% 
  26-Nov-08 1.1% 76.0% 0.3% 33.5% -2.3% 97.4% -2.2% 97.9% 
  27-Nov-08 -0.5% 41.7% -0.6% 53.7% 2.6% 98.1% 3.0% 99.0% 
  24-Jan-14 1.2% 80.3% 1.2% 84.1% 1.2% 89.3% 0.8% 79.4% 
  27-Jan-14 0.5% 45.5% 0.4% 40.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
  28-Jan-14 -1.0% 74.5% -1.1% 80.1% 2.8% 98.6% 2.4% 98.2% 
Taper 29-Jan-14 1.6% 88.0% 1.4% 88.1% 2.7% 98.3% 1.0% 86.0% 
  30-Jan-14 -0.7% 56.8% -1.3% 84.7% 1.5% 93.4% 0.8% 79.8% 
  31-Jan-14 0.2% 18.2% -0.4% 39.9% 1.3% 89.7% 1.1% 88.1% 
  3-Feb-14 0.6% 50.8% 0.8% 67.4% -0.9% 81.2% -0.5% 65.8% 
 
Table 5.4: gains and losses on daily asset returns (selected Fed UMP policies) 
Fed UMP event date IBK 3M Percentile rank CDS 5YR Percentile rank CDS 10YR Percentile rank Stocks-Fin&Indust Percentile rank Stocks-all Percentile rank 
  21-Nov-08 -0.4% 93.4% -12.4% 99.5% -12.4% 99.5% -0.7% 56.9% 1.4% 81.4% 
  24-Nov-08 -0.4% 93.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 91.9% 5.1% 99.6% 
QE1 25-Nov-08 -0.4% 93.6% -9.8% 99.1% -9.8% 99.1% 3.1% 98.1% 6.7% 99.9% 
  26-Nov-08 -0.4% 93.7% 1.7% 78.5% 1.7% 81.0% 1.1% 76.9% 1.0% 69.8% 
  27-Nov-08 0.0% 64.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 91.5% 4.0% 99.0% 
  24-Jan-14 0.0% 0.0% 3.7% 91.6% 2.8% 89.1% -1.7% 90.9% -1.2% 76.8% 
  27-Jan-14 0.0% 0.0% -1.9% 80.2% -0.7% 69.3% -1.5% 88.5% -1.5% 84.2% 
  28-Jan-14 0.0% 0.0% -0.4% 62.0% 2.1% 84.7% -0.1% 15.2% -0.1% 8.6% 
Taper 29-Jan-14 0.0% 0.0% 3.2% 88.9% -0.3% 61.6% -1.0% 73.0% -0.4% 30.4% 
  30-Jan-14 8.9% 100.0% -1.0% 71.0% -0.6% 66.4% -1.2% 81.6% -0.8% 60.7% 
  31-Jan-14 -0.3% 90.6% 2.7% 86.7% 2.3% 86.5% 0.2% 22.4% -0.1% 11.9% 
  3-Feb-14 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 55.8% -0.3% 63.1% -0.4% 40.0% -0.4% 32.9% 
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Table 5.5: gains and losses on daily asset returns (selected ECB UMP policies) 
date ER Rand to USD perc ER Rand to USD ER Rand to Euro perc ER Rand to Euro Yields 5YR perc Yields 5YR Yields 10YR 
perc Yields 
10YR ECB UMP event 
6-Oct-08 5.4% 99.8% 3.1% 99.0% 0.3% 54.2% 0.1% 45.1%   
7-Oct-08 -0.8% 61.1% 0.3% 27.7% 0.1% 45.8% 0.2% 48.0% FOR, LTRO 
8-Oct-08 4.5% 99.7% 4.5% 99.9% -2.0% 96.7% -1.9% 96.6% FRTPFA 
9-Oct-08 -1.6% 88.5% -1.5% 90.4% 0.3% 55.8% 0.3% 55.2%   
10-Oct-08 3.2% 98.7% 2.1% 95.9% 0.9% 82.1% 1.0% 84.8%   
13-Oct-08 -1.9% 92.9% -1.3% 85.7% 1.2% 88.0% 1.3% 91.8% FOR 
14-Oct-08 -2.3% 96.2% -2.0% 95.4% 0.2% 50.2% 0.4% 60.8%   
15-Oct-08 4.9% 99.8% 4.5% 99.9% -0.2% 50.7% -0.2% 47.2% 
COLL, FOR, 
LTRO 
16-Oct-08 10.3% 100.0% 8.9% 100.0% 0.2% 51.4% 0.1% 46.4%   
17-Oct-08 -2.6% 97.3% -2.2% 96.7% 3.8% 99.3% 3.8% 99.4%   
20-Oct-08 0.9% 67.1% -0.2% 22.3% -0.6% 69.6% -0.7% 75.0%   
29-Jan-09 0.5% 47.8% -0.6% 52.7% -0.8% 77.2% -1.2% 90.1%   
30-Jan-09 2.6% 97.4% 0.5% 50.5% -1.2% 89.4% -1.6% 95.0%   
2-Feb-09 0.0% 3.7% 0.0% 5.8% 0.7% 76.5% 1.2% 89.7%   
3-Feb-09 -0.8% 61.5% 0.5% 48.0% 0.2% 51.8% 0.4% 61.6% FOR 
4-Feb-09 -2.0% 94.1% -2.6% 98.0% -0.4% 59.5% -0.1% 44.4%   
5-Feb-09 -0.6% 50.0% -0.9% 71.9% 0.0% 38.8% 0.3% 56.1%   
6-Feb-09 -1.7% 90.4% -1.6% 91.0% -1.7% 95.4% -1.2% 89.3%   
2-Mar-09 4.4% 99.7% 3.4% 99.4% 2.6% 98.1% 2.4% 98.1%   
3-Mar-09 0.1% 6.3% -0.1% 15.7% 0.5% 67.9% 0.5% 68.6%   
4-Mar-09 -1.0% 71.4% -1.0% 77.1% -0.5% 68.7% -0.4% 63.5%   
5-Mar-09 1.2% 79.6% 1.1% 79.7% -1.6% 94.5% -1.5% 93.7% FRTPFA, LTRO 
6-Mar-09 0.2% 23.4% 1.1% 81.4% -0.3% 55.9% -0.3% 59.5%   
9-Mar-09 0.6% 51.5% 0.4% 38.8% -1.2% 88.2% -1.4% 92.8%   
10-Mar-09 -2.9% 98.0% -2.0% 95.5% 1.5% 93.4% 1.2% 89.8%   
5-May-10 0.6% 52.3% -0.7% 60.6% 2.1% 96.8% 1.8% 96.5%   
6-May-10 0.6% 54.0% -0.6% 54.5% 0.5% 68.8% 0.4% 61.9%   
7-May-10 0.5% 46.3% 0.0% 5.0% 2.5% 98.0% 1.9% 96.6%   
10-May-10 -2.9% 98.1% -1.5% 89.1% -2.4% 97.6% -2.0% 97.1% FOR, LTRO, SMP 
11-May-10 1.0% 72.6% -0.2% 19.4% 3.2% 99.0% 1.3% 91.5%   
12-May-10 -1.0% 74.7% -1.1% 80.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%   
13-May-10 0.0% 1.6% -0.9% 72.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%   
1-Nov-11 2.6% 97.3% 0.6% 53.0% 0.7% 73.6% 0.6% 71.0%   
2-Nov-11 -1.6% 88.6% -0.7% 59.7% 0.2% 51.9% 0.9% 82.2%   
3-Nov-11 -1.4% 85.5% -1.8% 93.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% CBPP 
4-Nov-11 0.3% 26.8% 0.4% 39.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%   
7-Nov-11 1.0% 72.3% 0.9% 73.5% -2.6% 98.0% -1.5% 93.6%   
8-Nov-11 -1.2% 79.0% -0.8% 63.9% -0.9% 80.8% -1.1% 87.5%   
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Table 5.6: gains and losses on daily asset returns (selected ECB UMP policies) 
date IBK 3M perc IBK 3M CDS 5YR perc CDS 5YR CDS 10YR perc CDS 10YR Stocks-Fin&Indust perc Stocks-Fin&Indust Stocks-all perc Stocks-all ECB UMP event 
6-Oct-08 0.0% 0.0%   0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -6.0% 99.9% -7.3% 100.0%   
7-Oct-08 0.0% 0.0%   0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.1% 94.1% 2.6% 95.4% FOR, LTRO 
8-Oct-08 -0.4% 93.5%   0.0% 51.2% 100.0% -1.8% 92.3% -2.8% 96.4% FRTPFA 
9-Oct-08 0.1% 71.5%   0.0% 25.0% 99.9% 0.4% 37.9% 1.4% 81.6%   
10-Oct-08 0.5% 94.6% 37.4% 100.0% 35.3% 99.9% -3.7% 99.3% -3.1% 97.7%   
13-Oct-08 0.1% 80.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.0% 98.0% 4.2% 99.2% FOR 
14-Oct-08 0.0% 63.8% -45.0% 100.0% -41.1% 100.0% 2.9% 97.6% 3.1% 97.7%   
15-Oct-08 0.0% 63.8% 47.7% 100.0% 39.3% 100.0% -4.1% 99.7% -7.0% 99.9% COLL, FOR, LTRO 
16-Oct-08 0.4% 94.4% 13.5% 99.7% 10.3% 99.2% -1.5% 87.9% -2.3% 94.1%   
17-Oct-08 0.0% 0.0% 10.7% 99.3% 9.3% 99.1% -2.1% 94.3% 0.2% 20.9%   
20-Oct-08 0.0% 0.0% -3.2% 89.2% -3.2% 91.1% 1.3% 84.1% 2.8% 96.6%   
29-Jan-09 -0.3% 91.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -2.4% 96.3% -2.1% 92.6%   
30-Jan-09 -1.1% 98.4% 5.3% 95.7% 5.5% 96.7% 0.1% 11.3% -0.1% 8.6%   
2-Feb-09 -0.5% 94.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -2.7% 97.2% -3.1% 97.8%   
3-Feb-09 -0.3% 90.9% -1.0% 70.5% -1.0% 73.0% 1.3% 83.6% 0.5% 37.1% FOR 
4-Feb-09 -0.6% 96.1% -1.2% 73.7% -1.2% 76.1% 1.5% 87.6% 3.1% 97.8%   
5-Feb-09 -0.7% 96.8% 3.2% 88.8% 3.3% 91.3% -1.1% 78.1% -1.0% 66.9%   
6-Feb-09 -4.0% 99.6% 2.4% 84.2% 2.4% 87.3% 3.5% 99.0% 4.9% 99.5%   
2-Mar-09 -0.2% 85.3% 3.3% 89.5% 3.4% 92.0% -1.3% 83.2% -0.4% 35.8%   
3-Mar-09 0.0% 0.0% 3.2% 88.8% 3.3% 91.4% -1.7% 91.3% -1.4% 82.2%   
4-Mar-09 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 65.9% 0.6% 67.7% -0.2% 19.4% 2.0% 90.8%   
5-Mar-09 0.0% 0.0% -0.6% 65.8% -0.6% 67.7% -0.5% 44.5% -0.3% 26.6% FRTPFA, LTRO 
6-Mar-09 0.0% 0.0% 6.1% 96.9% 6.4% 97.7% -0.7% 58.4% 1.2% 75.6%   
9-Mar-09 -0.1% 80.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -1.9% 93.0% -2.6% 95.7%   
10-Mar-09 0.0% 65.7% -6.7% 97.4% -7.0% 98.1% 2.0% 93.6% 2.4% 94.5%   
5-May-10 0.0% 0.0% 9.0% 98.9% 8.9% 98.9% -1.6% 89.9% -1.1% 73.5%   
6-May-10 0.2% 87.9% 10.8% 99.3% 15.1% 99.7% 0.0% 6.4% -0.4% 32.3%   
7-May-10 0.0% 0.0% 16.2% 99.7% 10.1% 99.2% -4.3% 99.8% -3.6% 98.8%   
10-May-10 -0.2% 87.8% -25.0% 99.9% -25.2% 99.9% 4.0% 99.6% 4.3% 99.3% FOR, LTRO, SMP 
11-May-10 0.0% 0.0% 2.5% 85.3% 6.1% 97.5% 0.1% 10.1% -0.5% 42.5%   
12-May-10 0.0% 0.0% -7.9% 98.2% -8.7% 98.9% 2.8% 97.4% 2.4% 94.6%   
13-May-10 -0.5% 94.6% 0.7% 67.3% 1.3% 76.5% -0.9% 70.2% -0.5% 39.5%   
1-Nov-11 -0.6% 96.5% 8.9% 98.9% 9.0% 99.0% -1.7% 90.7% -1.9% 90.7%   
2-Nov-11 0.6% 96.6% -1.5% 77.3% -3.6% 92.7% 0.9% 70.3% 1.5% 83.3%   
3-Nov-11 0.0% 0.0% -3.1% 88.3% -4.3% 94.7% -0.1% 11.7% 0.0% 7.6% CBPP 
4-Nov-11 0.0% 0.0% -1.3% 75.2% 0.7% 69.5% -1.3% 83.5% -0.9% 64.0%   
7-Nov-11 0.0% 0.0% 4.8% 94.5% 3.2% 91.1% 1.5% 87.0% 1.9% 90.0%   
8-Nov-11 0.4% 92.4% -0.3% 60.4% -0.5% 65.2% 0.3% 31.8% 0.5% 39.3%   
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6. Spillovers from Fed & ECB UMP: IH regressions  
Table 6.1: IH Regressions (IV & GMM); Impact of SARB Monetary 
Policy on various asset returns 
 
IV 
 
GMM 
 
ER Rand to USD 0.0977** (0.05) 0.1006** (0.05) 
Yields 5YR 0.0525** (0.02) 0.0537** (0.02) 
Yields 10YR 0.0446* (0.02) 0.0457** (0.02) 
CDS 5YR 0.1718** (0.08) 0.1788** (0.08) 
CDS 10YR 0.1463** (0.07) 0.1524** (0.07) 
IBK 3M 0.0202*** (0.00) 0.0201*** (0.00) 
Stocks-all -0.0535*** (0.02) -0.0554*** (0.02) 
Stocks-Fin&Indust -0.0408*** (0.01)    -0.0423*** (0.01)    
 
 Table 6.2: IH Regressions (IV & GMM); Impact of Fed UMP (QE1) on 
various asset returns 
 
IV 
 
GMM 
 
ER Rand to USD -0.2064*** (0.07) -0.2095*** (0.07) 
Yields 5YR -0.1144*** (0.04) -0.1134*** (0.04) 
Yields 10YR -0.1079*** (0.03) -0.1078*** (0.04) 
CDS 5YR -0.3788*** (0.13) -0.3851*** (0.13) 
CDS 10YR -0.3302*** (0.11) -0.3362*** (0.11) 
IBK 3M -0.0028 (0.00) -0.0027 (0.00) 
Stocks-all 0.0912*** (0.03) 0.0919*** (0.03) 
Stocks-Fin&Indust 0.0664*** (0.02)    0.0676*** (0.02)    
 
 
Table 6.3: IH Regressions (IV & GMM); Impact of Fed UMP (QE 
Tapering) on various asset returns 
 
IV 
 
GMM 
 
ER Rand to USD 0.0094* (0.01) 0.0313*** (0.01) 
Yields 5YR 0.0173*** (0.00) 0.0297*** (0.01) 
Yields 10YR 0.0161*** (0.00) 0.0288*** (0.01) 
CDS 5YR 0.0442** (0.02) 0.0950** (0.04) 
CDS 10YR 0.0286* (0.02) 0.0706*** (0.02) 
IBK 3M 0.0178*** (0.00) 0.0056 (0.02) 
Stocks-all -0.0093* (0.01) -0.0186** (0.01) 
Stocks-Fin&Indust -0.0096**  (0.00)    -0.0188*** (0.01)    
 
  
Table 6.4: IH Regressions (IV & GMM); Impact of ECB UMP (all 
policies) on various asset returns 
 
IV 
 
GMM 
 
ER Rand to USD -0.0151** (0.01) -0.0134* (0.01) 
Yields 5YR -0.0089** (0.00) -0.0082** (0.00) 
Yields 10YR -0.0089** (0.00) -0.0083** (0.00) 
CDS 5YR -0.0365** (0.02) -0.0337** (0.02) 
CDS 10YR -0.0316** (0.01) -0.0292** (0.01) 
IBK 3M -0.0006 (0.00) -0.0006 (0.00) 
Stocks-all 0.0071** (0.00) 0.0065* (0.00) 
Stocks-Fin&Indust 0.0055**  (0.00)    0.0051**  (0.00)    
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Notes:  
a) Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) The table shows the pass-through of domestic monetary policy to the (Rand/USD) exchange rate, 5 and 10 year 
sovereign yields, 5 and 10 year CDS, 3 month interbank rate, JSE all shares index, and JSE Financial & Industrial 
shares index.  
 
Notes:  
a) Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) The table shows the impact of Fed QE1 on (Rand/USD) exchange rate, 5 and 10 year sovereign yields, 5 and 
10 year CDS, 3 month interbank rate, JSE all shares index, and JSE Financial & Industrial shares index.  
 
Notes:  
a) Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) The table shows the impact of Fed Tapering on (Rand/USD) exchange rate, 5 and 10 year sovereign yields, 5 
and 10 year CDS, 3 month interbank rate, JSE all shares index, and JSE Financial & Industrial shares index.  
 
Notes:  
a) Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) The table shows the impact of all unconventional ECB policies on (Rand/USD) exchange rate, 5 and 10 year 
sovereign yields, 5 and 10 year CDS, 3 month interbank rate, JSE all shares index, and JSE Financial & Industrial 
shares index.  
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Table 6.5: IH Regressions (IV & GMM); Impact of ECB UMP (Asset 
Purchases) on various asset returns 
 
IV 
 
GMM 
 
ER Rand to USD -0.1470** (0.07) -0.1449** (0.07) 
Yields 5YR -0.0850** (0.03) -0.0833** (0.04) 
Yields 10YR -0.0774** (0.03) -0.0760** (0.04) 
CDS 5YR -0.3039** (0.12) -0.2987** (0.14) 
CDS 10YR -0.2649** (0.11) -0.2606** (0.12) 
IBK 3M -0.0001 (0.00) -0.0001 (0.00) 
Stocks-all 0.0723** (0.03) 0.0710** (0.03) 
Stocks-Fin&Indust 0.0526**  (0.02)   0.0517**  (0.02)    
 
Table 6.6: IH Regressions (IV & GMM); Impact of ECB UMP (Liquidity 
Provisions) on various asset returns 
 
IV 
 
GMM 
 
ER Rand to USD -0.1470** (0.07) -0.1449** (0.07) 
Yields 5YR -0.0850** (0.03) -0.0833** (0.04) 
Yields 10YR -0.0774** (0.03) -0.0760** (0.04) 
CDS 5YR -0.3039** (0.12) -0.2987** (0.14) 
CDS 10YR -0.2649** (0.11) -0.2606** (0.12) 
IBK 3M -0.0001 (0.00) -0.0001 (0.00) 
Stocks-all 0.0723** (0.03) 0.0710** (0.03) 
Stocks-Fin&Indust 0.0526**  (0.02)   0.0517**  (0.02)    
 
 
Table 6.7: IH Regressions (IV & GMM); Impact of ECB UMP 
(Collateral Easing) on various asset returns 
 
IV 
 
GMM 
 
ER Rand to USD -0.1470** (0.07) -0.1449** (0.07) 
Yields 5YR -0.0850** (0.03) -0.0833** (0.04) 
Yields 10YR -0.0774** (0.03) -0.0760** (0.04) 
CDS 5YR -0.3039** (0.12) -0.2987** (0.14) 
CDS 10YR -0.2649** (0.11) -0.2606** (0.12) 
IBK 3M -0.0001 (0.00) -0.0001 (0.00) 
Stocks-all 0.0723** (0.03) 0.0710** (0.03) 
Stocks-Fin&Indust 0.0526**  (0.02)    0.0517**  (0.02)   
 
  
Table 6.8: IH Regressions (IV & GMM); Impact of ECB UMP (FWG) 
on various asset returns 
 
IV 
 
GMM 
 
ER Rand to USD -0.0203*** (0.00) -0.0178 (0.03) 
Yields 5YR -0.0217** (0.01) -0.0314 (0.03) 
Yields 10YR -0.0087 (0.01) -0.0181 (0.03) 
CDS 5YR -0.0275 (0.03) -0.0183 (0.08) 
CDS 10YR -0.0146 (0.03) 0.0008 (0.05) 
IBK 3M -0.0002 (0.00) 0.0000 (0.00) 
Stocks-all 0.0217* (0.01) 0.0351 (0.04) 
Stocks-Fin&Indust 0.0199**  (0.01)    0.0314    (0.04)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Notes:  
a) Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) The table shows the impact of ECB’s Asset Purchases program on (Rand/USD) exchange rate, 5 and 10 year 
sovereign yields, 5 and 10 year CDS, 3 month interbank rate, JSE all shares index, and JSE Financial & Industrial 
shares index.  
 
Notes:  
a) Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) The table shows the impact of ECB’s Liquidity Provision program on (Rand/USD) exchange rate, 5 and 10 year 
sovereign yields, 5 and 10 year CDS, 3 month interbank rate, JSE all shares index, and JSE Financial & Industrial 
shares index.  
 
Notes:  
a) Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) The table shows the impact of ECB’s Collateral Easing program on (Rand/USD) exchange rate, 5 and 10 year 
sovereign yields, 5 and 10 year CDS, 3 month interbank rate, JSE all shares index, and JSE Financial & Industrial 
shares index.  
 
Notes:  
a) Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) The table shows the impact of ECB’s Forward Guidance policy on (Rand/USD) exchange rate, 5 and 10 year 
sovereign yields, 5 and 10 year CDS, 3 month interbank rate, JSE all shares index, and JSE Financial & Industrial 
shares index.  
 
140 
 
Table 6.9: IH Regressions (IV & GMM); Impact of ECB UMP (OMT) 
on various asset returns 
 
IV 
 
GMM 
 
ER Rand to USD -0.0216*** (0.00) -0.0137* (0.01) 
Yields 5YR -0.0127*** (0.00) -0.0083 (0.01) 
Yields 10YR -0.0103** (0.00) -0.0060 (0.00) 
CDS 5YR -0.0409** (0.02) -0.0199 (0.01) 
CDS 10YR -0.0360** (0.02) -0.0191 (0.01) 
IBK 3M 0.0000 (0.00) 0.0000 (0.00) 
Stocks-all 0.0119** (0.01) 0.0084*** (0.00) 
Stocks-Fin&Indust 0.0086*   (0.00)    0.0059*** (0.00)    
 
Table 6.10: IH Regressions (IV & GMM); Impact of ECB UMP (FOR) 
on various asset returns 
 
IV 
 
GMM 
 
ER Rand to USD -0.0338*** (0.01) -0.0314*** (0.01) 
Yields 5YR -0.0164*** (0.01) -0.0154** (0.01) 
Yields 10YR -0.0163*** (0.01) -0.0154*** (0.01) 
CDS 5YR -0.0829*** (0.03) -0.0788*** (0.03) 
CDS 10YR -0.0760*** (0.02) -0.0725*** (0.02) 
IBK 3M -0.0028** (0.00) -0.0028** (0.00) 
Stocks-all 0.0190*** (0.01) 0.0182*** (0.01) 
Stocks-Fin&Indust 0.0150*** (0.00)    0.0144*** (0.00)    
 
Table 6.11: IH Regressions (IV & GMM); Impact of ECB UMP (SMP) 
on various asset returns 
 
IV 
 
GMM 
 
ER Rand to USD -0.1001 (0.07) -0.1018 (0.07) 
Yields 5YR -0.0586* (0.04) -0.0592* (0.03) 
Yields 10YR -0.0523 (0.03) -0.0529 (0.03) 
CDS 5YR -0.2457** (0.12) -0.2489** (0.12) 
CDS 10YR -0.2221** (0.11) -0.2247** (0.11) 
IBK 3M -0.0002 (0.00) -0.0002 (0.00) 
Stocks-all 0.0413 (0.03) 0.0421 (0.03) 
Stocks-Fin&Indust 0.0310    (0.02)    0.0317    (0.02)    
 
 Table 6.12: IH Regressions (IV & GMM); Impact of ECB UMP (CBPP) 
on various asset returns 
 
IV 
 
GMM 
 
ER Rand to USD -0.0174*** (0.00) -0.0239** (0.01) 
Yields 5YR -0.0084** (0.00) -0.0108* (0.01) 
Yields 10YR -0.0075** (0.00) -0.0099** (0.00) 
CDS 5YR -0.0525*** (0.01) -0.0822* (0.04) 
CDS 10YR -0.0445*** (0.01) -0.0702* (0.04) 
IBK 3M 0.0006 (0.00) 0.0002 (0.00) 
Stocks-all 0.0027 (0.00) 0.0132 (0.01) 
Stocks-Fin&Indust 0.0029    (0.00)    0.0126    (0.01)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  
a) Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) The table shows the impact of ECB’s OMT policy on (Rand/USD) exchange rate, 5 and 10 year sovereign 
yields, 5 and 10 year CDS, 3 month interbank rate, JSE all shares index, and JSE Financial & Industrial shares 
index.  
 
Notes:  
a) Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) The table shows the impact of ECB’s FOR policy on (Rand/USD) exchange rate, 5 and 10 year sovereign yields, 
5 and 10 year CDS, 3 month interbank rate, JSE all shares index, and JSE Financial & Industrial shares index.  
 
Notes:  
a) Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) The table shows the impact of ECB’s SMP policy on (Rand/USD) exchange rate, 5 and 10 year sovereign yields, 
5 and 10 year CDS, 3 month interbank rate, JSE all shares index, and JSE Financial & Industrial shares index.  
 
Notes:  
a) Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) The table shows the impact of ECB’s CBPP policy on (Rand/USD) exchange rate, 5 and 10 year sovereign 
yields, 5 and 10 year CDS, 3 month interbank rate, JSE all shares index, and JSE Financial & Industrial shares 
index.  
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Table 6.13: IH Regressions (IV & GMM); Impact of ECB UMP (LTRO) 
on various asset returns 
 
IV 
 
GMM 
 
ER Rand to USD -0.0112*** (0.00) -0.0086*** (0.00) 
Yields 5YR -0.0078*** (0.00) -0.0065*** (0.00) 
Yields 10YR -0.0082*** (0.00) -0.0076*** (0.00) 
CDS 5YR -0.0208*** (0.01) -0.0177 (0.02) 
CDS 10YR -0.0189*** (0.01) -0.0159 (0.02) 
IBK 3M 0.0004 (0.00) 0.0004 (0.00) 
Stocks-all 0.0069*** (0.00) 0.0095* (0.01) 
Stocks-Fin&Indust 0.0042**  (0.00)    0.0075*   (0.00)    
 
Table 6.14: IH Regressions (IV & GMM); Impact of ECB UMP (PSPP) 
on various asset returns 
 
IV 
 
GMM 
 
ER Rand to USD -0.0122*** (0.00) -0.0002 (0.01) 
Yields 5YR -0.0081** (0.00) -0.0037 (0.01) 
Yields 10YR -0.0095*** (0.00) -0.0061 (0.01) 
CDS 5YR -0.0210 (0.01) 0.0053 (0.03) 
CDS 10YR -0.0174 (0.01) 0.0047 (0.03) 
IBK 3M 0.0005 (0.00) 0.0006 (0.00) 
Stocks-all 0.0062 (0.00) -0.0027 (0.01) 
Stocks-Fin&Indust 0.0042    (0.00)    -0.0029    (0.01)    
 
 
7. Variance ratios: Fed & ECB event dates vs. non-event dates 
Table 7.1: Standard Deviation and Variance Ratio for various assets - 
GFC 
period GFC Non-GFC Variance Ratio (GFC to Non-GFC) 
ER Rand to USD 0.011 0.010 1.04* 
ER Rand to Euro 0.010 0.010 0.94*** 
Yields 5YR 0.013 0.008 1.61*** 
Yields 10YR 0.012 0.007 1.56*** 
IBK 3M 0.005 0.005 0.90*** 
Stocks-all 0.012 0.012 1.08*** 
Stocks-Fin&Indust 0.011 0.010 1.04* 
Note: The table compares daily returns on various South African assets during the period 
of Global financial crisis (Jan 2007 onwards) with period before (Jan 2000 to Dec-2006) 
 
 Table 7.2: Standard Deviation and Variance Ratio for various assets - 
Fed QE 
period QE1 Non-QE1 Variance Ratio (QE1 to Non-QE1) 
ER Rand to USD 0.023 0.011 2.09*** 
ER Rand to Euro 0.016 0.009 1.69** 
Yields 5YR 0.015 0.013 1.180 
Yields 10YR 0.013 0.012 1.082 
CDS 5YR 0.058 0.038 1.54* 
CDS 10YR 0.058 0.035 1.66* 
IBK 3M 0.003 0.005 0.662 
Stocks-all 0.041 0.012 3.32*** 
Stocks-Fin&Indust 0.019 0.011 1.80** 
Note: The table compares daily returns on various South African assets during the Fed QE1 
announcement days with Non-Announcement days; this includes days post jan-1, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Notes:  
a) Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) The table shows the impact of ECB’s LTRO policy on (Rand/USD) exchange rate, 5 and 10 year sovereign 
yields, 5 and 10 year CDS, 3 month interbank rate, JSE all shares index, and JSE Financial & Industrial shares 
index.  
 
Notes:  
a) Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
b) The table shows the impact of ECB’s PSPP policy on (Rand/USD) exchange rate, 5 and 10 year sovereign 
yields, 5 and 10 year CDS, 3 month interbank rate, JSE all shares index, and JSE Financial & Industrial shares 
index.  
 
142 
 
Table 7.3: Standard Deviation and Variance Ratio for various assets - 
Tapering 
period Taper Non-Taper Variance Ratio (Taper to Non-Taper) 
ER Rand to USD 0.011 0.011 1.020 
ER Rand to Euro 0.010 0.010 1.028 
Yields 5YR 0.016 0.013 1.219 
Yields 10YR 0.011 0.012 0.979 
CDS 5YR 0.026 0.038 0.70 
CDS 10YR 0.011 0.035 0.31** 
Stocks-all 0.003 0.013 0.23*** 
Stocks-Fin&Indust 0.004 0.011 0.41* 
Note: The table compares daily returns on various South African assets during the Fed QE 
Tapering announcement days with Non-Announcement days. 
Table 7.4: Standard Deviation and Variance Ratio for various assets - 
Fed CMP 
period Fed CMP Non-Fed 
CMP 
Variance Ratio (Fed CMP to 
Non-Fed CMP) 
ER Rand to USD 0.026 0.011 2.41*** 
ER Rand to Euro 0.020 0.009 2.11*** 
Yields 5YR 0.010 0.013 0.787 
Yields 10YR 0.010 0.012 0.894 
CDS 5YR 0.055 0.038 1.444 
CDS 10YR 0.225 0.033 6.73*** 
IBK 3M 0.002 0.005 0.42*** 
Stocks-all 0.023 0.012 1.86*** 
Stocks-Fin&Indust 0.014 0.011 1.318 
Note: The table compares daily returns on various South African assets during the Fed 
conventional monetary policy, CMP, announcement days with Non-Announcement days. 
  
Table 7.5: Standard Deviation and Variance Ratio for various assets - 
Fed UMP 
period Fed UMP Non-Fed UMP Variance Ratio (Fed UMP 
to Non-Fed UMP) 
ER Rand to USD 0.011 0.011 1.021 
ER Rand to Euro 0.010 0.010 1.028 
Yields 5YR 0.016 0.013 1.219 
Yields 10YR 0.011 0.012 0.979 
CDS 5YR 0.026 0.038 0.696 
CDS 10YR 0.011 0.035 0.31** 
Stocks-all 0.003 0.013 0.23*** 
Stocks-Fin&Indust 0.004 0.011 0.41* 
Note: The table compares daily returns on various South African assets during the Fed 
unconventional monetary policy, UMP, announcement days with Non-Announcement days 
 Table 7.6: Standard Deviation and Variance Ratio for various assets - 
Fed FOMC 
period Fed FOMC Non-Fed 
FOMC 
Variance Ratio (Fed FOMC 
to Non-Fed FOMC) 
ER Rand to USD 0.014 0.011 1.32* 
ER Rand to Euro 0.012 0.009 1.231 
Yields 5YR 0.014 0.013 1.107 
Yields 10YR 0.012 0.012 1.029 
CDS 5YR 0.033 0.038 0.87 
CDS 10YR 0.031 0.035 0.88 
IBK 3M 0.002 0.005 0.395 
Stocks-all 0.018 0.012 1.46*** 
Stocks-Fin&Indust 0.011 0.011 0.984 
Note: The table compares daily returns on various South African assets during the Fed 
Federal Open Market Committee, FOMC, meeting days with Non-meeting days 
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Table 7.7: Standard Deviation and Variance Ratio for various assets - 
ECB CMP  
period ECB CMP Non-ECB 
CMP 
Variance Ratio (ECB CMP 
to Non-ECB CMP) 
ER Rand to USD 0.017 0.011 1.55*** 
ER Rand to Euro 0.016 0.009 1.71*** 
Yields 5YR 0.024 0.013 1.875 
Yields 10YR 0.021 0.011 1.84*** 
CDS 5YR 0.031 0.035 0.88 
CDS 10YR 0.127 0.034 3.80*** 
IBK 3M 0.002 0.005 0.47*** 
Stocks-all 0.019 0.012 1.50*** 
Stocks-Fin&Indust 0.014 0.011 1.30* 
Note: The table compares daily returns on various South African assets during the ECB 
conventional monetary policy, CMP, announcement days with Non-Announcement days. 
Table 7.8: Standard Deviation and Variance Ratio for various assets - 
ECB UMP 
period ECB UMP Non-ECB 
UMP 
Variance Ratio (ECB UMP to 
Non-ECB UMP) 
ER Rand to USD 0.014 0.011 1.34*** 
ER Rand to Euro 0.013 0.009 1.44*** 
Yields 5YR 0.009 0.013 0.72*** 
Yields 10YR 0.009 0.012 0.73*** 
CDS 5YR 0.076 0.036 2.13*** 
CDS 10YR 0.087 0.035 2.73*** 
IBK 3M 0.008 0.005 1.79*** 
Stocks-all 0.019 0.012 1.58*** 
Stocks-Fin&Indust 0.015 0.011 1.44*** 
Note: The table compares daily returns on various South African assets during the ECB 
unconventional monetary policy, UMP, announcement days with Non-Announcement days. 
 
Table 7.9: Stand. Dev. and Variance Ratio for various assets - ECB 
Gov.Council. 
period ECB Gov. 
Council 
Meeting 
Non-ECB 
Gov. 
Council 
Meeting 
Variance Ratio (ECB Gov. 
Council Meeting to Non-
ECB Gov. Council Meeting) 
ER Rand to USD 0.011 0.011 0.981 
ER Rand to Euro 0.011 0.009 1.61* 
Yields 5YR 0.023 0.013 1.85*** 
Yields 10YR 0.021 0.011 1.88*** 
CDS 5YR 0.030 0.038 0.79** 
CDS 10YR 0.026 0.035 0.724*** 
IBK 3M 0.001 0.005 0.30*** 
Stocks-all 0.013 0.012 1.053 
Stocks-Fin&Indust 0.011 0.011 1.020 
Note: The table compares daily returns on various South African assets during the ECB 
Governing Council meeting days with Non-meeting days. 
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Chapter 5: General Conclusion 
 
The essay has presented three analytical chapters that discuss the problems of debt 
sustainability, financial crisis and the role of external monetary shocks to the stability of 
developing countries. This conclusive chapter summarizes the key exercises, findings and 
contributions of the three chapters — together with some policy lessons. 
Chapter 2 has based itself on the argument that ‘unsustainable’ debt burdens play a negative 
role on the growth prospects of developing countries. Many studies conducted on the topic have 
also arrived at this conclusion and usually set a benchmark that would serve as a sustainability 
threshold (Schclarek, 2004; Caner et al., 2010; Greenidge et al., 2012; Panizza and Presbitero, 
2013).81 The literature, however, largely fails to address the overall heterogeneity in developing 
countries, while setting these debt sustainability benchmarks. Particularly, the gaps among 
developing countries with regards to institutional quality is often overlooked. Thus, in addition 
to the focus on the non-linear impacts of public debt on growth, the paper makes a contribution 
by highlighting the role of institutions (specifically those of public sector management quality). 
We focus on public sector management quality since we are dealing with public debt and the 
former is an evident determinant. The chapter has particularly focused on how governments 
with divergent public sector management capacity may see a diverse nexus between public debt 
and economic growth. And even when the relationship is similar for countries with different 
quality of institutions, the level of debt that would make it ‘unsustainable’ could differ - in favor 
of countries with better institutional quality. 
Going to the results, although a linear and straightforward look at the data backs the 
hypothesized negative relationship between indebtedness and economic growth, deeper looks at 
the data reveal non-linarites related to the quality of institutions.82 Most importantly, we notice 
that what would be deemed as a sustainable level of debt in one country (e.g. a country with 
efficient public sector, strong revenue mobilization capacity, and low level of corruption) may 
not be sustainable for another county (e.g. a country with weak institutional quality).  
The debt-growth nexus also shows some sensitivity to the level of debt. The argument for non-
linear effects of sovereign indebtedness on growth has been captured in the literature of the 
‘debt-laffer curve’ (Krugman, 1989; Claessens, 1990; Megersa, 2015). A simple argument is that, 
                                                            
81 Within this literature, the infamous study by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) on public debt in advanced 
economies has argued that countries start to experience negative impacts on growth after a debt-to-GDP 
ratio of 90%. However, their analysis have been criticized for arbitrary setting of thresholds and 
computational issues (Herndon et al., 2013). 
82 When we allow for non-linearity — first) in the cross-country differences of institutional quality and 
second) across different debt levels, we get varying results in the relationship between public debt and 
growth. We witnessed a negative linear debt-growth nexus in the group of countries with ‘weak’ public 
sector management qualities, but not in the group of developing countries with ‘strong’ public sector 
management. This result also persists on alternative country clusters formed using robust procedures and 
also using disaggregated indices of public sector management instead of aggregate indices. 
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developing countries lack both key infrastructures that would serve as engines of growth and the 
capital which could finance such operations (i.e. they need ‘development finance’). Initial 
investments in key projects and strategic sectors would also have bigger marginal productivity 
contributions to their economy. However, borrowing too much (beyond the repayment 
capacities) makes them susceptible to debt crisis. Further, ‘too much too fast’ debt fueled public 
investments could also make the marginal contribution of investments low and redundant. The 
gains are further reduced in the context of poor institutions, low transparency and high 
prevalence of corruption in developing countries (Eden and Kraay, 2014). An interesting outcome 
of this non-linearity exercise (based on levels of debt) has been that developing countries with 
better public sector management tend to experience the detrimental impacts of public debt at 
relatively higher levels — when compared to other developing countries with weaker public 
sector management quality. 
The overall policy implication (and aim of the paper) is that, the discussion on the negative 
effects of public debt in developing countries should pay attention to the issue of country 
heterogeneity. Institutional determinants are known to be important but are frequently ignored.83 
Further, the chapter also tries to re-orient some attention to the problems of public debt in 
developing countries in a period where the major focus has shifted to advanced countries (with 
historically much higher levels of debt-to-GDP). The fact that many developing countries are 
again witnessing rapidly rising public debt levels (often due to large government loans in the 
name of big public projects) only adds to the timeliness of the issue at hand. For instance, the 
joint IMF’s debt sustainability analysis (DSA) puts a number of low-income countries in 
(‘red/Yellow’ categories), signaling growing public debt distress (IMF, 2016a). 
In chapter 3, I studied the predictive power of key macroeconomic variables towards incidents 
of currency crisis using signals approach.84 By defining currency crisis episodes as extreme 
movements in the exchange market pressure index, the approach makes a non-parametric ex-
post study in to the behavior of key macroeconomic variables, in the immediate periods preceding 
identified crisis incidents.85 
The analysis determines three key episodes of currency crisis in Ethiopia (1992-93, 1999, and 
2008). The first crisis displayed relatively higher out-of-sample crisis probabilities, when 
compared to the latter two crisis. On the basis of the noise-to-signal ratio rule, M2 multiplier, 
bank deposits, exports, terms of trade, deviation of real ER from trend and lending-deposit rate 
                                                            
83 Institutional aspects are often left out from empirical excercises for ease of analysis. Employing them 
usually introduces certain complexities — with respect to difficulty of measurement and lack of data. 
84 The approach was introduced by Kaminsky et al. (1998) at the start of the Asian financial crisis that 
brought severe currency crisis to a number of emerging countries in East Asia. As a third generation 
currency crisis model, it builds up on older two generations of currency crisis models. See section 1 of 
chapter 3 for more. 
85 The changes in exchange market pressure index (EMPI) primarily depend on the movements of its two 
key components, namely exchange rate movements and accumulation of foreign reserves.  
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ratio were good indicators which displayed significantly ‘abnormal’ movements prior to currency 
crisis events in Ethiopia.  
Based on these results, I would like to make two important points, which could well be key 
lessons for early warning methodologies and their applications. The first has to do with the role 
of ‘political shocks’ and the other with the role of ‘external financial shocks’. First, key political 
shocks and structural reforms could have an impact and might even become crisis triggers. This 
could be clearly seen from the 1992-93 crisis which was a period of significant structural reform 
in the economy and the 1999 crisis which overlaps Ethiopia’s border skirmish with Eritrea. The 
important lesson driven from this is that, crisis could arise - not necessarily from weakening 
macroeconomic fundamentals (as is often done in financial early warning methodologies) - but 
also from significant political shocks. Analysis of crisis episodes in developing countries should 
especially take this in to account. This becomes even more valid considering that political shocks 
are big and more frequent in low-income (and sometimes emerging) developing countries than 
in advanced economies.  
However, one could also argue that some of the macroeconomic indicators could capture these 
political shocks that are not directly accounted for by the ‘early warning exercises’. For instance, 
in the recent Russian currency crisis (2014-15), it took some time for the effects of the political 
crisis to have visible impact on the wider economy. As the economy gradually started facing 
capital flight, declining trade, speculative attacks, rapid reserve losses, rising inflation, and loss 
of confidence; a fully blown crisis was witnessed (Dabrowski, 2016). Thus, perhaps, the 
significance of these political shocks might as well be captured by the simultaneous shock on key 
macroeconomic indicators to some extent.   
Going to the second point, Ethiopia’s loose connection to the world economy in general and to 
global capital markets in particular, lead me to assume that international shocks do not play a 
direct key role to its vulnerability. However, I still do not rule out their possible indirect role. 
Especially the shocks that are global in nature tend to have ripple effects on international trade, 
foreign direct investments, global interest rate differentials, remittance based international 
capital flows, aid flows, etc. This is perhaps evident in the results, as some of the crisis events 
could be roughly matched to concurrent financial turmoil in world economy (e.g. 1992–93 crisis 
of European Exchange Rate Mechanism; 1997-99 Asian financial crisis; 2008-09 global financial 
crisis). Examining the exact impact of these events and channels of transmission is, however, 
something I leave for future research. 
A useful improvement of financial early warning systems may also start with the inclusion of 
more indicators from the real and financial sectors that have better capacity of detecting the 
transmission of external shocks. This becomes ever more important given the growing 
internationalization of financial crisis contagion.86 This would particularly become useful in 
countries that are relatively more connected with the global economy and international capital 
                                                            
86 Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) provide a broad list of indicators that may better enable the detection 
of financial crisis in the setting of international contagion. 
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market, thus, are more likely to face the impacts of such shocks. In fact, the discussion in the 
next chapter walks across these lines by analyzing the impacts of external (monetary policy) 
shocks on South Africa. With mounting evidence of international transmission of financial 
shocks, key financial institutions such as the IMF are emphasizing the need to focus on 
multilateral surveillance techniques for crisis (IMF, 2016b).  
However, given the poor performance of existing (even the most complex) ‘early warning 
systems’ and repeated failures to foresee a number of past crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009), I 
do not recommend that monetary authorities of developing countries should solely rely on these 
tools. Yet, at the minimum, they can be instruments that can warn when ‘known anomalies’ are 
seen in the economy - that may potentially progress to a crisis. Having a guideline, even if half 
perfect, is still better than not having one. Further, having a tool (such as the approach we 
utilized) that looks at multiple key macroeconomic variables, and sectors, often does a better 
job of ‘early warning’. This is particularly helpful as different crisis may come from weaknesses 
in different sectors, and those areas of weaknesses may differ from one period to another and 
from one country to another. This makes the learning process daunting, as future crisis may 
have origins that are different from those in the past. 
Yet, in the end - there are no ‘overnight’ currency, debt, banking or other forms of financial 
crises. There are often signs that are overlooked by the experts (economists, monetary 
authorities, analysts, governments, etc.) before a crisis emerges. Even looking at the great global 
recession of 2008-09, there were signs that were unfortunately ignored. Banks were taking too 
much risk, the housing sector (at least in the US) was in a bubble, there were alarming 
disconnects between the real and financial sector, and there were highly skewed trade balances 
among major economies, just to mention a few indicators. Nevertheless, it takes a rare capacity 
(not necessarily a ‘Raghuram Rajan’)87 to connect these dots and argue that things are not 
normal. Especially when what is ‘normal’ is not objective and static but evolves over time and 
becomes a ‘new normal’. Even more so difficult, when the existing consensus among ‘experts’ 
goes against predictions of crisis — “Crisis? What crisis?” 
At the conclusion of chapter 3, I noted that developing countries (especially the ones that have 
relatively established financial sectors and have strong links to international capital markets) 
should pay more attention to the roles of shocks emanating from the outside. Indeed, this 
‘warning note’ will become relevant to a growing number of developing countries, as many of 
them are establishing (or expanding) their capital markets. As their local financial markets 
mature, developing countries will have ever increasing ties to the flow of global capital.  
                                                            
87 One of the few ‘famous’ predictions of the global financial crisis was by Raghuram Rajan, who at the 
moment was ‘Economic Counsellor’ and Director of the IMF's Research Department on Financial Markets, 
Financial Fragility, and Central Banking. “The Greenspan Era: Lessons for the Future” (Saturday, August 
27, 2005) Jackson Hole, Wyoming, US.  
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp082705 
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Chapter 4 tries to make a contribution to the research on problems linked to external financial 
shocks - by studying the spillovers from the recent unconventional monetary policies of the Fed 
and ECB. It analyzes the unintended impacts of these shocks on the returns (dynamics) of 
various South African assets, e.g. currency, bond yields, credit default swap, interbank market 
rate, and stock market. Since the study wants to investigate the impact of monetary policy 
announcements (surprises) from two of the world’s biggest central banks - and since the 
transmission of the impact of such policies on global financial markets are ‘immediate’ (Rey, 
2014; Bowman et al., 2014; Fatum and Scholnick, 2007), the chapter employs high frequency 
daily data.  
Going to the results, we see significant evidence for the presence of spillovers from the key 
unconventional monetary policies of the Fed and ECB. For instance, announcements of the large 
scale asset purchase program (QE) of the Federal Reserve generally led to the  appreciation of 
the South African currency, reduction in sovereign bond yields (especially during QE1), credit 
default swaps, reductions in interbank rate, and gains by the stock market. The announcements 
regarding the tapering (gradually stopping) of Fed's asset purchase programs essentially 
displayed the reverse effects of the asset purchase programs. It led to the depreciation of the 
rand, rise in CDS, increase in interbank rate, and decline in key stock market indices. 
Just like the non-standard monetary policies of the Fed, the policy instruments followed by the 
ECB also had spillovers on various South African assets. Overall, the announcements of ECB’s 
‘asset purchases’ policies (e.g. ‘Securities Markets Program’, ‘Outright Monetary Transactions’, 
‘Covered Bond Purchases Programs’) were followed by appreciation of the rand, falling sovereign 
bond yields as well as CDS, and a rise in stock market indices. Further, the ‘liquidity provision’ 
policy (e.g. ‘Fixed Rate Tenders With Full Allotment’, ‘Long-Term Refinancing Operations’, 
‘Foreign Currency Funding’) and the ‘collateral easing’ programs (mainly comprising of ‘Asset-
Backed Securities’) also had qualitatively similar impact to ECB’s asset purchases programs, 
although the significance of the programs (and their specific instruments) had not been seen on 
all assets and also depended on the specification of the regressions used.  
One key asset investigated, and was often insulated from ECB’s key policy announcements, was 
the South African (3-month) money market rate. The results show an overall weak evidence for 
the ‘international bank lending’ channel between Eurozone and South Africa. From a diverse 
set of ECB’s unconventional monetary tools, the instruments that shows a significant impact on 
the money market rate was the ‘foreign currency funding’ policy, which is part of ECB’s 
‘liquidity provision’ program. This instrument made large provision of foreign currencies 
(primarily US dollars but also other currencies) to banks in the Eurozone via liquidity swap 
arrangements with the US Fed and national central banks across Europe. 
The results are generally in line with expectations - on the basis of how large scale asset purchase 
programs by the world's biggest central banks should affect other economies that tend to see 
significant capital inflows as a result. Conversely, the monetary policy tightening and the end of 
these policies reverses the flow of capital back to advanced economies. As discussed in the 
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chapter, this form of capital flow operates on a number of important transmission channels (e.g. 
international portfolio rebalancing, confidence, and credit channels). Through these channels, 
the effects of the asset purchase programs get transmitted to other (substitute) countries, where 
alternative assets that are targets for international investors could be found. For instance, the 
asset purchase programs such as QE and SMP end up boosting the confidence not only in their 
intended markets (i.e. the US and Eurozone capital market) but also international capital 
markets. Further, the prices of assets directly targeted by these unconventional monetary 
instruments will not be the only ones to be affected. Almost instantaneously, the prices of 
alternative assets at home (i.e. US and Eurozone) markets and also overseas capital markets will 
start to respond on the basis of international portfolio rebalancing channel - as investors redirect 
their capital from less lucrative (low yield) home market to overseas assets with significant 
returns, once they factor in risk factors overseas.  
Further, the combination of the asset purchases and liquidity provisions programs with explicit 
policy signaling instruments (such as ‘Forward Guidance’), enables markets to get clear ‘policy 
signals’ that central banks are committed to keeping rates low, banks capitalized, and economic 
activities high. Low central bank policy rates backed by a QE will send a much ‘clearer’ signal 
that the central bank will not easily reverse this policy, as it will be costly to do so - due to 
balance sheet exposures.88  
To conclude, we observe clear evidence of spillovers from the so called ‘unconventional’ monetary 
policies adopted by the Fed and ECB as response to diverse forms of financial crisis witnessed 
since the recent ‘Great Recession’. Yet, a detailed look at individual monetary policy instrument 
yields different results in terms of the impact and significance on individual South African 
financial assets examined by the chapter. 
The chapter has used South Africa as a case study because it's an emerging economy with fairly 
developed domestic financial market and strong links to international capital markets. However, 
the findings could be relevant for other African countries which, in turn, have strong links to 
the South African economy (especially those in the southern African region).  South Africa is a 
key player in the region by being a source of capital and an important trade partner. In fact, 
the country serves as an entry point for international capital to the wider sub-Saharan Africa 
region. Many South African banks and financial institutions as well as retail, telecom, 
construction, mining, etc. companies operate in many African countries. Therefore, the direct 
transmission of international monetary shocks to the country could have an indirect effect (or 
relevance) on neighboring countries with strong links to its economy. 
The motivation of the chapter — apart from examining the vulnerability of small and financially 
open developing economies to external financial shocks — is the problem that monetary policy 
conducts of world's major central banks, especially the ‘experimental’ non-standard policies, 
have 'unintended' consequences for developing economies. It is often customary to talk about 
                                                            
88 A sudden rate hike will be costly to a central bank that purchased significant quantity of assets under 
unsteralized asset purchase programs such as QE. 
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the ‘contagion’ of financial crisis (e.g. GFC) that originate in developed countries and move on 
to affect developing countries. However, the policy 'remedies' designed to deal with the crisis 
could themselves have downside risks for developing countries. The design and implementation 
of these policies largely accounted only for the impact on the respective domestic economies of 
the US and Eurozone, and not the wider world. Therefore, the additional objective of this chapter 
(and this line of research) is delivering caution to the policy makers and monetary authorities in 
advanced economies to carefully analyze the diverse potential impacts (intended and unintended) 
of new policy instruments, before they are implemented. 
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